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
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
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TO

A Tory-Member.

Bella geri placuit nullos habitura triumphos.

The Second Edition.

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. Baldwin, near the Oxford-Arms
in Warwick-Lane. 1711.

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Nov. 23, 1710.

SIR,

AS little as I love Scandal, whatever side it comes from, I have prevail'd with my self, in Obedience to your Commands, to run over the Bundle you sent me; and knowing you to be a Person of that Integrity and Honour, as to have more regard to Truth than Party, I will without more Ceremony give you my Thoughts as you desire, upon such Parts of them as relate to the Management of the War, which I hope you will find not to be the less true or just for the Haste they are writ in; for plain Truths need no Disguise; Fiction and Ornament are of no Advantage, but when they serve a Cause, that can't bear to be seen in its true Light. This I hope will be Excuse enough, for the many Marks of Haste and Negligence you will meet with in this long Letter.

You won't expect I should consider each of these Papers by themselves, that would be giving too much trouble to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of so much Consequence; *The Letter to the Examiner* is a mere Declamation, and consider'd in that View is a pretty smart Performance, and you may read it to be entertain'd, but not to be inform'd; there is some Fire and Imagination,

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but

but no Reasoning, Judgment or Experience, plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in time ripen into something considerable, and come up to the Author of *Arlus and Odolphus*, which is the Fiction of a more able Writer, and has the Beauties of a tolerable Romance; and to shew the Skill of the Author, is very happily call'd a *Secret History*; which is a Cover for all the Eyes the Father of them can invent, since that Name immediately forbids all asking of Questions; for were the Proofs to be produc'd, where would be the Secret? I can't say, I was so well pleas'd with Sir *Thomas*, which I found so dull and tedious, 'twas impossible to get thro' it, there is, by all I could see, neither Decorum nor Argument, nor Life in it; the Author shews he was sadly put to it for Matter, when he is forc'd, to make up his Invective, to take in the Compass of 22 Years, the fatal Period some among us are so angry with, that is 18 more, than the present Change is concern'd in; for 'tis but four Years at most, that his Principals pretend to think (for think they don't, as I shall shew you by and by) that the Management of Affairs has been wrong. In short, 'tis a stupid unnatural Piece, and what made me more sick of it, I have been told, 'tis as ungrateful as 'tis senseless, writ by a Man, who owes his Bread to those, whom he has with so much Venome drawn his Pen against. I don't know whether you will agree with me, when I tell you, I think the *Letter from a Foreign Minister* the most artful Performance of them all; the rest seem to be the Works of under Agents, from Directions and Hints mark'd out for them; but this I take

to

to be the Work of the chief Operator him self; who, if he was not at leisure to write more largely, has in this short Piece sufficiently shewn; what a Right he has to the Esteem the World have long had for him; there being in it some quick and crafty Turns, and an affected Appearance of Fairness, with which he gilds over the blackest Poison of Malice and *Invention*. You'll see I use that last Word in the modern Sense of it; and in my Mind the whole Letter is well enough contriv'd, to answer its Design; which plainly is, to please Friends, take off Enemies, amuse and quiet all, who are not acquainted with Affairs, nor enter into Parties, but by the new *Scheme* might be apt to be alarm'd. *Faults on both sides* has, to my thinking, a good deal of plain common Sense in it, which Experience has all along justify'd, and I dare say always will. And common Sense at this time of Day, I take to be a great Commendation to a Paper, and that this Writer seldom looses sight of, except where his Cause obliges him to quit it; which it does in several places, but no where more than where he speaks of Credit, all which is as mean, as the late *Essay* upon that Subject; and that I take to be the most affected uncommon mysterious Piece of Nonsense, even this wonderful Year has produc'd.

Taking these Papers together, there is one thing in them, for which I mightily admire the able Architect, under whom they have all been form'd; and that is the Difference of Spirit one sees in them, according to the several sorts of Readers they are intended to impose on. One makes great Court to the

bove three that there is any Dispute about: Till then, all is allow'd to have gone well for certain Reasons, that held good, till about the time, that the *French King* dismiss'd Monsieur *Chamillard* from the Finances, for no other Reason, that I have ever heard, but to show us what we ought to have done here at the same time; and 'twas not the Fault of those, who have play'd their Game better since, that we did not. This was in *February, 1707*, all the Complaints we have heard of the Management of the War, are from the beginning of that Year, but without much Noise till these last six Months. Since then we have been told, every-thing relating to the War is wrong, and are fill'd with loud Clamours of Grievances, which before went abroad in gentle Whispers only, or were not at all heard of. And——

First, They tell us, a Good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramillies* Campaign.

Now to decide this Question, we must first settle what a Good Peace is; and in order to that must consider, what it was we went into the War for. No body wants to be told, that this was chiefly to obtain these two Ends, the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* to the House of *Austria*; and the procuring of a good Barrier against *France* on the side of the *Netherlands*. Without which two Points there can be no Security for *Great-Britain*, that their best Trade will not be lost, and with it their Religion and Government, and every thing that is dear to them; for we should every Minute be in danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery and

and Poverty of *France* forc'd upon us, by the exorbitant Power of that most arbitrary Prince, if he should be suffer'd to strengthen himself with the Addition of that vast Monarchy, who was before much too Great for his Neighbours; to say nothing of the Safety of the *Dutch*, or the Liberty of *Europe*; the last of which most of us, I fear, have little or no Sense of; and for the Safety of the *Dutch*, so fatal a Delusion has possess'd many of us, that one may every Day meet with Men, who are silly enough to wish against it. Now the *Spanish* Monarchy, the Restitution of which is the first Article of the Grand Alliance, is known by every body to consist, besides the *Spanish Netherlands*, of these two great Parts, of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and of *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Isles. And a good Barrier against *France* means at least a better than the *Dutch* had before; which by the Experience of fifty Years has been found to be much too weak for so large a Frontier; the *Spanish Flanders* and its Capital City *Gand*, having in truth no Cover at all; and *Brabant* but a very poor one; while the *French* being intire Masters of the *Lys* and *Schelde*, both Provinces lie expos'd to their Invasions. Look but on some large Maps of these Provinces, such as have been printed of late Years, and your own Eyes will presently convince you of the Truth of this. But if this Restitution and this Barrier were thought necessary at our ent'ring into the War, no body, I presume, will say, they are less necessary now, when so much more has been done to gain these Ends, than any body at the Beginning

ning could ever hope to see. And if these two Points are necessary, then no Peace without them can be a Good Peace. Let us then compare this Good Peace with what the *French* offer'd at the end of the *Ramellies* Campaign; which is so far from being a Secret, that the Letters written to the Maritime Powers by the Elector of *Bavaria*, who was employ'd by the King of *France* to make the first Overture, were immediately communicated to all the Allies, and by their Consent made publick: And who ever will be at the Pains to look back to the News Papers, and Monthly Accounts of that Time, or will consult even the common Yearly Collections, will see there is no Mystry in the Whole of that Affair; which, in short, is no more than this, that the *French* offer'd to give up to the Allies, which of these two they lik'd best, either *Spain* and the *Indies*; or *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily*, &c. Which Offer was unanimously rejected.

I suppose, there is no need of proving, that the Allies ought not to have accepted either Part of this Alternative, it being so short of what upon our Entrance into the War was thought necessary. To have been content with a Moiety of what we went into the War for, after so many Successes, and not a few surprizingly Great, would have rend'ed us inexorable to all Posterity; and some body, who, we are now told, prolongs the War, would have been said to have been well paid for such a Peace; 'twould have been in the Language of the Faction, a plain Case we were sold to *France*, and nothing less than his Head could have

have aton'd for it. But instead of proving the Absurdity of accepting such a Peace, I shall shew you rather, what to every body is not so plain; and that is, that the *French* were not sincere; they meant nothing by their Offer but to amuse the Allies, and knew, they could not all agree to accept either Part of the Alternative, and that *England* and *Holland* without the Emperor could not take *Spain* and the *Indies*, were they never so much inclin'd to it. For had the Allies hearken'd to this Proposal, it had been in the Power of the *French* to have clos'd with which they wou'd. Now 'tis easy to see what this must have ended in: For in such a Partition, there is no doubt, but as the *Dutch* and we should have been for *Spain* and the *Indies*, 'tis as plain, the Emperor would have made the other Part his Choice, which is evidently best for him. Which Part now of the Allies in this Division would *France* be most willing to comply with? or in other Words, which Part of the Monarchy would they chose of the two to quit? A Man must be blind not to see, that the Part the Emperor would like best to have, the same *France* would like best to part with: Behold then the necessary Consequence of heark'ning to such Terms; the Confederacy broken, and the Maritime Powers left to shift for themselves, without being able to obtain either of the Parts, when they ought to be content, according to the Terms of the Grand Alliance, with nothing less than both.

Who now, I would fain know, have most Reason to complain that these Offers were re-

reject, the People of *London* or *Vienna*? They who might have had the Part they had most mind to, if they would have abandon'd their Allies, or we, who 'tis certain, besides the Infamy of so base an Action, could have had nothing? Had the Writers, who are so able at making Something out of Nothing, had their Lot in *Austrian* Ground, what a Field had there been for them? What rare Matter to shew their Skill in? What specious Pretences, without the help of *Secret History*, to give out, that the Emperor was ill advis'd? What reject so advantageous an Offer, by which so great an Addition of real Strength would have been made to the House of *Austria*, and that at a Time, when they were so unable to carry on the War, when the People have been exhausted with continual Wars for more than Thirty Years! When the *Malecontents* are at the Gates of the Capitol! When the King of *Sweden* insults in that outrageous manner, the *Imperial* Dignity, and every Minute threatens an Invasion! Is that a Time to reject so Good a Peace, and hazard the Safety of the Empire in Complement to the Maritime Powers? What wicked Counsellors must these be, who can advise at this rate? Is it not plain they are false, and in some other Interest, or that they mind nothing else but making their own Fortunes, when they act so manifestly against the Welfare and Honour of the *Imperial* Family, and shew they have no Regard to the Safety even of the Empire? Would not this be the Language of the Faction, if the Scene were chang'd from

from *London* to *Vienna*? And yet we don't hear, that either the Emperor or his People, have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Ministers, who would not hearken to those Terms; instead of that, all the World think it much for their Honour, that they have appear'd true to themselves; and faithful to their Allies, in rejecting so pitiful and insecure a Peace.

And is not this a Reproach to us, who suffer our selves to be deluded by such vile Impostors, who would persuade us out of our Senses, that Half the *Spanish* Monarchy is as good as the Whole; and that Nothing is as good as Half. For I have shewn you, that one Half only was offer'd, and that even that could not be had. It must sure, to all Thinking Men, be very surprizing, that we only of all the Allies shou'd complain, that this ridiculous Offer of the *French* was rejected, when we of all of them have most reason to be pleas'd with it: There must needs be some Secret in it above the reach of common Sense, that all of a sudden this shou'd be made a Capital Crime in our Ministers, their not doing Three Years ago that, which if they had done, we should all before now have thought they deserv'd to lose their Heads for.

I believe you begin to be tir'd with this Article, and would be content I should say no more in so plain a Case, after such a Discovery of the Impudence of these State Mountebanks, who would have persuaded us, that we were dangerously ill, when we saw and felt our selves to be very well; and that we

were all undone, if we did not leave the skilful and able Hands we had long us'd with so much Success, to try their boasted Medicines, when we were not in the least want of them. No body; if you will believe them, have such universal Remedies for all the Evils of the State as they; and under this popular Pretence of curing the Nation, they take all the Pains they can to poison it; of which I have already given you one Example; you shall have more in what follows.

But before I dismiss this Subject, I must beg leave to observe one thing farther, which is of too much moment to be pass'd over; and that is, That they who have done their Country so much Service in rejecting this Offer from the *French*, would have done, it still much greater, could they have prevented any Regard being given to it. For tho' the refusing these Terms could do no harm, the hearkning to them I will shew you did a great deal. The Inclination some People of the same Complexion with the Author of the *Secret History*, express'd to come to a Treaty with the *French* upon the Terms offer'd, rais'd in the *Imperial* Court a great Jealousy, that the Maritime Powers were tampering with *France*, and making Terms for themselves, to which the Interest of the House of *Austria* was to be sacrific'd: This put that Court upon Measures that had a fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and occasion'd the two most unfortunate Events that have happen'd all this War. First, This Suspicion made them begin and conclude a Treaty with the *French* for evacuating the

Mila-

Milanese, without the Privity of *England* and *Holland*, who did not know one Word of the Matter: And what do you think was the Consequence of this? Why, it gave the *French* an Opportunity of sending immediately into *Spain* a great Body of good Veteran Troops; and 'tis to this Reinforcement sent the Duke of *Anjou*, that we owe the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, which prov'd so fatal to our Affairs on that Side; if those Troops had not joyn'd, we had been Superior to the Enemy, and that Battle had either not been fought, or it had been won, and *Spain* with it, considering the ill Condition the Duke of *Anjou's* Affairs were then in; and the true Reason we ventur'd that Battle, was to prevent the Junction, which we did not know, or at least did not believe, was made at the Time we fought; a Mistake, we may think, very easily made in *Spain*, when 'tis known, we owe the Victory of *Ramellies* to the *French* making the very same Mistake in *Flanders*, where they thought the *English* had not at that Time joyn'd the Confederate Army, and reckon'd for certain that the *Danes* at least, neither had, nor could: And this Perswasion made them venture a Battle, which the *French* have so much reason to remember, without waiting for a considerable Body of Troops, that were coming to them from the *Rhine*, the Head of which were actually at *Namur*, when Monsieur *Villeroi* began his March towards the Confederates. But to return, 'tis plain the *French* had not gain'd the Battle of *Almanza* without that Reinforcement from *Italy*, and even with it, tho'

tho' the Battle was fought in *April*, and our Army was in a manner ruin'd by that Blow, all they did that Year, was only to take *Lodi*. But that Reinforcement could not have been sent, had not the Secret Treaty for the Evacuation of the *Milanese* been made; and the Treaty had not been made, had not the Jealousy rais'd in the Imperial Court, by the Inclination of some People, express'd to hearken to the Offer of the *French*, made them resolve upon securing something for themselves. And the same Jealousy put them upon taking another Step, no less prejudicial to the common Cause; and that was the Expedition to *Naples*, which they could not be prevail'd with to defer upon the repeated and most pressing Instances that the Maritime Powers made to them by their Ministers, both at *Vienna* and *Italy*. And the Consequence of the Expedition was, that it not only diverted a great part of the Troops, that were to execute the Project on *Toulon*, but retarded for a considerable time the March of the rest; and this Loss of Time, and lessening of their Numbers, seem to have been the chief Occasions of the Mis-carriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing made the Imperial Court so obstinately bent on that unhappy Expedition, but the Fears they had, that *Naples* as well as *Milun*, would at the *Hague* be given up to facilitate a Peace, which they were resolv'd to prevent, by getting Possession as soon as they could. This is all we have got by hearkning to those Offers, which 'tis now thought a great Crime

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we did not close with; the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Misfortune of the Project on *Toulon*, the greatest, most important, best concern'd Enterprize that was ever enter'd on. And both these Misfortunes had in all Probability been prevented, had the Offers of the *French* been roundly rejected at the first, and no Occasion of Jealousy had, by listening to them, been given the Imperial Court. This is all plain naked Truth and Fact, which these Writers, or those at least that dictate to them, know as certainly, as they do, that two and two make four; and if they have any Modesty, they will blush when you let them see their Inventions thus expos'd.

After saying so much of that Part of the Offer the *French* made, which concerns the Partition they propos'd of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which we ought not to have accepted if we could, and could not if we would; there is no need of telling you, what Barrier was offer'd for the *Netherlands*, which the *Dutch* were most concern'd in, who don't use to neglect good Offers to come at Peace, if we may believe the Faction, who have for a long time pretended to fear nothing so much, as their quitting the Alliance for their own separate Interest. Tho' now the noble Firmness they have shewn in adhering to it, till Terms may be had to the Satisfaction of all Parties, is by these ill designing Politicians, who can take every thing by a wrong Handle, imputed to them for a Crime; a Crime perhaps, that they may not be guilty of much longer; or if they are, 'tis not for want of some Mens taking the most effectual Methods to cure them.

them of a Fault, which I don't remember they were ever before blam'd for.

That this is the whole Truth of this Matter, that these and no other, were the Offers the *French* made after the *Ramellis* Campaign; I will give you, besides those already hinted at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as good as a thousand Demonstrations, and that is a Letter of the *French* King to the *Pope*, on this Subject, writ in the following Spring, when all Thoughts of Peace were at an end, and a new Campaign was entering upon.

This Letter may be found in the *Mercurie Historique & Politique*, Tom. 43. pag. 33. and here follows a Translation of it.

LETTER of the King of *France* to the *POPE*.

Dated at *Versailles*, 15 Feb. 1707.

THE Care which your Holiness continues to take for procuring the Peace of Europe is always equally agreeable to us. We have nothing more at Heart than to second your Endeavours, and we wou'd even prevent you in any thing we cou'd do to make them effectual. As it was not our Fault that the War was begun, so we shall seek Occasions to end it, by the most ready and easy Methods. Your Holiness has been inform'd, that we have already made frequent Advances to come to so wholesome an End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of the Times, that *Catholick* Princes, struck with a Fear of displeasing their Allies, shou'd yet refuse to bear

bear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jesus
 Christ. When we left it to the Arbitration of your
 Holiness to satisfy the Rights and Demands of the
 Emperor, by a valuable Compensation, upon some
 Parts of the Spanish Monarchy: The Ministry of
 your Holiness were charg'd with the Care of
 making the Proposal of it to that Prince. But with
 what Haughtiness did he reject it! Having said
 Things exorbitant, and insensibly demanded that our
 Grandson should be recall'd. Who could have
 thought, most holy Father, that he would have made
 so arrogant a Return to an insulted King, to a Mi-
 nister of your Holiness, and to our Love of Peace.
 For the Comjunctura, far from being favourable to
 the House of Austria, seem'd then to threaten it,
 by the Superiority of our Forces, and by our gaining
 the Battle of Cassano. But God, who is the Ma-
 ster of Events, chang'd the Posture of our Affairs.
 Yet tho' we were employ'd with the Cares of repairing
 our Losses, we had still in our Minds the Idea we
 had conceiv'd of Peace, at the time even of our great-
 est Prosperity. We renew'd to Holland the Of-
 fer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Sea-
 curity demanded for their Trade; reserving it
 still to our selves to treat with the Emperor a-
 bout a Compensation. Propositions so reasonable
 were again rejected by the Intrigues of that Party,
 which had shew'd it self averse to the Ad-
 vancement of our Grandson: And then we em-
 ploy'd all our Thoughts to increase our Preparati-
 ons for a War, which had been violently and un-
 justly declar'd against us.

Nevertheless, as it becomes us to be obedient to the
 pious Exhortations of your Holiness: And to the
 End that our Enemies may have no pretence to impute
 to us the Loss of so much Christian Blood, as is al-

ready spilt, and now going to be let out, we will give your Holiness a plain and frank Account of the Disposition we are in for Peace. We will therefore acquaint your Holiness, that the King our Grandson, has intrusted us with full Power to convey the Arch-Duke a Part of those Estates that compose the Spanish Monarchy. The Catholick King has the Hearts of the true Spaniards, and is content to reign over them.

It only depends therefore on the Emperor to explain himself at this time, who may have, if he pleases, for ever reunited to his Family, The Milanese, Naples, and Sicily, with the other Islands belonging to Spain, that are situate in the Mediterranean Sea.

We should easily agree about a Barrier for the Republick of the united Provinces: And the Two Pretences for the War, being thus remov'd, it wou'd not be difficult to put an End to those Misfortunes, which Europe has been so long oppress'd with.

We pray God that he will preserve your Holiness a great many Years in the Government of his Church.

Your Devout Son,

the King of France
and Navarre,

S. Louis.

I shall leave it to your self to make the Reflections which naturally arise from this Letter; and having thus plainly shewn you how ground-
less

less the first Complaint of these Writers is, I shall endeavour to prove to you with the same Clearness, that there is as little Ground for the next, which is this:

2. That the War in *Spain* has been shamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entering into the War.

This is the most plausible of all their Complaints, and yet I doubt not but I shall easily convince you, that it has, if possible, less Sense in it than any of the rest. We that live at home have for the most Part, no other Way to judge of Affairs abroad, but by Events; and things having succeeded but ill on the Side of *Spain*, or at least very short of the Expectations we were fill'd with, that a Revolution there might be compass'd with as little Trouble as it was here, we readily give into any Insinuations or Surmises, be they never so groundless or extravagant, that impute the Event we did not expect, to ill Conduct or Mismanagement; 'tis the Nature of Mankind, they would fain be knowing, or judging at least, whether they know or not, which makes them catch at every Shadow of a Reason, to account for things, especially when they don't go to their Mind; they take for granted, wherever there is want of Success, there is a Fault; and 'tis some A-mends they fancy for a Disappointment, if they can first lay the Blame somewhere, no matter where: 'Tis this Humour makes this Complaint so popular; and when the Faction has given out that the War in *Spain* has been neglected, 'tis easily believ'd by those that know no better; but a very little Examination will clear up this

Matter to the meanest Understanding.

This Complaint must mean one of these two Things, either that the Parliament has not been mov'd to make sufficient Provision for the War in *Spain*, or that the Provision made by Parliament has been misapply'd; and that either here at home, or by those who have commanded the Forces that have been sent thither. If the Parliament was not mov'd to make sufficient Provision for the War in *Spain*, or there was any Neglect here at home, it will concern those whom this Complaint comes from, to shew they had no Part in the Management they now complain of, or else they will come themselves into some Part of the Blame; unless it can be prov'd that they made proper Remonstrances against the Manner in which this War was carried on. If the Neglect was not here but in *Spain*, if they misapply'd the Money, and return'd false Masters; or did not manage the Troops they had to the best Advantage, yet those who were entrusted with the Command there look to that: 'Tis a prett' great Presumption, there was no Fault in what was to be done here at home, that they who, in that Case had most Reason to complain, have been so silent; tho' it so highly concern'd them, for their own Honour, to remove the Blame of our ill Successes from themselves: But to come a little to Particulars: This Complaint is dated with our Consent from the Battle of *Almanza*, and yet, in all Reasons, they ought to have look'd back at least one Year farther: For 'tis yet a Secret how the mighty Advantage we had over the Enemy upon raising the Siege of *Burdos* came to end as it did, when

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we had, so fair a Prospect of making an entire Conquest of the whole Kingdom; Why don't they ask, What was the true Reason that oblig'd *K. Charles* to lose six Weeks at *Barcelona*, when he should have been hastening to *Madrid*? Why, my Lord *G.* and the *Portuguese* General, who lay so long in the Neighbourhood of *Madrid*, could have no Intelligence from those who commanded in *Catalonia*? Why, when *K. Charles* did, at last, march to join the *Portuguese*, his Orders were not obey'd, when he desir'd that all the Troops that could be drawn together should be sent to reinforce those he had with him, which might have enabled him to give the *French* a Battle, and have ended the War on that side at once? And as to the whole Conduct of the War in *Catalonia*, to the End of that Year, why don't they ask, What Care was taken in transmitting Muster-Rolls, and what became of the Money issued for that Service? Why the Pay for full Companies was given to the Captains, when they had not ten, nay some not five Men in them; which made the *Spanish* Service so beneficial to the Officers, that they return'd home full of Money, a Thing very uncommon in Soldiers, and of which among the inferior Officers in the *Flanders*-Army, 'tis not easie by all I have ever heard, to find a single Instance? One would think when so much Complaint is made upon this Subject, these were proper Points to be enquir'd into; which, as great a Secret as they are at present, may one Day be laid open, so as every body may be able to see what Neglect there has been, and whose Doon it lies at; But to come to the Battle of *Almona*, from which their Complaints are

are dated, what occasion'd the Loss of that Battle, or which comes to the same thing, what gave the *French* that great Superiority of Troops, I have told you before, it was the Reinforcement which the *French*, by the Evacuation of the *Milanese*, were at Liberty to send from *Italy* to *Spain*; a Thing which in *England* we did not know till it was too late to fence against it. What Pains had been taken here at home, to enable *R. Charles* to recover the Ground he had lost, upon his Retreat from *Madrid*, has been so well shewn in an Answer I have read to that Part of *Faults on Both Sides* which relates to this Matter, that I shall beg Leave to refer the Reader to it.

As to the general Scheme of the War on that Side, and the Provision made for it, let those who clamour upon this Head shew us that they disapprov'd it, and let them tell us what they thought wrong, and how they would have had it mended, and then we may think for ourselves there is some Sincerity in what they say; but till then I shall take Leave to suspect all they say on this Head is only an Invention to insinuate groundless Prejudices into the People against their best Friends: And for my own part, I am fully perswaded that these Writers, or those at least whose Tools they are, have been long convinc'd, from all the Experience we have had of the *Spanish* War, and particularly from the Battle of *Almanza*, and what follow'd upon it, that the best thing for *England*, is to draw the War on that Side into the least Compass we conveniently can, and keep on the Defensive only, contenting our selves with maintaining the Footing we had got, without pretending

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to more than to be in a Readiness to lay hold of any favourable Opportunity of Action, which either the Weakness or Negligence, or ill Conduct of the Enemy, might offer, or which we might be invited to by the Encouragement given us by those that are in the *Austrian* Interest. This, I dare say, those Gentlemen think is the true Foot we should put the *Spanish* War upon: and that it should be chiefly carried on by taking Foreign Troops into our Pay, and not employing our own Men, which can't be done without the greatest Inconveniencies; besides that, at this Time, they may, 'tis plain, be much more usefully employed nearer home; and therefore I can think nothing to be farther from these Mens Thoughts than what is so much in their Mouths, that this War has been neglected, and that greater Provision ought to have been made for it: My Reason why I think them so insincere, is plainly this, that they can't but know the great Difference there is between an Offensive and Defensive War, and that what they seem to contend for is impracticable, and the most effectual Way we can take, never to have what their Writers and their Friends pretend to be so mightily concern'd for; 'Tis so evident to all that know any thing of these Matters, upon how unequal a Foot the *French* and we must make an Offensive War in that Country; But nothing can make this so plain as to put a Case to you.

Suppose then, to humour these Men, we were to send from hence an Augmentation of 20000 Men, or for our own Share 10000, to *Cambronia*, shall we not then have 10000 less in *Flanders*, and may not the *French* lessen their Army

Army there by the same Number? Suppose then the *French* and we both would send an Augmentation of 10000 Men thither, let us see what will be the Consequence: The Men we send will be transported at a very great Charge, and we can never make any tolerable Guess when they will come thither, and consequently can be sure of nothing, that depends upon their Arrival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lay ready to embark; and when Deductions are made for Sickness and Desertion, while they lie at *Portsmouth*, waiting for Ships and Winds; and for what Numbers of them may die at Sea, in so long a Passage, especially if any malignant Distemper get among them, when we consider how unable these Men will be for Service, upon landing after so long a Voyage, which will make it absolutely necessary for them to go into Quarters of Refreshment, before they take the Field; the Chance they have of arriving at the most unwholsome Season of the Year, the Difference of that Climate from our own in all Seasons, the Numbers that will be swept away by drinking immoderately the strong *Spanish Wines*, which 'tis impossible to keep Men from, when they are eas'd to be come at, and the intemperate eating of rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an Army; the many Men that will be lost by *mistrading* in a strange Country, before they know where they are, a Word Soldiers are well acquainted with, and by which an Army loses more Men than can be easily imagin'd by those who are Strangers to these Matters; when all these things are consider'd, after so much Expence and Time, I believe our 10000 at the
End

End of two Months after their Arrival, will, upon a modest Computation, be found not to exceed 4000 Effective. Let us now see what will become of those Men *France* sends: They may be fetch'd from *Dauphine* and that Neighbourhood, and their Place may be supply'd from the *Rhine*, and theirs again from *Flanders*: They may be sent at the most proper Season of the Year; their March may be made in a Month or six Weeks; their Arrival may be known to a Day, and all things may be concerted against the Time they shall be fit to enter upon Action. Their Transportation costs nothing, and when they arrive, they are what they set out, 10000 Men; and the Wines, and Fruits, and Climate, are so little different from their own, that 'tis very little they suffer from them. I may add, that their Religion procures them better Quarter from the Peasants of the Country, than Hereticks can hope for, which makes no inconsiderable Difference: So that to *France* 'tis in a manner the same thing in all Respects to send Men to *Spain* as 'tis to *Flanders*; but to us, 'tis not only a vast Expence, but almost all to no Purpose.

But this is not all; I would ask these Gentlemen, how these Troops when they come to *Spain* shall subsist; how they shall get Horses, or find Forage, or be provided with sufficient Magazines? They that know any thing of *Spain*, can tell them (but I know they don't want to be told) that the Country is not able to subsist its own Inhabitants, much less an Army of Foreign Troops, those Parts especially that are in our Hands: And I have heard that one great Reason for venturing the Battle of *Al-*

manza was, that as few Troops as 'tis' said we had there, they were too many to subsist, and that they must have starv'd if they had not foughr. Now if the Country won't furnish Necessaries, whence are they to be fetch'd? Why, either from *England* or *Italy*; except some small Matter that may be had from the Coasts of *Africk*. And is not this a pretty Method to subsist an Army? Ask those who know any thing of our *Flanders*-Armies, what would become of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or 100 Leagues from them? Ask them, what Straits they are put to, when only a little Bad Weather has spoilt the Roads, tho' their Magazines be but four or five Leagues from them? Ask them, how inconvenient in general 'tis for them, when they can't be supply'd by Water with the Things they want, tho' *Flanders* be the finest Country in the World to subsist an Army in, 'tis so fruitful in Corn, so full of good Towns, and affords so great a Quantity of Wheel-Carriage. Ask but these Questions, and you will be presently convinc'd, how difficult it must be to subsist an Army in *Catalonia*, when a great Part of their Subsistence must be brought by Sea, and from Places so remote; and the little the Country it self affords, must be fetch'd often-times a great way, and over such Mountains, as no Carriages can pass; all must be brought by Mules, which cost a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in such Numbers, as a very moderate Army has occasion for. In short, to subsist any Army in this Country is very difficult; they must often be in great danger of starving, while they depend on Winds
and

and Seas for their Provisions; and to subsist a great one; which these Gentlemen would seem to argue for, is absolutely impossible.

Let us now see how it stands with *France* in this Point: Even as well as they can wish; for 'tis a very short Passage from *Marseilles* and *Toulon* to *Roses* and other Ports on that side of *Spain*; and the Provinces of *France* that lye nearest to their own Ports, are extremely fruitful, so that Magazines may be erected in them with all the ease imaginable; and when the Winds won't let their Ships come out, which does not happen very often, they have a Reserve in Case of Necessity, and can supply their Troops by Land. Such a prodigious Advantage has *France* over us in making War on that side, even upon Supposition of maintaining but a moderate Army there, that shall act Offensively, and be to make great Marches in so barren a Country; and if we would send a great one thither, (not that I think any Army could be very great by the Time it was there) these Inconveniences would increase in a double Proportion at least; that is, sending twice the Number would be attended with four times the Disadvantages, thrice the Number with six times, and so on; but this is so plain, that I can't think it needs any farther Illustration; Need I add, how hard it is to recruit the Troops in this Service, which one may be sure finds no Voluntiers; and those the Law would give to it, will of two Evils be glad to choose the least, and to prevent being sent to *Spain*, will list themselves in any other Service. Besides, when these Recruits are rais'd, how shall they be sent? In small Numbers by the Packet-boats? But how often are they

they taken? And when they come to *Lisbon*, how shall they get on to *Catalonia*? And if they are kept till they can have the Opportunity of a Convoy, how long will they be wanted, and how insensibly will they moulder away, while they lie expecting the Time they so little wish for? And is not this a blessed Place to push the War in, where a great Army can neither be had, nor subsisted, nor recruited, without the utmost Difficulties, the greatest Hazards, and perpetual Disappointments? I know but one sure Effect of such a War, and that is, that were it constantly fed, it would soon eat up all our Men: For every twenty effective Men in *Spain*, *England* loses at least threescore: And our Treasure issu'd for that Service, we shall have reason to think, sinks in the same Proportion as our Men do, if we consider the Expences of Transportation, and of Supplies sent from hence, the Danger they go in from the Enemies Ships of War and Privateers, the Exchange of Money between *England* and *Genoa*, the excessive Price which Things will cost that are bought there for *Catalonia* by the time they get thither, the Charge we are at to get Horses for our Cavalry, which one with another, cost as much as five sent to *Flanders*. A slight View of these and the other necessary Articles, besides the standing vast Expence of maintaining so great a Part of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, will easily shew you, that to extend this War would serve to little else but to exhaust us of our Money, as well as Men. In short, both Men and Money shrink almost to nothing, when they come thither, in comparison of what they were
when

when they went from us : From all which I can't but conclude, That nothing can be greater Nonsense, or rather greater Villany, than what these Writers, or those that direct them, tell us upon this Head : For they know all this to be true, that there is no Pretence for the Complaints they make of the War on this side having been neglected, but that on the contrary, nothing can be so ruinous to *England*, as the Measures they would hurry us into. We can't have a better View, with what a Disadvantage we make an Offensive War in *Spain*, than our Affairs there give us at this Time, when the greatest Advantages are lost, thro' the utter Inability we are in to support them ; for we can neither send them timely Help, nor so much as know what it is they want. Which, by the way, is another Circumstance, that ought to cure us of our Fondness for this War. The *French* King can hear from thence in as few Days as we commonly do in Weeks ; and that regularly ; whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This we are all at present sensible of : The Impatience we have for these four Months and more been in, to know what our Friends are doing there, makes every body feel the Want we have of Intelligence from those Parts ; we know nothing but what the *French* are pleas'd to tell us, who won't lose, we may be sure, the Opportunity to impose upon us what they think most for their Purpose ; which makes it impossible, even for the New M—— to take the proper Measures to support our Troops ; tho' could we have known as much and as early as we would, all Relief from hence must have come too late to enable our
Men

Men to keep the Ground they had with so much Glory gain'd ; and thus it must always be, unless we could foresee, some Time before, when a Battle will be lost or won, and provide accordingly ; otherwise every thing must come out of Time ; while the *French*, in the mean while, have it in their Power to shape their Measures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require ; of which we have seen a melancholy Instance in the Support they have given the D. of *Anjou*, when his Affairs seem'd to be desperate and past Remedy. They can hear quickly, have the Means to support him always near, and can concert things with that Exactness, as to make them all bear to a Point ; whereas we can neither know nor do what we would, and the Uncertainty our Preparations are unavoidably attended with, makes it impossible to depend on them, or to concert any Measures against such or such a Time, if they must wait the Arrival of Succours or Supplies from *England* for their Execution. In a word, all things conspire to make *Spain* the least desirable of all Places to push the War in ; and one ought rather to wonder we have been able to maintain our Ground there so well, than complain that more has not been done, or pretend I know not what. Neglects to account for it : The thing is so plain, it speaks it self ; the *Dutch* are so convinc'd of it, that they have never, for these three Years past, been prevail'd with to send any fresh Troops thither ; *England* only is to be perswaded into these wise Measures, as if we could not be ruin'd fast enough.

If you have any Doubts about the Truth of any thing I have said on this Head, I will put you

you into a Way how you may easily inform your
 self: Get a Sight of the Accounts of the several
 Embarkations that have been made for *Spain*,
 both before and since the Battle of *Almanza*,
 and observe the Distance of Time between the
 Encampments of the Troops to go on board,
 and their taking the Field in *Catalonia*: Inquire
 into the Numbers the Regiments consisted of
 when they march'd for these Entampments, and
 how strong they were when they join'd our Ar-
 my: Ask some of the Officers of the six Regi-
 ments that were broke into others, a little be-
 fore the Battle of *Almanza*, how many private
 Men they left when they came away, and some
 of them will tell you, that their Regiments had
 not above 50 Men in them, and some not so
 many. I can't suppose you will pretend these
 Inconveniencies arise from any Neglect in the
 Admiralty, because that is no Part of the
 Complaint these Gentlemen make, and you
 know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the
 same Hands which we are at present so much
 pleas'd with. If this be then a true State of this
 Matter, I can compare Mens being fond of en-
 larging the Scheme of the War in *Spain*, to no-
 thing but to *Shakespear's strange Alacrity in Sink-*
ing; for sink we shall, and that very fast, if the
 Advice of these Writers be pursu'd.

But if this be the Case, you will say, Why then
 did we at first begin a War in *Catalonia*, or have
 not long since quitted it? This admits of a ve-
 ry easy Answer, if we look back into the Po-
 sture of Affairs at that Time, and consider
 what it was we propos'd by making War on
 that Side, and what were the true Reasons that
 engag'd us in it: Such an Enquiry will shew you
 it

it was begun with the most promising Appearances in Favour of it, could we but succeed in the first Step; and tho' they have not answer'd our Expectations, yet when so good Footing was once got, we neither cou'd nor ought to have quitted our Ground. When the Forces which began that War were first embark'd, 'twas very difficult to determine at this distance, which was most for the Service of K. Charles and the Common Cause, to land in *Catalonia*, or attempt to give some Relief to the D. of *Savoy*, which he was at that time in the greatest Want of; the Decision of this was left to the two Kings of *Portugal* and *Spain*, and their Ministers, who were best able to judge what Part was best to take; and after the Matter had been thoroughly consider'd, 'twas resolv'd for *Catalonia*, upon the pressing Instances of K. Charles, and the many and repeated Assurances that had been given him of the good Dispositions of the *Spaniards* to declare for him, as soon as he should have any firm Footing in *Spain*, and be in a Condition to protect them. For we did not pretend to conquer *Spain*, or to force a Revolt upon them, but to favour one, supposing them inclin'd to it; and what made the Experiment the more worth trying, was the desperate Condition of Affairs in *Italy*, which this was thought the likeliest Way to give some Relief to, by obliging the *French* to take off a Part of that Weight of Troops with which the Duke of *Savoy* was so violently press'd: Besides, you may remember that at the Time this War in *Catalonia* was begun, we had not the least Prospect of making such mighty Conquests in *Flanders*, which was every Inch of it in the *French* Hands,

Hands; and 'twas more than any body cou'd tell, when it wou'd be otherwise, much less cou'd they hope to see any possibility of Penetrating into *France* on that side, which we have had since the *Ramelies* Campaign so fair a Prospect of. These Circumstances of Affairs, the Appearance there was of losing all in *Italy*, and of getting nothing in *Flanders*, made it very reasonable for us to try the Inclinations of the *Spaniards*; and had they answer'd better the Assurances that had been given, whatever Body of Troops had for once been carry'd thither, had doubtless been very well employ'd, to give them Countenance.

These were the Motives, upon which the War was begun on that side, and nothing but Experience could have convinc'd People, that *Spain* might not have been had for going for; especially when those who were presum'd to be the best Judges, were so sure of the Success; so that nothing could have justify'd our not making the Tryal; whatever had been said against it, would not have been believ'd, while the Inconveniences of this War had not yet been felt, and for that Reason could not be so certainly judg'd of.

These were great Inducements to try what might be done there, and the first Attempt met with Success; for the Enemy not being prepar'd for us, and the People on that side being pretty much in our Interest, *Barcelona* soon fell into our Hands, and all *Catalonia* with it; and we gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Revolt in the other Kingdoms, but not to force one, unless they had been more dispos'd to it

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themselves; in which Point no body wants to be told, they fail'd: But tho' this Consequence, which we hop'd for from our Success, did not follow from it, the Advantage we had gain'd was too considerable to be parted with; for by being Masters of *Barcelona*, we kept up Life in our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to our Enemies, who were by this Situation of ours, oblig'd to lessen considerably their Army on the side of *Portugal*, which one might have expected would have turn'd to a better Account than it did, and wou'd have enabl'd the *Portuguese* to have made some Impression on *Spain*. But that is not all, as long as we had such a Footing, and the Enemy could not depend on the Inclinations of the People to the Duke of *Anjou*, which by what they had seen in *Catalonia*, they had reason to be very apprehensive of, they were forc'd to employ an Army, much superiour to ours, to observe our Motions, not knowing to which side we might turn our selves, or where an Insurrection might break out in favour of us. And besides the Distraction, Uneasiness, and great Expence this new War created the Duke of *Anjou*, and his Adherents, it oblig'd him to discover his Distrust of the *Spaniards* more than he had done before; and to shew, he thought himself safe only in *French* Armies, as well as *French* Councils; which could not but make a great deal of ill Blood, tho' not so much as might have been hop'd for from the old Spirit of that Nation. These, you will allow, were no slight Reasons for maintaining the Footing we had in *Catalonia*; much more will you think so, when you reflect, that this little Flock of *Spain* had four Years a-

go let us into a full Possession of the Whole, had not a most fatal and unaccountable Mismanagement ruin'd all; not to insist on several other good Effects; such as keeping his Holiness, and the other *Italian* Princes in awe, who discover'd but too much Inclination to a League with *France*; the alarming all the *Southern Coast* of *France*, and giving Encouragement to the *Severnois*, and other *New Converts*, who had long shewn they would stir if they could; which created a fresh Trouble and Expence to the *French King*, by obliging him to keep Troops on that side, to no other end; but to observe the Motions of his own Subjects; and in the last Place, had it succeeded, 'tis to this we had ow'd the Whole of the *Grand Project* against *Toulon*. These are such Advantages of the *Spanish War* as will sufficiently justify the beginning and pursuing of it in the manner we have done, especially since the Reduction of *Minorca* has made it so safe and easy to keep a good Squadron all the Year in the *Mediterranean*. But these Purposes are all answer'd, while we confine that War within moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep on the *Defensive* only. There is no need of enlarging the Scheme of the War, which instead of doing Service to the *Common Cause*, would make us lose several of the Advantages we have by it, while it lies in a narrow Compass, and would endanger what we might maintain, while we extend our selves beyond our Strength; and grasp at more than we can hold; besides the other great Inconveniences, which I have shewn you, must follow the making an *Offensive War* on this side, which can never possibly succeed, unless the *Castilians* were

more our Friends, or more were to be expected from the *Portuguese*. And even a Defensive War, Experience has shewn us, is much better carry'd on by Foreign Troops, which not only spares our Men, but saves a great deal of Money, and is much more convenient for the Service, the Passage being so much shorter from *Italy* than it is from *England*. And yet we all see, that notwithstanding the Endeavours to support King *Charles* upon his late Victories, no Reinforcement has yet been sent him, even from thence, as feasible as it seems, and as great Occasion as he has for them; and the Reinforcement that was last sent, 'tis known did not arrive till the middle of *June*, tho' it was intended and order'd, that they should be there in *January*. Thus difficult it has been to maintain this War on the Foot it has been hitherto upon; and from Experience we may be sure, thus it will be, and worse, proportionably worse, as we enlarge it. And therefore I can't think, any body does in earnest mean more, than to do what we design, without loss of time, but not to design more than is absolutely necessary, or to extend the Compass of the War.

But they tell us, there is a Necessity for it, and that *Spain* is not otherwise to be had: But why so? Have they never heard in Physick of such a Term, as Revulsion, which teaches to remove the Evil from one part by proper Applications, not to the Part it self, but to its Opposite? Or have they not so much Mechanicks, as Children can teach them, who if they would throw down *B*, which is at the Top of *A*, and out of their Reach, will present-

ly try if they can't pull down *A*: They know almost by Instinct, that 'tis all one whether you pull down *B* directly, or that which supports it. And 'tis the same thing with *Spain*; if that Kingdom be ever recover'd, it must be by proper Applications to *France*. *France*, all the World sees, is the Support of the Duke of *Anjou*, and if this Support be forc'd from him, he will as surely tumble, as if you cou'd pull him with your Hands from the Throne he has usurp'd. Since therefore we can't reach him, we should set our selves with all our Might to pull from him his Support, and then he must fall on course: How near we have been succeeding in this, you can't want to be told. And how it came not to be quite done, your Friends know without being told; and how much soever they may like the Reason of this, I'm perswaded they don't much like to hear of it. And if *Spain* be not gain'd this way, one may without the Spirit of Prophecy foretel, it never will be gain'd at all.

Read now again these admird Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have amms'd you, and you begin to think there is something in them, then turn to this true State of the Case, and the Mist they have cast before you will vanish; their Harangues will leave no more Impression upon you, than the famous Doctor's Speech does upon those that look into his Sermon. But instead of those Impressions, I cannot but think there will remain upon your Mind, as there does on mine, an utter Detestation and Abhorrence of the black Villany and Malice some Men have us'd

to ruin the Reputation of the ablest and most
 faithful Ministers, and to hazard every thing
 that is dear to us as *English-men* and Protestants,
 rather than to compass their own destructive
 Ends and Ambitions; but I remember, I have often thought, upon the
 late intended Invasion of the Pretender, that
 it was on his part a very foolish Enterprise; for
 tho' it might answer the Purposes of *France*,
 and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail
 to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends; And
 I am of the same Opinion with respect to our
 Domestic Invasion, if I may use that
 Expression; the Publick indeed may suffer by
 them, as much as *France* can wish; but if we
 should have the good Fortune to escape the
 Danger, we are threatened with; the Attempts
 that has been made upon it will, I am per-
 suaded, sooner or later bring inevitable Ruin
 upon themselves; and as I have said before,
 - But we are both, I dare say, sufficiently
 tired for our time; I shall therefore take leave
 of you for the present, with Assurances that
 you shall in a very little time, hear again
 from me; and so I am, Sir, I leave you
 to the Blessings of Heaven, and so I am,
 Sir, your most faithful,
 Humble Servant,
 Post-

Postscript.

Since these Papers were in the Press, the ill News is come of a Battle lost in *Spain* after the Glorious Actions of *Almanara* and *Saragossa*; Two Victories so great in themselves, and in the Consequence of them, that they might have been decisive of the War, if the *Portuguese* had join'd; which I am very sorry they did not, for the sake of the common Cause, and even of the young General himself, so justly applauded for his fearless Zeal both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service of his Country. But tho' this unfortunate Battle has too much justify'd what I have said against enlarging the Scheme of the War in that Country; I still hope we may be in a Condition not much worse than last Year, and able to continue acting in the *Defensive* manner I have recommended.

N. B. *The Second Letter will be publish'd next Saturday.*

F I N I S.

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
THE
Management
OF THE
WAR.
IN A
Second Letter
TO
A Tory-Member.

[Francis Hare 1711]

Non Cauponantis bellum, sed Belligerantis.

L O N D O N :

Printed, and Sold by *A. Baldwin* near the Oxford-Arms in Warwick-Lane. 1711.



L A J

* * * *Novemb. 30. 1710.*

S I R,

YOU have here, according to the Promise I made you in my last, the Thoughts of your Humble Servant; with the same Freedom and Impartiality, upon the other two Points, relating to the Management of the War, which the Pamphlets have been so full of; I mean, the Fault of making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, and the Methods the D. of *M.* has us'd to prolong it for his Private Interest:

First, 'Tis pretended, that pushing the War in *Flanders*, is pushing it in a wrong Place, *France* being cover'd on that Side with so strong a Frontier. But this Accusation will appear to have no more Sense in it, than I have shewn you in my former Letter there is in Complaining as they do, of our not pushing it in *Spain*: To clear this Matter, they should shew, not how improper, or inconvenient a Country *Flanders* is to make the War in; but where it could have been made better, or with more Success: For if they don't prove this, they prove nothing, it be the best Side we could have turn'd

the main Force of our Arms to, tho' it be not so good as we could have wish'd, there is no preference for finding any Fault upon this Head: And they that do so, can mean nothing else, but to condemn indirectly the War it self; which, had it depended upon them, they do in effect say, should never have been begun. But to come nearer the Point, and to judge whether it be wrong to make *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, we must compare it with what other Places it could be push'd in; and a short Comparison will decide this Matter, to any Man of tolerable Understanding, if he have with it what I confess is not common, Tolerable Honesty; For Integrity and Honesty of Mind can't preserve themselves, where the violent Prejudices of Party and Faction have once got Possession. Now all the other Places the War could have been push'd in, are *Spain*, *Italy*, and the *Rhine*. The first of these I have already shewn, till I have tir'd you, is Impracticable: And I think Experience has abundantly convinc'd us, how little is to be hop'd for from the other two. Besides, an Experiment of the Second has been made; and when the War had been remov'd with incredible Success and Speed, from the *Danube* to the *Rhine*, and from thence to the *Moselle*, the next Year a great Army was carry'd thither, to penetrate *France*, on that which is confess'dly the weakest side. But how did this end? Much indeed to the Honour of the General, who by that Glorious March outdid himself; but thro' the Disappointments he met with, not at all to the Advantage

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vantage of the Common Cause; He was forc'd to return to *Flanders*, where the *French* had made his Presence absolutely necessary. If this had not been try'd; these Gentlemen might have complain'd, tho' for some Reasons, I scarce think they would; but to complain now, when the Experiment has been made, is imposing too grossly upon us.

Well then, what is next? Would they have had the D. of *M.* have march'd with a great Army to *Savoy*, as a proper Place to be the main Seat of the War? I shall shew you by and by, it was not the D. of *M.*'s Fault he did not go to *Italy*, when our Affairs there were most desperate; but should he, when there was no such necessity for it, have carry'd Forty or Fifty thousand Men thither, what Treatment must he have expected from those Men, who made his March to *Bavaria* so great a Crime; as we all remember this Party did, in the Interval between the Actions of *Schellenberg* and *Blenheim*. And even that great unparallel'd Success and all his glorious Conquests of that Year, could not divert the Malice that some swell'd with, or hinder the Rage from breaking out, which they hop'd to vent with so much Pleasure and Revenge. I mention this only, to shew the Sense of the Party, and what might have been expected from them, who were so angry at that Glorious March, if the D. of *M.* had carry'd his Army to *Italy* or *Savoy*, when *Turin* was reliev'd, and no pressing Necessities call'd for it.

But the mention of that Interval puts me in mind of another thing, which the same Pamphlets

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Pamphlets make so much Noise about, that I hope, you will pardon the Digression, while I take a little notice of it; and that is, the famous *Act of Security*: Which was the other favourite Topick, with which the Faction pleas'd themselves; tho' the prodigious Successes of that Year might easily have convinc'd them, such Clamours would be as unpopular, as they were unjust. For that they were unjust, any impartial Man will be satisfy'd, that does but examine the Fact, how that Bill came to be pass'd. You remember, I am sure, what a very melancholy Prospect we had here in *England*, of Affairs in that Interval. At that time the *Scotch* Parliament was Sitting, were very uneasy, would give no Money, nor dispatch any Publick Business, till that Act was granted them. What Part shall the Q. take in this Matter? 'Tis the unanimous Opinion of Her *Scotch* Ministers, that it must be comply'd with; they can't answer for the Quiet of the Kingdom an Hour, if it be refus'd: Shall an *English* Minister take upon him singly to advise the contrary, in a *Scotch* Affair, and against their Opinions, who may be presum'd to be the best Judges of the Disposition and Temper of their own People? Let us suppose he had done so, and that the Refusal had produc'd any Tumults or Insurrections in that Kingdom, where every Body knew there had for a long time been a great deal of ill Blood. Without entering further into this Matter, I would only ask this Question; What would these Gentlemen have said in this Case? Would it not have been loudly affirm'd to:

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have been a concerted thing to ruin us; and that our Army was sent out of the way on purpose, that we might be the more effectually Undone, and out of the reach of any Succour or Relief? Could the Success of *Blenheim* be foreseen? Could any Body be sure the Refusal of the Bill would have ended in nothing worse, than the losing the Supply? Which does not use to be thought a trifling Matter. Was it not of the utmost Consequence, in that untoward Posture of Affairs, that Peace should be preserv'd among our selves? To be angry therefore with a Minister, for advising, or not opposing the Royal Assent to this Bill in such Circumstances, is both unjust and absurd. And I think, one may be pretty sure, what, as I have put the Case, the Faction would have said, had the Bill been refus'd, who now say the passing of it was so great a Fault, and make heavy Complaints about it; tho' the same Minister has taken the Advantage of better times, to undo what bad ones had forc'd him to comply with: And has to the Surprise and Confusion of his Enemies, extinguish'd the unhappy Differences that threaten'd the Constitution and Succession, by a perpetual Union; which he will always be allow'd to have been the chief Adviser and Promoter of. And if the Truth were known, 'tis this, which is at bottom the Impardonable Crime. Such is the hard Fate of *British* Ministers, whom no Wisdom or Abilities, no Justice or Integrity, no Fidelity and Zeal for their Prince and Country, nor the most happy and successful Administration, can protect

ect from the Virulence of Faction; which has made me often think them the only Slaves in this very free Nation. This has been the Fate of the Old M—rs. and sure the New ones can't hope for better Luck.

But to return from this Digression. You see upon a very short View, that to lay a Stress of the War in *Spain*, *Savoy* or the *Rhine*, is altogether impracticable. From whence it follows, that it must be laid in *Flanders* or no where; which last I am afraid is what these Complainers would bring about.

But to set this Matter in another Light; if *Flanders* be so improper a place to pass the War in, how come all the Allies so readily to give into it? How came no Remonstrances to have been made by any of them against it? How came the *Dutch*, who have been always thought to be in haste enough for Peace; to go into that Scheme, by which they are so unlikely to obtain it? How come the Princes whose Troops are in our Service, to send them into the Field so early, and let them continue there so long as they do; if the Scene of the War is so wrong laid, and we are so little the nearer coming to an end of it; tho' the Service be so hard, and their Troops suffer so much in it? How comes the Emperor, when the Empire is so naked and defenseless, and is so terribly threatened to be invaded by the *French*, and one Year felt their Threats in earnest; how comes he to send such a Body of Troops to *Flanders*, if they could be employ'd better any where else; especially when he has so good a General of his own to put at the Head of them; a General who has

has the happiness to be in favour with the Faction, for no other Reason, but because he is not their own; for if he were, what Quarter could he expect for advising to send Troops to run their Heads against Walls in *Masters*, which they would say, he advis'd merely for his own Honour, and for the Pleasure of being at the Head of a Hundred Thousand Men. Thus the Faction would use him if he were *English*; for thus they use the *D.* for no other Reason in the World; and thus the *French* Scribblers, who are in the same Interest, use them both. I would recommend to you upon this Head a Monthly *French* Paper, call'd; *The Clef de Cabinet*; which would be a better Key to the understanding the Designs and Language of the Faction, than all the things they write themselves; and of more use than anything that is writ against them; for which Reason, I have many times wish'd it translated into our own Language, for the Benefit of the *English* Reader, who will be judging of the Affairs and Politicks of all Countries; when he can speak no Language but his own, and that obliges him blindly to follow those blind Guides, the Pamphleteers, who are but the mercenary Tools of the Party, they serve, and seldom know any thing of Affairs abroad themselves; much less are they fit Masters to teach others, how to judge about them. And I could be glad to know, how such Guides and their Followers come to be more competent Judges in what manner the War should be pursu'd; than our Allies are, who have so great an Interest in it; who by their Struc-

on have so much the Advantage of us in
 knowing what is done; who by their near-
 ness see and feel what we only talk of at a
 distance; and in short, under whose Eyes
 every thing passes: And yet notwithstanding
 the separate Interests they have, they all agree
 to shew us, that in their Opinion the War
 could no where else be push'd to so much
 Advantage for the Common Cause, as it has
 been in *Flanders*: Where if we were to be on
 the Defensive only, and do nothing but
 march from one strong Camp to another, to
 wear out a Campaign of four Months, which
 by the help of good Management, may in a
 little time be the Case; even then a great
 Army would be absolutely necessary to co-
 ver so large and weak a Frontier, as that of
 the *Netherlands* was three Years ago, when it
 had not one single Town of any considera-
 ble Strength to secure any part of it. And
 is it not a great pity, a noble Army should
 not be suffer'd to continue in Tranquility
 and Quiet, that is, useless and unactive?
 Ought a General to be forgiven, who has
 taken so much pains to make them useful, by
 the Addition of a little more Strength,
 which could not have been employ'd, we
 are sure, to any Purpose any where else.
 This single Reflection may convince a Man
 how ridiculous all their Glamour is, against
 making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War,
 where upon any Scheme the greatest Army
 must have been, tho' little enough to do no-
 thing, had not that Addition been made to
 it, which these Gentlemen are so much of-
 fended at. There is nothing wanting to
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make this single Argument a Demonstration, but to shew you, that this Addition to the *Flanders* Army could have been of no Service any where else. If they had not been employ'd here, they would either not have been us'd at all, or upon the *Rhine*. Now there was no want of them to be on the defensive; that is plain from the Event; and act offensively they could not, for one plain Reason, which is, that the *Imperial* Army have no one thing that is necessary for an offensive War; they have neither Money, nor Magazines, nor Ammunition, nor Artillery, nor Bread-Wagons; and even where all these things may be had, to how little purpose is it, if they that are to use them, can't take the Field betimes, which is what is never to be hop'd for on the *Rhine*? 'Tis therefore plain these Troops must have been perfectly useless, had they not been brought to *Flanders*, where without them no more could have been done, than there has been in other Parts; and this we may be sure was the true Reason of the Emperor's sending such a Number of his Troops thither, as he did; he took them from a Place where he knew they could be of no use, to send them where they might act vigorously in Conjunction with an Army which is perfectly well provided with all Necessaries, and under the Conduct of a General, whose Services the H. of *Austria* will always retain a grateful Sense of, for having in so wonderful a manner sav'd the Empire.

After having seen the Judgment of the Allies in this Point, it may not be amiss to turn to another View of it, and see the Sentiments of our Enemies upon the Question; who we shall find have confirm'd the Opinion of our Friends. There is nothing they have shewn themselves so much afraid of, as of our Progress in *Flanders*; nothing they have so much labour'd to divert us from. What else is the meaning of the mighty Threats they have fill'd us with every Winter since the *Ramellies* Campaign, that they would invade the Empire with a powerful Army in the Spring, and drive *K. Charles* out of *Catalonia*? Which two things they never threatned more than last Year; and the latter, we were, I believe, all in pain for, upon their making so much noise of entring *Catalonia* with two Armies at the same time? I ask what they did this for? Cou'd it be for any other End, but to make us lessen our Strength in *Flanders*, and perswade us to detach to the *Rhine*, and send Troops to *Spain*? If this were not their meaning, why did they not execute their Threats, when they were sure to meet with so little opposition? Why have the Allies drawn the greatest Force of the Enemy to *Flanders*, rather than they the Strength of the Allies to *Germany*? Can it be for any other Reason, but because the Enemy knew, they could not give so deep a Wound in one Place as they might receive in the other? 'Tis this made them withdraw their Troops from *Spain*, and make so many Detachments from the *Rhine*, and fetch the Duke of *Berwick* from *Savoy*. All other
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Points have been given up to guard this one. They have neglected all the other Parts of the War, where they might have acted with Success; not to make a vigorous Effort in *Flanders* themselves, where for several Years they have not so much as pretended to do any thing, or to give the Allies a Blow, but to fence against those they apprehended from them. And is not this a plain Confession, they think no Ravage they can make in the Empire, no Attempt they can make in *Spain*, of so much Consequence to them, as to stop the Progress the Allies are making in *Flanders*? Don't they by this own, that this is the Home-Push, they are most concern'd to guard against? Is not the last Campaign a surprizing Instance of this, in which they have shewn they thought 140000 Men well employ'd in doing nothing else, but hindring the Allies from doing so much as they would? tho' what they did, notwithstanding all the Opposition so vast an Army could make, was more than the great Monarch ever did any one Year of the last War, or we, I fear, are like to do again. Go now, and believe if you can, these Men that tell you the Scene of the War is ill laid, and that *Flanders* is not the properest Part to attack *France* in; after you have seen the Judgments both of Allies and of Enemies upon it.

Thus far I have been shewing you, that as bad a Place as *Flanders* is to push a War in, 'tis the best, or rather only one, in which it could be push'd, with any tolerable Prospect of Success. But I shall now set this Matter in another Light, and distinguish upon what
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I have hitherto allow'd. *Flanders* was indeed, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, it being cover'd with a Frontier, that was thought Impenetrable; but that Frontier has now great part of it been taken, and is turn'd against those it has hitherto defended: And by this means *France* lies now as open and expos'd on the *Flanders* Side, as on any other; and indeed more. So that nothing can be wish'd more feasible, than what remains to enable the Allies to penetrate into the Heart of it. Not above a Fifth Part of the Work is now left, of what the Allies had upon their Hands Three Years ago. *Flanders*, I say, was at the beginning of the War, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, 'twas cover'd with so strong a Frontier. I will readily allow these Gentlemen this; but then I must tell them, That it was for this Reason the D. of *M.* look'd out for another Scene of Action, and did all that could be done on his Part towards it; and therefore when he had in the Two first Campaigns driven the *French* from *Nimeguen* to *Namur*, and had set the *Dutch* at Ease by the Reduction of *Gelder* and *Limburg*, and clear'd the *Rhine* by taking *Bonne*, he did not the third Year content himself with walking up and down in the Neighbourhood of *Holland*, where there was no Prospect of doing any thing to Purpose; but march'd into the Heart of *Germany*, forc'd the strong Pass of *Schellenberg*, before the end of *June*; which is the Key of *Bavaria*: And had the Ammunition and Artillery been ready, as the Duke had been assur'd it was, he had march'd directly to *Munich*, and with-
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out the hazard of another Battel, had in a Fortnight's time not only extinguish'd that fatal War, that threaten'd nothing less than the Ruin of the whole Empire, but had gain'd the Elector also over to the Side of the Allies, who, could he have been perswaded to make their Interest his own, might have done the greatest Service to the Common Cause, both in *Germany* and in *Flanders*. But when that Point was lost, and the Inability of the *Germans* to make a Siege, had encourag'd the Elector to break off the Treaty he had entred into, and the Sword had decided the Fate of his Country, what Part did the D. of *M.* take next? Not that of returning to *Flanders*; no, he improv'd the rest of that wonderful Campaign, to facilitate the Operations of the next, in a Part where *France* might be more easily attack'd: He pass'd the *Rhine* before the end of *August*, and made, or rather submitted to the making the Siege of *Landau*, by Pr. *Lewis*, while he cover'd it: And that the unexpected length of the Siege might not break his Design, without waiting for the End of it, he advanc'd with a Body of Troops to the *Saar*, surpriz'd *Treves*, and possess'd himself of other proper Posts for erecting Magazines, and opening the next Campaign with the Siege of *Saar-Lewis*; and had that Project succeeded, that Campaign had probably been the last. Why it did not, I need not tell you: You can't but remember, that the D. of *M.*'s Part was punctually perform'd; His Army arriv'd at *Treves* at the time appointed, and

and from thence he made a bold March to *Syrk*, in the sight of Monsieur *Villars*, who thought fit to retire to a safe Post, where he could not be attack'd, and left the Country open to the Confederates, quite to *Saar-Lewis*; of which they might have made the Siege; without any Opposition. But all was defeated by the Failure of Pr. *Lewis*; tho' more Pains had been taken to fix him to what had been agreed, than any one, that does not know the thing, can believe; and the Duke was oblig'd to hasten back to *Flanders*; where the *French* began to Act: Which he did with that Success, that he oblig'd them to raise the Siege of *Leige*, retook *Huy*, forc'd the Lines, defeated great part of their Army; and had every Body been as forward as his Grace on that Occasion, he had anticipated no little Part of the Glory of the next Campaign. All that was done this Year in *Flanders*, gave the Duke no great hopes of doing much there the next. The Duke of *Savoy* in the mean time, was reduc'd to the last Extremity. This made him not only persuade the Allies to send two considerable Reinforcements to him, but form the Design of marching thither himself to his Relief. And nothing hindred his going, but that the *Dutch* thought they shou'd be too much expos'd by his Absence; who would not consent to the sending the 10000 *Hessians* to *Savoy*, but on Condition he would stay with the Army in *Flanders*; and God was pleas'd to bless his Zeal for the Common Cause, by a most surprizing Victory, when he had not the least Hopes of it. For who could have expected the

the *French* would quit the *Dyle*, they had been for Nine or Ten Months fortifying, to give the Allies the Opportunity they so much wanted of a fair Engagement; which ended in the Reduction of the greatest part of the *Netherlands*, which, as much as forgetting is in Fashion, I doubt not, but honest Men will remember.

Thus you see for Five Campaigns of this War the D. of *M* — either did not act in *Flanders*, or did it out of necessity, and much against his Will. So sensible was he how difficult it must be to bring the War to a speedy End, when the chief Weight of it lay in a Country against which *France* was so well defended. The Sense he had of this, made him very unwilling to end so great a Campaign as that of *Rapellies*, without the Reduction of *Mons*, which he would fain have made the Siege of, to frighten the *French* into a Peace, or secure the making a good War the next Year; which he forelaw he could not be sure of without that Conquest, since it would be in the Power of the Enemy to avoid a Battel if they pleas'd, and the Confederate Army would not be big enough to make any great Siege and cover *Brabant* at the same time. This Apprehension made the D. of *M* — earnest for the Siege, but the badness of the Weather at the end of the Siege of *Aeth* made the *Dutch* afraid of entering upon so great an Enterprize so late in the Year. They who know any thing of the War, know this to be true, and those from whom these Clamours come, know a great deal more; they know his

Grace went to the *Hague* himself soon after the Battle of *Ramellies* to concert with the States how that Victory might be improv'd to the best Advantage, and to hasten the Preparations for it. They, I believe, could tell us, that if what his Grace propos'd and press'd for, had been comply'd with, that Campaign had been still greater than it was, and had enabled us to push the War in *Flanders*, with the like Vigor the next Year; which for the Reasons I have already hinted, was spent without much Action; the *French* declining to fight, and the Allies on their part having no Inclination to it, nor Force enough to make a Siege without great difficulty: Not that the Duke of *M---* himself was for sitting still; but the States were so frighten'd with the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Invasion of *Germany*, that they would not let him stir. Thus the Duke could neither carry the War out of *Flanders*, nor act with Vigor in it; such was the Fate of this Campaign, and the same it must have been of all succeeding Ones, had not the Duke laid hold of the Opportunity, which the change of Affairs in *Italy* gave him to increase his Army, by that Addition of Troops, which the Emperor was prevail'd with to send to him, otherwise there was nothing to be hop'd for but from Battles, which 'tis very easy for the Enemy to avoid in *Flanders*; and when they can be attack'd, 'tis with more hazard than the States care to run so near home, especially considering, that the little Work our Allies give the *French* upon the *Rhine*, and in *Savoy*, leave them at liberty to

to bring what Numbers they please against the *Flanders* Army. There was no possible Way of overcoming this Difficulty, but that which the Duke took to procure a Body of Troops to join him from the *Rhine*; where I have already shewn you, they would have been of no use at all.

'Tis to this we owe all the Successes we have had in *Flanders* for these three last Campaigns, in which, thro' the indefatigable Care and Diligence of my Lord M-- and the perfect good Agreement between him and Prince *Eugene*; things have been done, that Posterity will wonder at; the Frontier that was thought impenetrable, is not only broken into, but thorough; the Work of half an Age has been undone, Places have been taken; upon which an infinite Treasure has been spent; and the Enemy have been reduc'd so low, after all the Advantages with which they began this War; that had our Engineers been at all equal to our Generals; the Allies had been now upon the *Sonne*; which wou'd have left the *French* no room to doubt, whether they should give them the Peace they demanded, or not. But we see but half the Advantage the Allies had in acting offensively in *Flanders*, if we consider only the Successes of our Arms on that Side. The Vigour with which they acted here, was at the same time, the saving all the weak Parts of the Alliance from the dangers they would otherwise have been expos'd to. Had the Allies been upon the Defensive only in *Flanders*, the *French* would not have been content to be so in the other Seats of the

War. We may remember they began the *Ramelies* Campaign offensively in all Parts at the same time; and they would have been at liberty ever since to do the same in other Places, had not the Vigour with which the War was push'd in *Flanders*, and the near danger with which that threatned them, made them weaken themselves every where else to guard this single Point, and yet to very little purpose: as you will easily be convinc'd, if you run over in your Thoughts the many and great Sieges we have made in the sight of the Enemy, and in defiance of such vast Numbers; who think it work enough to make Entrenchments to cover themselves, while we are taking their Towns; and every step we advance, is so sensible to them, that they dare not give the least room for it, by attempting either to raise a Siege, or make a Diversion; so weak and tender is *France* become on this Side, where a few Years ago it was so strong, that all Attempts against it seem'd to be in vain. I believe, I may now take for granted, you have heard enough upon this Head; the State of which stands thus. *Flanders* was indeed at first a very bad Place to push the War in, but there was a necessity for it; 'twas the only Place where there was a possibility of doing any thing; and as bad a Place as it was, 'tis now by the successful Conduct of this War become a very good one; the Success on this Side has fav'd all the weak Parts of the Alliance; it drew the Troops of *France* out of *Spain*, from whence no Forces sent thither, could e'er have driven them; it has oblig'd them to be on the

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Defensive in *Savoy*, or rather to leave *Dauphiné* and *Provence* without Defence, if our Friends on that Side wou'd do what we expect from them; it has preserv'd that great but languid Body, the Empire, from the dreadful Ravages it has been yearly threatened with; it has reduc'd their Armies to subsist upon their own Country, a thing new to *France*, and has turn'd all their Thoughts of invading others to defend themselves; it has driven them from Post to Post, and in spite of all the Opposition, the united Force of *France* cou'd make, has taken whole Provinces from them; nothing but *Arras* is wanting to the Allies to oblige them to retire within their inmost Circle, beyond which all would be open to us: In short, it has driven them to the extremity of Danger, and had not some new Appearances made them hope the Face of the War would now at last change; 'tis pretty certain, the Invincible *Louis* would not have hazarded the Safety of his own Kingdom, by further Efforts to support the Usurpation of his Grandson.

This Point is the *Flanders* War brought to by the surprizing Conduct of the Man, whom the Faction is so angry with; and one is tempted to suspect this is his great Crime; what else can mean so much Clamour, against pushing the War on that Side, when we are upon the point of entering *France*, which true *Britains* have so long wish'd for, and that from Men, who made no noise at all, but on the contrary, highly approv'd as may be shewn under their own Hands, the Management of the War, and the Conduct
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of the General, when there were little hopes of his making his Way thro' so many difficulties, which have since so happily been overcome.

But whatever be the true reason that has brought the Duke of *M*— under the displeasure of these Gentlemen, the pretended one is chiefly this, that he has unnecessarily prolong'd the War for his private Interest, a Calumny, which you will, I dare say, conclude to be very groundless from what I have already said. But because this is the Capital Accusation, and 'tis natural for People when they grow weary of a War, to give into any surmizes of this kind, be they never so ill grounded; I shall shew you the vile Ingratitude and Impudence of these Men, in such a Manner, as will, I hope, abundantly convince you, the most implacable Malice could have invented nothing more stupidly ridiculous, than to accuse him of prolonging the War, who has more Reason than any Body to wish a good End to it, and has done more towards it, than his best Friends cou'd ever hope for.

Now if there were any Truth in this Accusation, and the D. of *M* had unnecessarily prolong'd the War, it must be either in the Quality of General, or as he is Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary. To judge therefore, rightly of this Matter, we must see how he has behav'd himself in each of these Capacities: And First, as he is General. If he has offended in this Quality, he has the Happiness to offend with good Company; with Prince *Eugene*, and with the Deputies of the States,

States, whose Consent is necessary in all the Operations of the War. If therefore there be any Blame in the Management of that, it must not all lie upon the D. of M. unless it appear that he has hinder'd the good Measures they would have taken, or forc'd upon them his own ill ones. But neither of these, I think, are so much as pretended; nor, I suppose, will be. I can't hear there have ever been any Differences between the Duke and the Prince, not so much as in their Opinions about any one Enterprize: No Body has observ'd any Coldness or Reservedness between them, or any other the least Sign of Misunderstanding. But on the contrary, 'tis Notorious to all the World, that they act with the most perfect Harmony, and with the greatest mutual Esteem of each other; without any Marks of Jealousy, without the least Suspicion of Envy, or of having any separate Ends or Aims, to eclipse the Glory of one another, or advance their own. The Friendship is so great, the Agreement between them is so entire, the Intimacy and Secrecy they concert with, is so wonderful; that the Armies under them, enjoy all the Advantages they can have, from the Command of two great Generals; without any of the Inconveniencies that one would think those Advantages must unavoidably be attended with. They are to all Purposes but one Army, and under one General; there is no Sign of more than one, the Unity between the Two is so perfect. If then there be any Fault in the Conduct of the War, for these Three last Years, the Prince must come
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in for his Share; they must both be Absolv'd, or both Condemn'd; or else these Gentlemen have some strange Rules of Judging by, which I am yet to learn. But let us see whether it will mend their Cause, to consider the Part the Deputies of the States have in these Matters: If they agreed with the Duke in the Measures that have been taken, can he be in Fault, and not they? Or have we heard they have ever differ'd from him, in opposing any thing that wou'd tend to prolong the War? Have they desir'd the Army might take the Field sooner than he would have them, or continue in it longer? Have they press'd any brave and bold Undertaking, that he has declin'd; has he been against Fighting, when they were for it? Have they been for making Sieges of Towns, that were more advanc'd within the Enemies Frontier, and leaving those that have been Besieg'd, behind them, to fall of themselves? Or have they been for penetrating into *France*, without making any Sieges at all? If any thing of this Kind could be made appear, that would be a Discovery indeed. But depend upon it, they have never propos'd any one thing that would push on the War, which he has been against: But on the contrary, his Hands have been often ty'd, when he was impatient to be doing something brave and Enterprising. But I had rather leave his Grace without Defence, than pretend to do him Justice, by entering into things he thinks fit to make a Secret of; the End of the War will be time enough for that. In the mean while one may be sure, by all one has
ever

ever heard of Deputies, that they are something like *Socrates's* Genius, which never put him upon doing any thing; it's whole Business was to check him, when he seem'd to be too forward. If therefore one would do the Duke Justice, the Vigor that has been us'd in pushing the War, should be imputed to him; and that there has not been more done, to the Restraints he has been always under; always, but one Campaign, that of *Blenheim*, in which he has shewn what he would do, were he left to himself. Had he a mind for a lingring War, nothing was so easy; he needed only not to have fought that *Battel*, and the War might have lasted there long enough, which that Day ended at a Blow.

In one Sense, indeed, I am willing to allow He has prolong'd the War, that without him must have ended long ago in an ill Peace; which he has hinder'd our coming to, so soon as some seem to wish we had: And this may some time or other be made his Crime. In truth, his Conduct the whole War, has been one constant Endeavour to hinder its ending till so soon as it might, and must have done otherwise. This made him so earnest to Fight the *French*, as we all know he was, the first Campaign, when he thought he had them at a great Advantage: This made him take so much Pains to bring them to an Engagement the Second Campaign, when he stole a March, and pass'd a River, and got between their Army and their Lines: This made him march to *Bavaria* the Third, and to the *Meuse* the Fourth: This made

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him endeavour to go to *Italy* the Fifth, to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savooy*, and the Loss of All on that Side : This made him the Sixth inopertunate with the States, for near two Months together, to march from the Camp of *Meldert*, and after that to try to fall upon the *French* Army at *Seneff* : This made him the Seventh pass the *Schelde*, and Fight the Battel of *Oudenarde* ; without which all *Flanders* must have been lost ; and afterwards make the Siege of *Lisb* which was the most sensible Part *France* could be wounded in ; and begin in *December* the Siege of *Gand*, which had it been left in *French* Hands, the Allies, instead of doing anything themselves the next Campaign, must have seen *Lille* and *Menin* taken from them without a Possibility of Relieving them : This made him the next Year, when he could not Fight the *French*, Surprize them with the Siege of *Tournay* ; when they expected nothing less, and take so much Care that the rest of the Campaign might not be lost. With this View he endeavour'd to Surprize *St. Guilain* ; and that failing, by the time the Garison of *Tournay* march'd out, he had pass'd the Lines of *Mons* ; After which he fought the great Battel of *Taniers* ; in which the Enemy were so defeated, that they who had hazarded a Battel to prevent the Siege of *Mons*, did not dare to venture any thing for the Relief of it ; towards which they did not make the least Step : tho' the Allies had neither River, nor Intrenchment to cover them. Lastly, 'twas this made him begin the last Campaign Six Weeks sooner than the Enemy were able to take the Field :

eld; which gave him Possession of their Lines, and soon after of *Douay*; and had that Siege ended in the time propos'd, *Arras* had met with the same Fate; which, however, was in great Measure compensated by the reduction of *Bethune*, *St. Venant*, and *Aire*: which last Place, though some may think it a slight Conquest, the *French*, who knew not the Importance of their own Places, thought it so great an Enterprize that they would not believe the Allies would venture on it; and when 'twas taken, they own'd it open'd to them a Passage to the *Soam*; and without much Skill in Military Matters, a Man can't look upon a Map, and not see that besides the Command of all the *Lys*, which is a vast Advantage for erecting Magazines against another Year, it gives the Allies a great Front, which will make it much more difficult for the *French* to stop their Progress on that side, when they are not confin'd to one Way only of advancing to their remaining Frontier, as they would have been, had the Campaign ended without *Aire*.

These have been the Endeavours and Steps the *D. of M.* has made this War, which have all contributed to prolong it in one Sense, as they have kept the Allies in Heart, and set them above the mean Conditions of an ill Peace; which they must have long since submitted to, had either the Emperor or the Duke of *Savoy* been ruin'd, or had the Enemy gain'd any considerable Advantage in *Hollanders*; or if our Inaction there had left the Enemy at Liberty to act Offensively in other Parts. All which has been prevented

by the Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as you can't but see in what I have already said; except that which respects the Duke of *Savoy* in the saving him you may be apt to think the D. of *M.* could have no Part. But not to tell you, he made all the Use he could of the Queen's Interest to support Pr. *Eugene*: at the Imperial Court, where at that time he had his Enemies, nor to mention the Supplies he procur'd him from *England*; if you look but five or six Years, you will find the Duke made in the depth of Winter a Journey to *Berlin* which obtain'd from the King of *Prussia* Succour of 8000 Men for *Italy*, which he had been often and absolutely refus'd to the Imperial Court; and the Applications of the Ministers of *England* and *Holland* had been made to as little Purpose. These were the Troops that, as we all know, enabled Prince *Eugene* to make a Stand; and two Years after the same Zeal for the common Cause procur'd for *Italy* Two more Reinforcements, one of *Palatine*, and another of 10000 *Hussars*; which last is in so particular a manner owing to the Duke, that after they had not only been agreed for, but had actually begun their March, they had been diverted from this Service, and employ'd on the *Rhine*, but not he persisted for their being sent to *Italy* where some were inclin'd to think, they would not be wanted, upon the Turn that the Battel of *Ramellis* would probably give the Affairs. But the Event shew'd how right the Duke judg'd: Nothing could have sav'd *Vindobona* but a Battel, and without these Troops Battel had been impossible, which was di-

outs enough with them. And now I believe you will allow, I have Reason to put the Methods that were taken to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savoy*, among the Ways the D. of *M.* has taken to prevent an ill Peace; To which I ought to add another, which was as strange an Action in him, as any of the rest; and that was his Journey to *Saxony*, to persuade the K. of *Sweden* not to disturb the Allies by the Jealousy his Stay in *Saxony* gave the Emperor. What a very ill Influence his Stay there had on the Common Cause, we all know: How far that Journey contributed to remove it, I am not enough in the Secret to know; but 'tis certain, he did from that time give no fresh Jealousies by making any new Demands, but on the contrary receded from several Points, and set himself in earnest to making the necessary Dispositions for quitting *Saxony*; which he did at the end of the Summer, as soon as ever the Treaty between him and the Emperor was sign'd; which put an end to the Fears the Allies had been so long under, and enabled both K. *Augustus* and the Emperor to send Troops to the Support of the Common Cause, instead of drawing any from it; which had the King of *Sweden* not remov'd, they must have done. Now what Part the D. of *M.* had in this, I can't pretend to affirm; but I believe I may venture to say, that had some others done what he did, they would have made no difficulty to give these Men all the Merit, who are so unwilling to allow any thing to the D. of *M.*

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Now if this be prolonging the War, the D. of M. is certainly guilty in a very high Degree: For all this he has done, we are sure, and more; besides a great deal of Management and Negotiation, which is yet a Secret to us: But thus much is open and above-board. And if his Accusers don't mean an ill Peace, and prolonging the War to hinder it; I can't imagine what they would pretend. I always thought to take all Opportunities of acting Offensively in an Offensive War, had been the Right Management, and the most natural way to put a good End to it. I never could have suspected, that Great Armies, Long Campaigns, Surprizing Marches, Glorious Battels, and Important Sieges, had been the way to prolong the War, if these Gentlemen had not told us so. By what they find fault with, you may see what it is they like, and which way they would have a General take to end a War. They would, it seems, have him manage his Troops tenderly and frugally, take Care how he takes the Field too soon, for fear of ill Accidents; instead of drawing them out in *April*, keep them in their Quarters till *June*; and because the latter Season is usually wet; let them leave the Field before the *September* Rains overtake them: To keep Men in the Field till *November* or *December*, is the Ruin of an Army. They would have him make no Sieges of Towns that are well fortify'd; for that is making Men run their Heads against Walls: Fight no Battels, but when you are sure of Victory; That is, never fight at all,

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much less fatigue the poor Men with great and continual Marches to look out for the Enemy, to force their Camp, to attack an Entrenchment, or pass a River in their Sight; These are hazardous Things, and can't be done but at great Disadvantage: Such Attempts have often miscarry'd, except this War; and when they succeed, Armies often suffer very much: Tho' it must be confes'd indeed, the D. of M. has been very fortunate, in passing so many Rivers and Lines with so little Loss. But Things are not the more Reasonable, because a Man has Luck; and therefore he is justly to be blam'd for them; for he could not be sure he should succeed. In short, a General should always favour his Men, never make unmerciful Night-Marches; tho' the Duke indeed has practic'd them with strange good Fortune, upon a great many Occasions. Never march above Three Leagues at a time, that the Enemy knowing your Rule, may never be surpriz'd; for by your long Marches, your own Army and the Enemy's too suffer extremely, especially in warm Weather, when Men and Officers are, for want of their Baggage, forc'd to be without the necessary Refreshments. Lastly, Avoid of all Things Marching in wet Weather, which tires the Men strangely: And for that Reason, when you are in a good Camp, never leave it without Consulting the Glass: Wait till it be settled Fair, and then a moderate March can do the Men no hurt, but rather Good. These, by the Rule of Contraries, seem to be the Methods by which
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these Gentlemen think the War ought to have been managed. These are the Old Military Maxims which are evidently good for an Army; and 'tis impossible, in their Opinion, a General can recede from them so much as the D. of M. has done, but for his private Interest, and with a Design to prolong the War. And it must be confess'd, if the Generals of both Sides were agreed to follow these Maxims, an Army would have a good Title of it. Be a fine Army, brave complete Veteran Troops: The Men and Officers would understand their Business; and we should not have our Regiments fill'd with so many raw unexperient'd Creatures as are now in them: Besides, so few Recruits would be wanted, that they might be all pick'd Men, and rais'd without any Grievance to the Country. I fancy, if the Government were of the Mind of these Gentlemen; and thought this the likeliest way to put a good End to the War, there might be Generals enow found, who would be very careful and exact to execute them; which 'tis certain, the Duke of M. never has been, nor ever will be. And therefore, if that be a Crime, 'tis high time he should be remov'd: But if this be the sure way to prolong the War, without a possibility of ever coming at a good Peace; as I and all others, who are not in the Secret of the Faction, must needs think it is, then the way the Duke of M. has taken, must be the true Way to end the War by such a Peace, as will best answer our Design in going in to it; and consequently their Insinuations against the Conduct of the Duke of M. as if he

he had a mind to prolong the War, are ridiculous and scandalously false; and honest Men must always think them so, till they show that more might have been done, or that the Reason it was not done, proceeded from his own Fault, and not from the want of any necessary consent in others: Or that he perswaded those who act in Conjunction with him, to go against their own Judgments into any wrong things of his own proposing. But I must beg these Gentlemen to distinguish between judging of things before they are done, and making Judgments of them afterwards. There is nothing so easy as to be wise when 'tis too late; but the true Wisdom is to know, which is the most reasonable Part to take, while the Event is future and in the dark, and the Mind must determine it self, according to what *then* seems most probable; when no Certainty can be had, and Probabilities only are within its reach; and therefore if they can say any thing to the purpose, they must show, that the Duke of *M.* and Prince *E.* and the Deputies of the States, and such other Persons, as they think fit to consult with, as well qualify'd as they are suppos'd to be to judge of Military Operations, have not always chosen that side of the Question, which upon the whole was not reasonable.

Arhus indeed, the Writer, I mean, of the *Secret History*, who I have reason to think, is abler at asking Questions than he is at answering them, puts in here, and with great seriousness asks, if some *Counter-Steps* have not been made, for fear our repeated Suc-

cesses should put too quick an end to the War; and that he may not seem to suspect this without Grounds, he desires to know *If last Year's Bloody Battel was so well concerted, as it might have been; and if there was an absolute Necessity to stay Two Days within sight of the Enemy for a few Troops, that never engag'd when they came, and give 'em so much time to throw up such unequal Fortresses before we attack'd them:* I little thought to have seen the Battel of *Taniers* instanc'd for a Counter-Step design'd to hinder the Effect of our former Successes, when it was it self so great a one; but it shews the Absurdity of their Cause, when Victory it self is made a Crime; and they attempt to prove a General designs to prolong the War, because he has endeavour'd to force the Enemy to put an end to it by a new Defeat. This is a strange way of arguing indeed, peculiar to the Cause, and its worthy Defenders. It is a known saying, *Victoria ratio non redditur*; but it seems, it now must not be allow'd. A General has been often call'd to give an Account how he came to lose a Battel; but to be accountable for winning one is something new; and if Victories had not been so common, we should hardly have been so difficult; we should have understood the Value of a single Victory, and been thankful for it; but the Number it seems has made us so nice, that we had rather not have them, if they are not just to our Minds; if they are not of as much Consequence as *Blenheim*, or as cheap as *Ramellies* or *Oudenarde*. I would be glad to know, if ever any one *French* Writer treated the Battel of *Landen* with that Contempt that these Gentlemen

riemen do that of *Taniers*; or thought the fighting it a Crime in the General, because it was dear bought, and had little other Consequence but the gaining what *Arlus* calls *unprofitable Honour*. On the contrary, never Victory was so much magnify'd; the Tongues and Pens of that Nation were for many Years full of nothing else; and yet those who were at that Battel, will tell you, that the *French* did not only lose as many Men as the Confederates, but double or treble their Number; and the Allies recover'd that Defeat so soon, that in Six Weeks time they had a better Army than before the Battle; and all the use the *French* made of their Victory was to take *Charleroy*, tho' the Battle was fought in *June*; a Conquest one may easily suppose they might have made, without the purchase of so dear a Victory; as they made those of *Mons* and *Namur*, Places of much more Importance. Now let us see whether the Victory of *Taniers* be on any Account Inferiour to that of *Landen*. That it exceeded it in Honour *Arlus* himself allows, for he grants, *that in all the Wars of immemorial Time, there never was a Battle fought, where mortal Men gain'd such immortal Honour*: And whether he will allow it or not, 'tis as certain, 'twas more valuable also in its Consequence, and the Advantage the Common Cause reap'd from it; for *Mons* was evidently a greater Conquest in it self, and of more use to us when *Brabant* had no other Cover than *Charleroy* could be to them; besides *Charleroy* might have been had without *Landen*, but *Mons* could not have been had without *Taniers*; and tho' that Battle was not fought till the last of *August*, *Mons* had.

not been the only Fruits of it, if the Weather would have permitted the Allies to keep the Field longer; and the Success of the Siege was a plain Discovery that the Loss of the Enemy was not only as great as that of the Allies, but greater much. Why else should they venture a Battle to prevent the Siege, and yet not move a step to disturb it, when 'twas form'd? Is not this a Confession, that they who thought themselves a Match for our Army before the Battle, did not think so after it, tho' so many Troops were employ'd and weaken'd in the Siege? Did they not spend the time, the Allies were making the Siege, in throwing up Lines, and drawing all the Troops together that possibly they could? And was not the Duke of *Berwick* sent for Post from *Dauphine*, to join with *Mareschal Boufflers* in the Command of them? What, I would fain know, was all this for? Why such strong Lines, so vast an Army, so many Generals, so much Concern, in the middle of *October*, when the Ways were impassable; and the Confederate Army was entirely ruin'd by their Victory? If their Loss was so unequal, as *Arlus* thinks it was, the *French* might have done what they would; they might not only have lain still in great Tranquillity, without any Apprehension of being disturb'd by the Allies, but might have advanc'd to them, given them Battel, and not only sav'd *Mons*, but ruin'd their Army, if they were so much Superior to them, as their Writers would make the World believe. But if we will allow the *French* to be better Judges of these Matters than our Paper-Politicians, the Difference that

that was made by the Battel between the Two Armies, was to their Disadvantage entirely ; and the Impression which the Loss of that Battel gave them, made them think themselves never safe ; as if neither Weather, nor Entrenchments, nor Numbers, could effectually stop the Progress of this Victorious Army, though weakned by 3 Sieges, and a Battel equal to 3 more. They shew'd plainly by all their Motions, they thought nothing impossible to such an Army that could beat 100,000 Men, the best Troops of *France*, through such Entrenchments, or in the Language of the Learned *Arlus*, through such *unequal Fortresses*.

This short Account, I'm perswaded will satisfy you that the Battel of *Tamiers* was more glorious in it self than that of *Landen*, more advantageous in its Consequences, more necessary to be fought, and that it turn'd the Scale more in Favour of the Conquerors. Why then must it be treated in so cold a manner ; nay, censur'd and condemn'd ; while the *French* think *Landen* an eternal Honour to that Nation : And that they can never do too much Honour to him who gain'd it ? Why can't they, who love to imitate their dear Friends the *French* in their Government and Politicks, learn a little from them how to value a Victorious General, and the Battels he has won for them ? The *French* have made successful Wars for many Years, and can recount the Names of many great in Arms ; and yet are always ready to do Justice to every new Name, that brings by his Fortune and Conduct fresh Glory to their Nation ; But we, God knows, have but one
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to boast of, that has by his Success done much Honour to his Countrey; and him we are weary of. We were once so wonderfully Grateful, that the happy Conduct of one Campaign was thought, or said at least, to be *retrieving* the Honour of our Arms; but now the gaining of a Victory, one would think, were receiving a Disgrace. How must *Boufflers*, and *Tallard*, and *Villeroi*, and *Vendome*, and *Villars*, and the rest of the *French* Generals, who have been unfortunate this War, bless themselves, that they are not *Englishmen*, when they see the Man who has beat them round, treated in this injurious Manner in his own Countrey, after such Services, as the rest of the World never think they can do him too much Honour for? What Usage must this General have expected had he lost the Battels he has won; had he in any single Instance been unfortunate; had but one ill Day succeeded the many Glorious ones he has shin'd in? If so severe an Account be demanded of *Taniers* won, what a Reckoning would there have been, had that Battel turn'd against him? What can be more unjust than to impute to a Design of prolonging the War, a Battel which was fought for no other end, but that the War might not be needlessly prolong'd? A Battel, without which, the rest of that Campaign must have been spent without Action, and perhaps this last also? For we could not have carry'd our Arms into the *Artois*, while *Brabant* was so much expos'd, as it was before the taking of *Mons*; which would consequently have thrust the Work of this Year one Campaign at least backward. But if the Necessity,

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the Glory, and Advantage of this Victory can't keep off these Examiners, you may be well assur'd it will bear Examination: I have heard a good deal of it, and by all I can find, there never was a Battel, for which there was a more unanimous Concurrence of all Parties, than there was here. And the Delay that happen'd, was not only to wait for a few Troops, but for Bread, which Men who had been continually marching for Seven Days together, were not very fit to fight without; besides, the Troops they stay'd for, were not a few, and there was a great Number of Officers with them; and 'tis most ridiculous to fancy Troops were not worth staying for, because they did not engage. At that rate, all *Corps de Reserve* are very foolish and unnecessary Things. Might there not have been an occasion for Troops, because there was not? Or is it no Encouragement to Men that do engage, to know there are others ready to sustain them upon Occasion? But 'tis endless to argue with the real or affected Ignorance of these Men: 'Tis no great Complement to our Generals to suppose they understand their Business; and we ought always to presume they concert their Matters well, unless we are sure of the contrary; which we may easily believe neither these Writers, nor their Masters are, in the Case before us; since they were neither at the Consultations of our Generals themselves, nor pretend to any Correspondence with those that were. And therefore, to insinuate that they did not consider Things so maturely as they should have done, is extreme Impudence. Those *Unequal Fortresses*,
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indeed, which the Enemy had thrown up, were, I have heard, more and greater than they were thought to be: Our Generals knew they were Entrenching; but neither believ'd so much Work could have been done in so little Time, nor that the Fears of the Enemy could make them think so much was necessary. But this serv'd only to render the Victory more Glorious: And notwithstanding all their *Fortresses*, had the Orders, which, to prevent all Mistakes, were given in Writing, been rightly executed, the Price of it had been much cheaper than it was. But there is no need of entring further into the Particulars of this Battel, to shew the Folly and Malice of this most profligate Libeller, and the rest of his Companions. The Event sufficiently proves it was no *Counter-Step* to our other Successes; and the whole Conduct of the Duke, to any Reasonable Man, is a Demonstration, it could not be design'd for one; since had he a mind to prolong the War, he might have done it very much at his Ease, without being at the least Pains for it, or giving the least Suspicion of designing it. For I have already shewn you, he could have done nothing in *Flanders*, unless he had been join'd by a Body of *Imperial Troops*; which you may imagine did not come without sending for; nor could they have been had for sending for, if the Duke had done nothing more towards it. These Troops could not have been got, had not the War been carry'd out of *Italy*; and that could not have been, had not Pr. *Eugene* been supported as he was; had not 8000 *Prussians* been sent to reinforce him one Year, and 10000 *Hessians*,

Hessians, besides a Body of *Palatines*, the next and none of these, 'tis certain, had been sent, but for the Duke of *M.* Nor even after the *Italian* War was at an end, would the Emperor have consented that these Troops should come to *Flanders*, had not the Danger the *Empire* was under from the Neighbourhood of the K. of *Sweden* been remov'd ; which, there is Reason to think, the Duke's Journey to *Als Ranstat*, contributed a great deal to.

Thus, you see, the very Possibility of Acting with Vigor in *Flanders*, is owing to the Man who is now accus'd of a Design to prolong the War. But this is not all : When these Troops were in *Flanders*, had they in the Winter been suffer'd to return, they could never have come back again to any purpose ; so much Time would have been spent in going backwards and forwards, to and from Quarters at so great a Distance ; besides the Burden they would have been to the Country they must march thro'. To make therefore these Troops useful, 'twas not enough to bring them to *Flanders*, but *Ways and Means* must be found to keep them there ; which was from the first very hard to do, and every Day grows more and more difficult. Had the Duke now a mind to prolong the War, what a fine Opportunity is here ? 'Tis but sending these Troops home, and nothing is so easy as to say, 'Tis impossible to keep them there any longer : For the States of *Brabant* and *Flanders* do already say this, That these Troops are so much in Debt, that they are not able to subsist them in their Winter-Quarters. And this they have persisted in

to that degree, that nothing but the most pressing Instances of the Duke could prevail with them, to make one Effort more, in a Point of so much Importance to the Common Cause. What now can be more senseless and ridiculous, what more unjust and villanous, than to accuse such a Man of prolonging the War unnecessarily? What have the poor People of *England* done, to be so grossly impos'd upon? Or what Treatment does such a detestable Writer deserve from them, that uses such base and vile Artifices to corrupt their Judgments, and incense them against those who have done their Country the truest, the most faithful, and most important Services? Farewel Gratitude, and Justice and Honesty, and all common Sense, if such Opinions can be entertain'd of a General, who, instead of Prolonging the War, has precipitated it in a manner that will hereafter seem incredible, and by a strange Rapidity of Success and Victory, has outdone our most forward Hopes, and by all his Actions given the World the most convincing Proofs, that he never thinks he can put an end to it too soon.

If any thing in the World be certain, I think this is, That the D. of *M---* has not prolong'd the War in the Quality of *General*: Whether what they impute to him in his other Capacity, as *Plenipotentiary*, has any better Grounds for it, shall be the Business of another Letter. In the mean time, I am perswaded, you will not be in haste to hear what I have to say upon that Subject; since nothing can be more improbable, than

THE
Negotiations
FOR A
Treaty of Peace,
In 1709.
CONSIDER'D,
In a Third Letter
TO
A Tory-Member.

Part the First.

Justitiane prius mirer; Belline Laboram?

The Second Edition.

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. Baldwin near the Oxford-Arms
in Warwick-Lane: 1711.

T H E

Negotiations

FOR

THE

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CONSIDERED

IN A THIRD LETTER

TO

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* * * Decemb. 22. 1710.

S I R,

SINCE you are pleas'd to say you have receiv'd Satisfaction in what I have written of the *Management of the War*, I will now give you the fair and plain Account, you desire, of what has been doing these Two Years, with Respect to Peace: And I will shew you how the Negotiations at the *Hague* and *Gertruydenberg* came both to fail of the Success that was expected from them. This is a Task which, I confess, at this time I should wish to be excus'd from; since you own your self convinc'd, from the D. of *M.*'s Conduct in the War, that no particular Blame can lye upon him, with Relation to a Peace; which was all I undertook to prove to you: But I am on so many Occasions made sensible, how very little this Affair is understood, that I can't refuse telling you what I know of it. I every Day meet with something or other that convinces me, how much this Matter wants to be explain'd; there being no Point that People are so uneasy at, or so much in the dark about, and consequently in which they can be so easily impos'd on by the false

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Insinuations of those, whose Interest it is to lay all the Load they can upon the late *M.* which they can do no way more effectually, than by representing them engag'd in a black Design to perpetuate the War, and the *D. of M.* at the Head of it. This is a Calumny they are concern'd to fasten on him and his Friends, on a double Account; not only to justify their strange hard Usage of them, but to remove from themselves the *O-dium* they have Reason to fear, may in a little time lie heavily upon them, notwithstanding their present Majority. For if the Fruits of so Glorious a War should be lost, which they seem already apprehensive of, and we should be at last forc'd to submit to an ill Peace, they know True *Britains* will be apt to ask the Reason of it; and therefore those Gentlemen are already fencing against the evil Day, by throwing, if they can, upon the Old *M.* — the Blame which must otherwise fall upon themselves: And that it can fall no where else, you will be soon satisfy'd, when I have shewn you, that the ill Success of these Negotiations is owing to no wrong Conduct in the *D. of M.* or in any other Person concern'd in them on the part of the Allies; but that instead of Reproach and Blame, all their Ministers employ'd in this Affair, have deserv'd the greatest Commendation and Esteem for the Fairness, Unanimity, and Steadiness they have acted with, to the great Disappointment of the Enemy, who had Reason and Experience enough on their side, to flatter themselves, that in an Alliance consisting of so many parts, and of such different

ment Interests, some might be tempted, by the large Offers made them, to desert the Common Cause; which wou'd force the rest, to comply on cheaper Terms. *France* has, not on this Occasion been wanting to it self, in repeating and improving, if possible, its usual Artifices: What has rendred them unsuccessful, is an unusual Firmness on the Part of the Allies, who have bravely rejected all Separate Views, and have persisted to act with one Spirit in Defence of so good a Cause.

I need not tell you, what Advantage a single Power has over a Confederacy, in treating of Peace, as well as in making War; especially when *France* is that single Power. The *French* have shewn for more than half a Century, that there is no Artifice so base, they won't employ to compass their Ends; no Promises so fair, no Asseverations so solemn, they won't make, to amuse and divide those they treat with. They are so far from keeping the Treaties they make, that they intend to break them at the very time they are making them: They have never in any one Treaty, since that of *Munster*, troubled themselves with executing what had been promis'd in the most ample Words, after the Treaty was once sign'd: Nay, sometimes after they had induc'd the Principal Allies to consent to a Treaty, they have in the very first Congress for a General Peace, discover'd their Infincerity. This, one who is so well acquainted as you are with the History of *Europe*, knows to be true of all the Treaties *France* has made for these last 50 Years.

To go no further back than the Treaty of *Reswick*, which is fresh in every Bodys Memory ; the *French* were not content, not to execute great part of what by that Treaty they were oblig'd to, and to execute other Parts of it in so scandalous a manner, as defeated in great measure the Intention of the Articles ; but at the very first open Conference, they shew'd what was to be expected from them : What they had promis'd as the Foundation of the Treaty, both at the *Hague*, and at the Court of *Sweden*, who were to be the *Médiators*; they not only refus'd to comply with, but utterly disown'd the having ever promis'd, because it was Verbal only, and could not be shewn under their Hand. And with respect to *England* in particular, 'tis notorious that when my Lord *Portland* demanded the Removal of the *English* Court from *St. Germans*, according to what *Marschal Boufflers* had in the Name of the King agreed to ; the King, when the *Marschal* could not deny the Promise, deny'd his having given him any Authority to make it. But this is a Fault that will, I know, be easily forgiven the *French* King by some Men, for the sake of a Correspondence which could not so easily be carry'd on, if the *St. Germans* Court were remov'd farther off. Fresher still in our Memories, is the strange Part the *French* acted in the famous Treaty of Partition. They were not only solliciting at *Madrid* a Will in favour of *France*, at the time the Treaty was making, but the very Treaty it self, was the great Argument made use of, to induce the *Span*
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Court to consent to such a Will, as the only way to prevent the Partition they were so averse to. And to compleat the Perfidiouſness of *France* in this Affair, when the late King, upon notice of what *Mareschal Harcourt* was doing at *Madrid*, sent a Minister Express to *Versailles* to complain of it, the King of *France* not only deny'd his knowing any thing of the Matter, but under his Hand declar'd, in a Letter to the late King, That tho' a Will should be made in favour of his Family, he would take no Advantage of it, but adhere to the Partition. This is the Prince we have been these two Years treating with; whose many Breaches of Publick Faith, and base Artifices, *Europe* has suffer'd so much by, that no body, who is in earnest for a good Peace, can wonder that the Allies think no Care and Circumspection too great not to be deceiv'd any more; at least, not in so important a Point as the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy; upon which the Safety, and Liberty of us and our Allies, and I may add of all *Europe*, so much depend.

France could never have so great a Temptation to deceive, as now; since, unless they can deceive us, the Point they have been labouring for above 60 Years, must be lost; the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy being the Grand Intrigue, by which they have govern'd all their Motions since the Treaty of *Munster*: For it was with this View, as we see by the Memoirs lately publish'd of that Treaty, that Cardinal *Maxarin* press'd the *Spanish* Match; whose Words in a Letter to the *French* Plenipotentiaries in *Jan.*

46. are so remarkable, that I can't forbear transcribing them. *The Infanta*, says he, being *Marry'd to His Majesty*, we may pretend to the *Succession of those Kingdoms*, notwithstanding any *Renunciation* they may force him to make of it. *L'Infante etant Marié à sa Majesté, nous pourrions aspirer à la Succession des Royaumes d'Espagne, quelque RENUNCIATION qu'on lui en fit faire.* Such is the Conscience of the Cardinal, such the Justice and Goodness of the Cause, the King of *France* has spent so much Blood and Treasure to Support. And shall we not suspect his Sincerity in this Cause, to which Faith, and Honour, and Conscience. and every thing that is Sacred, has been so long prostituted? Can we be too cautious, how we trust the Promises of a Prince, who has shewn on so many Occasions, that his Word is not to be depended on? Or can we think any Security too much, in a Matter of so much Consequence?

But as *France* never had so great a Temptation to Deceive, so it must be allow'd, there is no Case in which the Allies can be so much concern'd not to be Deceiv'd; the Union of *France* and *Spain* being the most fatal thing, that can possibly befall them; which, should it be at last submitted to, must, humanly speaking, in a few Years ruin us and our Allies; tho' not so soon as it would have done, had the *French* been suffer'd to take quiet Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and to finish peaceably by this vast Accession, the Height of Power They were at, when we began the War.

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These Reflections on the general Conduct of the *French*, in all the Treaties they have made for these last 50 Years, will, I doubt not, convince you of the Necessity there was for the Allies to refuse entering into any Conferences for a General Peace, till some Preliminaries were first settled, as a Foundation on which it should be built. But before we come to consider the Preliminaries themselves, that you may the better judge of the Sincerity of *France*, I must observe to you, That they had previously, by their Embassaries, been feeling the Pulse of the *Dutch*; and by the mighty Professions they made of the sincere Desires of the King to put an End to the War, they obtain'd some private Conferences the beginning of the last Year; in which the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* to King *Charles*, was always suppos'd as the first Step towards a Treaty; and for the rest, they hop'd the *Dutch* for their Part would not be very difficult, since they were assur'd, that in other Points they might have their own Terms; and not only be secur'd by a good Barrier, in which the *French* were pleas'd to be very Liberal, but likewise be made very easy in relation to Trade. The *Dutch*, who on this Occasion shew'd they understood the *French*, as well as the *French* thought they did them, appear'd to be very well pleas'd to hear of Overtures of Peace, and express'd great Readiness to enter on a Treaty; but that they could do nothing without the Concurrence of their Allies, to whom they communicated what had pass'd; and in order to a Treaty, gave Leave to the
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Ministers of *France* to come to *Holland*; first to Monsieur *Rouille*, and afterwards to the Marquis *de Torcy*; who both tim'd their coming thither, too remarkably not to be taken notice of. The D. of *M.* made two Voyages that Spring to *England*, one in the Beginning of *March*, N. S. which was the soonest the Affairs of the War would admit of his Return, after the Campaign of *Lille*; the other about the End of *April*, when he went to communicate to the Queen what had pass'd, and to receive Her Instructions: Now Monsieur *Rouille* came to *Holland*, almost as soon as the D. was gone from thence the first time; and the Marquis *de Torcy* follow'd soon after the D.'s leaving it the Second: By which it should seem; they thought they might make some Advantage of his Absence; and that it was for their Master's Service, to have the *Dutch*, as much as they could to themselves, as the likeliest way to procure such a Peace as they had a mind to. I can't but observe on this Occasion, that the Gentlemen, who are so angry with the D. of *M.* have the Happiness to have the *French* on their Side, in what relates to Peace as well as War: For they too, it should seem, dislike the D. for a *Plenipotentiary*, as much as they do for a *General*; much less can they endure the Thoughts, that he should be both; since they are sure to be obstructed by him in all their Designs, and can make neither War nor Peace to their Minds, as long as he is at the Head of them. These are the Sentiments of the *French*; and in them 'tis natural
 enough;

enough; but sure this must seem strange Language here in the Mouths of Men, who would be thought to be the implicate Admirers of Her M——'s Royal Wisdom: 'Tis but an odd way, for a Party to express their great Deference to the Judgment of a Sovereign they tell you they Adore, to ridicule the Choice She has made of a Plenipotentiary. Infallibility, I confess, is no Part of the Prerogative, tho' it seems to be growing, fashionable of late with these Men, to think, or rather say so; which makes it the more extraordinary for them, to Censure Her M——y so freely as they do; which a very little Modesty would keep them from; in this Point at least, since all the Allies approve Her Choice, and the Emperor has done the same thing himself. These two great Princes think those the fittest Persons to treat a Peace, who have carry'd on the War with such Success; whose Conduct shews, that they have nothing so much at Heart, as the Interest and Glory of those they serve; and that they think nothing so truly an Honour to themselves, as to finish this great War by a safe and honourable Peace. These are the Views the D. of M. and Pr. Eugene have acted with, and 'tis this has recommended them to the Favour of these Princes, who from the Experience they had of them as *Generals*, chose them for their *Plenipotentiaries*. But the *French* it seems, and their Friends here, are of another Mind; and for this Reason Monsieur *Rouille*, and the Marquis *de Torcy* came neither of them into *Holland*, till the D. of M. had

had left it: Which was a plain Proof, that they had some Designs which they fear'd by would not come into; and that in his ap-
 Pr. *Eugens*'s Absence, they hop'd the States by the great Inclination they express'd for Peace, might be drawn in to consent to some Points, which might either produce a Treaty to their Minds, or divide the Allies among themselves. This they hop'd to do these two ways; first, by gaining their Consent to a Partition, which they had never absolutely declar'd against; and next, by offering to them, in Consideration for that, a greater Barrier than they thought consistent with the Interest and Honour of the House of *Austria*. The First of these they knew the *Emperor* would not agree to, and neither the *Emperor* nor *England* to the Latter. And from this Occasion and Ground for Division, they promis'd themselves great Success. But to their Surprize, the Firmness of the States was so great, that as they would absolutely reject nothing, so neither would they agree to any thing separably from the rest of the Allies, nor enter into any Treaty, but jointly with the *Queen* and the *Emperor*, who, to shew their Readiness to hearken to any reasonable Terms of Peace, that would answer the End for which they went into the War, immediately upon notice of the Proposals the *French* had made, sent to the *Hague* the D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*; the first was attended by my Lord *Forbushend*, and the other was soon follow'd by Count *Zinzendorf*. And both these Ministers distinguish'd themselves in these Negotiations, w

ly much for the Satisfaction of all the rest; my Lord *Townsend* particularly, has by his good Sense, Integrity, Openness, and Affability, acquir'd the universal Esteem of the States, and all the rest of the Allies, beyond what could be hop'd from so young a Minister, and to such a Degree as will always be remembered to his Honour in that Country; however it may be deny'd or forgot in this. If therefore you don't meet with his and Count *Zinzendorf's* Names in what follows, I must desire you would suppose of them, what I say of the Two Generals, so far at least, as to think they did not in any thing of Moment ever differ from them.

But to proceed: Upon the Arrival of these Ministers at the *Hague*, Conferences were daily held with those of *France*, to settle Preliminary Articles. In the treating of which, their Insincerity soon discover'd it self, and great Reason was given to suspect, their chief Aim was to amuse and divide Those they seem'd so much in haste to agree with; That if they could not get such a Peace for themselves as they desir'd, the Campaign at least might be lost to the Allies. For it was very observable, that they easily agreed, and in a very little time after these Conferences were begun, to all the Demands of *England* and *Holland* for themselves, tho' some Articles were contain'd in both, which the *French* never dreamt of being ask'd, when the first Overtures of Peace were made: such as the demolishing of *Dunkirk*, and the giving up many Towns which were no part of the *Spanish* *Netherlands*, at

the time of King *Charles's* Death, nor had in the Course of the War been taken from them. When the first Steps to a Treaty were made, the *French* so little thought of these Demands, that the quitting even *Lisb* and *Menin* was refus'd. But now these extraordinary Points on the Part of *England* and *Holland*, were by the Ministers of *France* readily agreed to, and yet at the same time great Difficulty was made, with respect to what was ask'd for the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*; tho' there was nothing in those Articles, but what was extremely reasonable, and necessary to secure the Dominions of those Princes from the Invasions they would otherwise be expos'd to. There was an Interval of several Days, before the *French* Ministers would treat about these Articles; nor did they at last consent to them, but with a Reserve; and a Declaration that this was beyond their Instructions; and that therefore they must suspend a full Assent, till the further Pleasure of the King was known. Now what could be the meaning of this Management, but to ensnare the Maritime Powers if they could, and draw them into a base Design of sacrificing the Interest of their Allies to their own? And what Use can any body imagine they would have made of this, but to engage the Allies in a Quarrel among themselves, and to take advantage of their Differences, to break the Confederacy, and to entice some of the Members of it by large Offers to come into separate Measures with them? But this Scheme failing, by the firm Adherence of the

the Maritime Powers to the rest of the Allies, there was one Article still remain'd to be adjust'd, which in effect included all the rest, and which would afford the *French* a specious Pretence for breaking off the Treaty whenever they had a mind to it; and that was to settle Terms, on which a perpetual Suspension of Arms should be agreed. No body had ever doubted, but that there was such an Understanding between the *French King* and his Grandson, that the Former could oblige the Latter to Resign the *Spanish Monarchy* whenever he pleas'd; since he not only gave it King *Philip* at first, but had hitherto supported him in it. Accordingly every thing about him was entirely *French*; and the Restitution of *Spain* at least, and the *Indies*, had, as I observ'd before, always been suppos'd: And as this was the Point that occasion'd the War, the first thing settled in the Preliminaries was a perfect and entire Cession of the whole *Spanish Monarchy* to King *Charles* the Third, to be made within Two Months from the First of *June* following: And in case the Duke of *Anjou* should make any Difficulty to comply with this, 'tis expressly covenanted in the Fourth Article, That His Most Christian Majesty and the Allies shall take in Concert the proper Measures to oblige him to it: What was to be understood by taking proper Measures, both Sides were content should not be then explain'd. Thus far look'd well, and one would have thought, the *French* meant in earnest that the Duke of *Anjou* should immediately quit *Spain* to his Competitor:

petitor: But all hitherto was Words on-
 ly, and would signify nothing, unless the
 Execution of this essential Point was effe-
 ctually provided for; and there was but one
 Way of doing this, which was to make this
Cession one of the Conditions of continuing
 the Suspension of Arms, agreed to in the
 34th Article, to the Conclusion of a general
 Peace, which was accordingly done in the
 37th Article, which declares, That this Sus-
 pension shall continue till a general Peace,
 provided the King of *France* executes all that
 is promis'd on his Part in the foregoing Ar-
 ticles, and the whole *Spanish* Monarchy be re-
 stor'd, *rendue & cedee*, to *K. Charles*, as is sett'd
 in these Articles. This Article touch'd
 home, and discover'd plainly, that all the
French pretended to consent to in this Funda-
 mental Point, was mere Grimace; and that
 they meant nothing else but to draw the Al-
 lies into a separate Peace, and leave them to
 get *Spain* as they could: This was the most
 they meant, and I am apt to think, for Reasons
 I will give you by and-by, they did not mean
 so much; but whether they did or not, they
 did not want a specious Cover for their Op-
 position to this Article; they made great Pro-
 fessions of the Sincerity of their King's In-
 tentions; that he would punctually execute
 all that depended upon him; and that he
 would endeavour to persuade his Grandson
 to a Compliance; but that to force him to it,
 and that within so short a Term, was not in
 his Power; that it wou'd therefore be impos-
 sible for the King to consent to this Article;
 and to consent to the rest of the Prelimina-
 ries,

ries, unless an absolute Suspension of Arms were agreed to, wou'd be to leave himself at the Mercy of the Allies, and put himself into a much worse State than before; and these Pretences, you may be sure, wanted no Art to set them off; But to all this 'twas easy to answer, That they were fully persuaded, that if the King were really in earnest in this Matter, he might certainly recall his Grandson without any Difficulty; and provided he acted the fair Part, and did all he could towards it, according to the 27th Article, he might depend upon it, the Allies would take no Advantage of any Words in the 27th, to begin the War again upon him, when he had faithfully perform'd the other Parts of it, and surrendred the Places agreed to be deliver'd up to them in the 25th: That supposing what they objected to this Article, were not a pretended but a real Difficulty, which could hardly be believ'd, the Consequence then would be, that the Allies must either trust to the Sincerity of *France*, or *France* to that of the Allies. As the King, supposing it not in his Power to oblige the Duke of *Anjou* to resign, would by executing the rest of the Treaty be at the Mercy of the Allies; so on the other Hand, if the Allies made a Peace with the King without this Article, they should be at his Mercy for the Recovery of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which was the great Point for which they entred into the War; but which they could never hope to gain, if he did not absolutely abandon his Grandson; which they could by no means depend on, while they had nothing

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but his bare Word for it. Now in this Case, which is more reasonable, for *France* to trust the Allies, or the Allies *France*? This can't be a very hard Question, since *France* has been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith on so many Occasions, that 'tis hard to find an Instance to the contrary. This very War will make two notorious Instances of this remembred to all Ages; the scandalous Violation of the Partition-Treaty, almost as soon as made; and the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy, notwithstanding the most solemn and repeated Renunciations that had been made of it. 'Twou'd be endless to enter into a Detail of all the Complaints of this Kind against *France*, since the *Pyrenean* Treaty. And therefore it can't be reasonable for the Allies to trust those, by whom they have so often been deceiv'd: But 'tis not so with them, they never have been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith in their Transactions with *France*, in any flagrant Case, at least I know of none: But I will venture to add further, that they neither would, nor if they would, can they act a false Part in such a Case as this. They *wou'd* not, they don't think it for their Interest to continue or renew a War unnecessarily; they are sufficiently weary, the Burthen of the War has laid so heavy upon them, that they *wou'd* be glad to have a little Respite, and to be at leisure to cultivate the Arts of Peace, and enjoy as fast as they can some Fruits of it. Thus they always have done; they have hardly had Patience to keep up their Armies till a Peace was sign'd: And 'tis this Humour of the Allies

lies has made the *French* have so little Regard to execute their Treaties with them; besides it must be own'd there is a great Probity, Plainness, and Honesty both in the *Dutch* and *Germans*, which appear in all the Affairs of CommonLife; and have been very observable in their Dealings with the *French* all this War; in which the Allies, notwithstanding the many Provocations they have receiv'd, have in no Instance retaliated; when they could not do it without Breach of Faith. The War in *Flanders* affords many Instances of this; that they have always punctually perform'd whatever Articles they have sign'd; and not made Reprisals, where even honest Men have thought they might have done it, without any Violation of Justice. But the greatest Instance, and the only one I shall name, is their exact Performance of the Treaty of the Evacuation of the *Milanese*; when the *French* had just Reason to fear their Troops wou'd have been detain'd against the Letter of the Articles, in Revenge of the Injustice and Insolence with which they had disarm'd and seiz'd a considerable Body of the Duke of *Savoy's* Troops, at the very time he was in Alliance with them. I need say nothing of our own Country, that *France* could have no Reason to fear any Perfidiousness from home: The Character of Her Majesty is too well known to give the *French* Grounds for any such Suspicion; and had we a Prince of less Renown on the Throne, *France* would have little to fear from him, unless he were supported by his People; which no Sovereign of *England*

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has ever both; when they have thought the War he made unjust. But 'tis not enough to say the Allies would not be false; nor a^t a gainst the Intentions of a Publick Treaty; I think I may affirm, they can't be so. A single Potentate is Master of his own Will, and can a^t without Controul; but a Confederacy can do nothing without a Concurrence of all Parts; which in so unjust a Cause as this there would be no Reason to apprehend. When all the most just and necessary Causes of a War concur, 'tis very hard to keep a Confederacy long together; much less can it be imagin'd it should be kept up to oppress a Prince, who has done all he can to satisfy the Demands of all Parties. Either Honesty or Interest will certainly disarm some of them. No Ally, when he has gain'd all he can hope for by the War, will be willing to continue the Expence of it in Complement to any of the rest, especially when the Cause is manifestly unjust: No, were it ever so just, this is hardly to be hop'd for. When a Confederacy is very successful, Jealousies naturally arise among themselves; and they are more concern'd, that one Part should not be too great Gainers, and have too much to their Share, than that any other should not have enough. Of which we see an Instance, though a very foolish one, among our selves; our present Masters of Politicks, to render the very Successes of the War odious, alarm us with new Fears, which no body before ever thought of; and tell us, The *Dutch* will have by this Treaty a better Country than their own. And if a certain

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Correspondence by way of *Catalis*, has been continu'd, *France* might be assur'd, that no Advantage would be taken of the 37th Article, tho' *Spain* was not relinquir'd in the time stipulated; and that therefore they might safely sign the Preliminaries, for that the War could not be renew'd, since they might depend on it, that *England* would never consent to use in so barbarous a Manner, Prince whom so great a Party among them were always had so much Respect for: And without *England* they know the rest of the Allies could do nothing.

But whether it was more reasonable for the Allies to trust *France*, or *France* the Allies, was not left at this time to general Reflections. What was doing at this very Juncture in *Spain*, gave the Allies abundant Cause to suspect the Sincerity of *France*; that they meant nothing less, than the Restitution of that Monarchy. No body that looks into the accounts of that time, and sees how thick Expresses went one upon another between *France* and *Spain*, can doubt, whether the King and his Grandson did not perfectly well see: And not only the News of that time, but the Facts themselves shew, that the King gave him all possible Assurances, that he would not abandon him, tho' it was necessary for his Affairs to promise it. This, I say, is very plain from what was at that time doing in *Spain*; for tho' the Marq. de Torcy told the Allies, He did not know but K. Philip might be at *Paris* before him, there was not the least Sign of any Intention to relinquir; but on the contrary, there were on

the Part of the D. of *Anjou*, all the Apperances that could be of a Prince, that thought of nothing less. For the War was press'd with the utmost Vigor in all Parts; *Alicia* was besieg'd at a vast Expence, and other Places in *Valencia* were reduc'd with all Diligence; Preparations were made for the Sieg of *Gironne*, and the Army was put into the best Condition it cou'd be, to invade *Catalnia*; and at the same time the Marq. de *B* advanc'd close to the *Portuguese* in *Estremadura*, with a Design to give them Battel; which, against the Opinion of my Lord they unhappily prevented him. This did not look like a Design to quit *Spain* to King *Charles*; but on the contrary, shew'd a Resolution to drive him out of it, if possible. But what gave the Allies a greater Jealousy than all this, was the causing the Prince *Asturias* to be acknowledg'd Presumptive Heir of *Spain* by all the States of the Kingdom; which Ceremony was perform'd with the greatest Magnificence the 7th of *April* that is, about a Month after M. *Rouille* had been in *Holland*; which Proceeding, you may remember, every body was then alarm'd at; such a Step being plainly taken for another End, but to lay in Matter for a new War; or rather 'twas a Declaration, That this End could not be put to this, as long as the Restitution of *Spain* was made one Condition of a Peace. The *French* Ministers had but one Reply to this; That their Master was not answerable for what the D. of *Anjou* had done; but that for his own Part he was Sincere, and would do whatever depended upon him; and that the

therefore, if a Peace was not concluded, it could not lie at his Door. The Allies, tho' they could not think what was urg'd had any Truth in it, yet to shew how far they were from designing to impose upon the King impossible Conditions, thought of an Expedient which could not be refus'd, without discovering, that *France* meant nothing by this Treaty, but to make Peace for themselves, and to leave the Allies involv'd in a War with *Spain*. If it was not in the King's Power to oblige his Grandson to retire out of *Spain*, they declar'd they would be content with his doing what evidently was in his Power; which was to deliver up to them such Places in the *Spanish* Dominions, as were Garison'd by his own Troops. But this Expedient was reject'd; and the Marquis de *Torcy*, thinking, I suppose, that the Allies insisting upon the Duke of *Anjou's* being Recall'd, was a more specious Handle to break off the Treaty upon, than the Refusal of the Expedient they propos'd instead of it, he agreed at last to let the 37th. Article stand as it is now worded; which is perfectly agreeable to the main Design of the Treaty, and to the Tenor of the other Articles; but with a Reserve, as before, to know the King's Pleasure, without whose further Instructions he could not Sign. And thus the Conferences held to settle these Preliminaries, ended the 28th. of *May*, and were the same Day Sign'd by the Allies. The Marquis de *Torcy* immediately set out for *Versailles*, leaving Monsieur *Rouille* behind, to whom he promis'd to return the King's Answer by
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the 4th. of *June* at farthest; which, from the Necessity of the King's Affairs, the Point the Treaty was carry'd to, the Marquis's Rank and Character, and Personal Merit, and the great Protestations he made of his Master's Sincerity, was hop'd would be favourable. But most of all, from his Desire to the Allies at parting, That they would hasten the Ratifications of these Articles, with all the Dispatch they could.

These Hopes the Marquis left with the Allies; and the near Prospect of a good Peace, fill'd all People with a Joy that is not to be express'd. They waited with great Impatience for the 4th. of *June*; 'twas the next Day before the Answer came, upon the Receipt of which, Monsieur *Koville* acquainted the Allies, that the King could not agree to these Preliminaries: The Articles excepted against, were the same that the Marquis had before disputed, those relating to the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*; and the 37th. The Allies were not a little surpriz'd at this Answer, and more at the haughty Air, with which Monsieur *Rouille* in a long Conference on this Subject press'd his Objections; a Behaviour very different from what either he or the Marquis had shewn before; which there being no visible Cause for, they thought it was in great measure Gasconade; that it meant nothing else, but to make what Advantage he could of the Inclinations the Allies had without Disguise shewn to Peace; and that he would at last recede from his Pretensions, when he saw they would not; and that in all Events, they

they could not on their Part give up Articles so reasonable in themselves, and which they had so unanimously agreed to, as absolutely necessary to make a good and lasting Peace. And what they suspected, did in good measure prove to be the Case, at least it seem'd so; for after having insisted with so much Stiffness, upon the Objections he had in the King's Name made, when he perceiv'd it had no Effect on the Allies, his Departure being fix'd for the 6th, the 7th in the Evening, or early next Morning, he waited on the Pensioner; and as an Instance of his great Sincerity, and Concern that the Treaty might not be broke off, communicated to him his Instructions, by which it appear'd that he was impower'd to recede from all the other Points he had before insisted on, excepting that of the 37th Article; which seems to have been a Master-Piece of *French* Artifice: For, if the Treaty must be broke, 'tis as effectually done by insisting upon one Article, as upon Twenty; and which ever Part the Allies took, the *French* would find their Account; for if they could be persuaded to give up that, which in appearance was but one Article, but in effect was the Substance of all, or at least of the most important ones, then it was in the Power of the *French* to make Peace, without obliging the Duke of *Anjou* to quit *Spain*; and if the Allies could not be brought to this, the Point they should break upon was so specious, that the *French* Ministers hop'd for a double good Effect from it; That it would incense the Populace in these Provinces against their

Mini-

Ministers, and set the King right in the Affections of his People, which thro' the continu'd Misfortunes of the War he began to lose: And in this last Point they succeeded perfectly well; there were no Efforts the *French* were not willing to make, to support a Prince, who seem'd to prefer their Safety to his own Glory, and to think no Sacrifice too great to procure his People a good Peace; but their other Point they were much mistaken in; and the breaking of the Treaty had no other Effect upon the Subjects of the *States*, tho' it be a Popular Government, than to fill them with the utmost Indignation against the *French*, and loud Resentments of their constant Injustice and Perfidiousness.

But to return to Monsieur *Rouille*; when he had shewn his Instructions to the Pensioner; which discover'd so much more than he would own before, he took his Leave of him, without proposing any Accommodation or Expedient in lieu of this important Article; and whether the Truth were all out, and there were not some secret Instructions still behind, was more than any body could tell: And tho' this was his Language the 8th. in the Morning, they did not know but he might alter it before Night, when he found the Allies were not to be mov'd, or that he might make a longer Stay; He and the Marquis *de Torcy* both, having often fix'd Days for their Departure, but when the Time came, thought fit to change their Minds. And what made this the more probable, was, that Monsieur *Petkum*, who had all along, without Authority or Character, gone

gone between the Ministers of the Allies and *France*, did that Morning propose to some of the Allies, that *France* should give to them 2 or 3 Towns as an Equivalent for the 17th Article, to be kept by them till *Spain* should be quitted to King *Charles*. But since Monsieur *Petkam* made this Motion as of his own Head, without any Commission from Monsieur *Rouille*, who lodg'd with him, and the Proposal was indeterminate, without either the Names, or fix'd Number of the Towns that should be given, the Allies could not take any notice of it. Besides, had the Offer been never so distinct, and made with full Authority, to give two or three Cautionary Towns, was to evade, and not to satisfy the Intention of the Article; and was in Effect nothing else, but to offer a little better Barrier to the *Dutch*, in Exchange for *Spain* and the *Indies*. In the meantime, Monsieur *Rouille* spent the Day in making Visits of Leave, as designing to set out in earnest for *Versailles* next Morning. When Night was come, and there was no room to hope for any further Step being made on his Part, here the Man who is accus'd of prolonging the War, interpos'd, and shew'd how little he deserves such a Censure. The D. of *M.* sent to the Pensioner, and the other Ministers, to desire a Meeting, to try once more if any thing could be done to save the Treaty: But this Meeting being disappointed, there was an extraordinary Congress of all the Ministers next Morning; in which the Deputies of the *States* having acquainted them of what had pass'd, and af-

sur'd them of their Resolution to push the War with the utmost Vigour, till France was forc'd to consent to a good Peace, Count *Zinzendorff* thank'd the States, in the Name of the *Emperor* and King *Charles*, for the Firmness they had shewn on this Occasion; the D. of *M.* did the same on the Part of the *Queen*; which was follow'd with like Expressions of Satisfaction by all the other Ministers that were present; with very particular Marks of Esteem to the *Pensioner*, whom I have oftē thought the *G*----- of the States, for his wise and prudent Conduct thro' the whole Negotiation. I need not say more, to let you know that he is a plain, grave, wise Man, of great Judgment and Abilities, quiet, unpopular, and uncorrupt.

All Thoughts of Peace being now in apearance over, and Monsieur *Rouille* got the D. of *M.* who was extremely mortify'd at this Change of Things, resolv'd to follow in the Afternoon, and would not give over all Hopes of having still one Interview more with him; to which End he got to *Brussels*, as soon almost as Monsieur *Rouille* and sent Word before to Pr. *Eugene*, (who had been there some Days, to give the necessary Orders for Assembling the Army) but Monsieur *Rouille* was gone, before either the D.--- or Prince could see him: And nothing now was left to the Generals, but to try to do by the Sword, what they could do by Treaty; and to make their way to Peace by a good Campaign.

This, I can assure you, from what I have observ'd my self in the Progress of this

fair, and the most exact Information I could get from others, is a plain and true Account of these Negotiations thus far; in which one sees on the Part of *France*, violent Suspicions of Insincerity through the whole Treaty, working its way by all the Methods of Address and Artifice, which they are so great Masters of: But in the Allies, Plainness, Uniformity, and an unshaken Constancy; every thing is open and Above-board, without any Divisions in their Conferences with the *French*, or any violent Heats among themselves; even in the great Point of the Barrier, which the *French* had hopes might make a Breach between the *Dutch* and *Imperial* Ministers: But by the Prudence of the contending Parties themselves, and the Fairness and Temper, with which the D. of *M.* only interpos'd; this difficult Point was amicably adjusted; and the Disputes upon it produc'd no Effects that the *French* could be any Advantage of. I believe you have not forgot, I am sure I have not, how Peopled here in *England* reason'd upon these Concessions: While the Preliminaries were like to take Effect, some Men were by no Means help'd; they thought Care enough was not taken of *England*; which should make us hope, that they will some time or other obtain better Terms for us: And but in the next Treaty more Regard will be had to the Trading Interest of *Great Britain*, than the late *M.* have shewn. And no sooner were the Preliminaries rejected, than the Men, who thought but just before this was too little in them, would have

persuaded us, there was then a great deal too much, and that it was unreasonable to insist on such high Demands; especially to oblige a Great King, whom they have always admir'd, to Dethrone his Grandson; tho' all such invidious Expressions were purposely avoided in the Articles; and no body, as I have observ'd before, doubted, but the King, if he were in Earnest dispos'd to satisfy the Allies, could do it without Difficulty. Such is the Dexterity of these Men in finding Faults, while to their great Discontent they are Spectators only: We shall see, whether they are as dextrous in avoiding them, when they tread the Stage themselves. They are sure to have something to oppose, let a M. or General they don't like, take which Part he will of a Contradiction, and that upon any Subject whatsoever, whether Peace or War; if he advises acting offensively in any Part, he is told, That is wrong: Well, let the same M. upon Alteration of Circumstances, or further Experience, advise a Defensive War in the same Place, That is wrong too. If he is against fighting, 'tis because it would be a Step to Peace; if he is for it, he intended a *Counterstep*. In the same Manner they reason in what concerns Peace; If a M. advises Peace, be sure he is well paid for it; if he advises against it, 'tis to perpetuate the War; if to facilitate a Treaty, he is willing to give up some part of the *Spanish Monarchy*, he shall be accus'd of betraying us to *France*: If according to his Instructions he insists upon the whole; 'tis plain he aims at nothing by such high Terms, but to render

der all Treaties impossible. If he acts neither one or other of these Parts by himself, but in Conjunction with the rest of the Allies, and is rather willing to hear their Opinions, than forward to give his own; and is so far from assuming to himself a Part that may particularly distinguish him, that he does not so much lead the rest, as he is led by them; yet a Fault must be found where there is none, and that must be all laid on him; which were it a Fault, he has perhaps the least Share in. One while we are told, That the War is continu'd to please the *Dutch*; another, That we are to be ruin'd to complement the Emperor, and that *England* is the *Dupe* of the War; and at other times, That no Side can find their Account in the War, which yet all have agreed to continue, but the General and Five or Six of his Faction: All these Inconsistencies can go down with the Party almost at the same time; nay, in the same Breath: but not a Word to be heard of the Insincerity, or Perfidiousness of *France*. Thus the D. of M. is with them a *Dutch-Man*, an *Imperialist*; a *French Man*, or any thing else but what he ever was, and ever will be in Spite of all their Provocations; a True *Englishman*; which I am afraid is one main Cause they are so angry with him; he had too great a Hand in the Revolution to be forgiven; and if his Successes be not stopt, he will put it out of some Men's Power to defeat the Protestant Succession.

But to set this Matter in a full Light, and let you see how very ridiculous and absurd all these Clamours are, with Respect either to the
D.

M. in particular, or to the Conduct of the Allies in general, with Relation to these Preliminary Articles; I will shew you, First, That if to insist on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of M. is not to be blam'd for it: And, Secondly, That to insist on that Article was in it self right, and necessary in Order to a good Peace.

First, I say, That if to insist on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of M. is not to be blam'd for it. First, because if he did insist, 'twas what he was oblig'd to; he had no Authority to do otherwise. All the World knows, that both Houses of Parliament did the Beginning of that Year (1709) address the Queen, That no Peace should be made with *France*, without an entire Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy: And Her Majesty was pleas'd to express Her self very well pleas'd with their Address, and that she was perfectly of the same Opinion. This Address being thus approv'd, no Minister had any Power or Authority to conclude a Treaty upon other Terms, without Her Majesty's Command; nor could such a Command be expected from Her, without Advice of Her Council: And I believe a Council will not easily be found, that will advise against the joint Opinion of both Houses of Parliament. If therefore the 37th Article was insisted on; the D. is not to be blam'd; he did but his Duty, and could not justify his doing otherwise; which, if he had, would as certainly have been made a high Crime and Misdemeanor, as his not doing it is now made a Matter of Complaint against him. There is no Room
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for any Objection here, unless it could be pretended, that this Address was of his procuring; the contrary to which is as well known, as the Address it self. But tho' 'tis plain, that the D. of M. had no Hand in making this Address, 'tis as plain, that when it was made, he was bound by it; and since that requir'd the Restitution of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, he was oblig'd to insist upon it. So the 37th Article was unanimously adher'd to as it is, by all the Ministers; and their doing so, I shall now shew you, was very right in it self, and necessary in Order to a good Peace.

First, 'tis right in it self, that is, just and reasonable, not hard, or insolent, or inhuman, as these Advocates of *France* would have it thought. For what is the Point in Dispute, but to restore to an injur'd Person, what has been unjustly taken from him? Has not the injur'd Party, by the Fundamental Laws of Justice, a Right to this? Or is not the Party that does the Injury oblig'd to Restitution, where it is possible? And is not this the Case of the *Spanish* Monarchy? I despair of ever proving any Usurpation unjust, if this is not; but if it be unjust, does it alter the Case because the King of *France* has not usurp'd it for himself, but for his Grandson? Am I the less oblig'd to restore what I have unjustly seiz'd, because I have given it to a third Person, provided it be in my Power? Does not the D. of *Anjou* know, as well as his Grandfather, that it is a violent Usurpation? Can he of Right keep, what the other had no Right to give? Is it not

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kept plainly for the Use and Benefit of the Giver? Has not the Giver Power to take it from him? Is it not plain, that his Grandson has not kept it thus long, but by the Support he receives from him? And if it be thus manifestly unjust, and the Usurper has it in his Power to make Restitution, is it ill Manners to demand it? Is the *Spanish* Monarchy such a Trifle, as not to be worth insisting on? Shall we Compliment the King of *France*, or his Grandson, with giving up what so many Princes and States have spent so much Blood and Treasure to regain? Can that now be thought consistent with the Safety and Commerce of *Great Britain*, with the Interest and Welfare of our Allies, or with the Liberty of *Europe*, which we ventur'd to begin a War for, under the most unpromising Appearances of ever seeing a good End of it? But it was Nonsense not to risque all, when all was at Stake; there was no room left, but to appeal to Heaven, and take Arms; which gave us a Chance for escaping the Ruin which was otherwise inevitable. This is the Truth of the Matter, this the Point in Dispute. What then do People mean by all their senseless Clamour, of the Hardship and Barbarity of the Allies, in obliging the King of *France* to recall his Grandson? They, who think the Causes of this War such indifferent Things, as not to be worth insisting on any longer, tho' we have so long struggl'd for them, that we have at last got fast hold; these Men, I fear, will in a little time think the same of the Causes of the Revolution too; nay, they already tell us so; they are
crown

grown so insensible to the Fears they were once in, that they begin to think Popery and Arbitrary Power, Innocent harmless things; they now plainly insinuate, that there was no Danger of the Government in Church and State being overturn'd, and that therefore the Revolution was not necessary; and in yessue of these foolish Sentiments, when the Revolution is upon the Point of being unalterably fix'd, they truly are grown weary; and after Twenty Years Labour, don't think it worth a little more Pains to finish the Work, and put an effectual Stop to the Return of those Evils they were once, as well as their Neighbours, so heartily frighten'd with. And 'tis no wonder, if Men who have contracted such a stupid Indolence, and are so indifferent for the Civil and Religious Rights of their own Country, can't see what Sense there is in insisting upon the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy; and are supinely willing to think, (if Non-sense can be call'd thinking) that the Demand of the Allies is either unjust, or at best very rude and unmannerly.

But further: This Demand of theirs is not only right in it self, but necessary in order to a good Peace; and the best way to set this in a clear Light, is to consider what would have been the Consequence, supposing the Allies had not insisted on it. Now to shew you what this would have been, I'll suppose for the present, that the *French* were in earnest, and that if this Article had been recorded from, they would have Sign'd the rest. Which way, now, I would ask, should we

have propos'd to get *Spain*? Can we do it, unless the King of *France* entirely abandons his Grandson? No, certainly; but he has promis'd he will. But is his bare Word a Security that may be depended upon? By no Means. What then? Why, he gives you up 18 many great Towns, which he would not do; if he did not intend to leave his Grandson to himself. Why so? How can the giving up these Towns to the Allies, be thought any Security? Is it any more than giving the Allies a Barrier, which Barrier they would have insisted on, whatever became of *Spain*? How now comes that to be a Security, that the King of *France* would abandon his Grandson, which he must nevertheless have comply'd with, tho' he had abandon'd him? Is it the same thing to part with these Towns, and keep *Spain*, as to part with them and *Spain* too? If not, then his agreeing to give up one, is no Proof he intends to part with the other. Ay, but when the Allies have these Towns, they will force him to it. That I deny. Why so, say they? The Towns are to be deliver'd in two Months; that is, by the middle of *August*; and then the Allies will have time enough to enter *France*, if he sends any Succour to his Grandson. But first, the Surrender that is to be made in two Months, is only of those Towns that are to make the Barrier for the *Netherlands*; those that are to be restor'd to the Emperor and *Empire*, are not to be evacuated till the Exchange of their Ratifications, which is a tedious Work: Besides, tho' it be stipulated that the Towns

in the *Netherlands*, &c. shall be given up in
 two Months, I believe no body wants to be
 old, that things are seldom so punctually
 executed, as to be perform'd nicely within
 the time agreed. But I will suppose for
 once, these Articles had been effectually
 comply'd with within the time, and that
 the Allies consequently would have been at
 liberty to invade *France*, if they had openly
 sent any considerable Succours to *Spain*; but
 what then? Could not they have sent Money
 and Jewels to the Duke of *Anjou*, without
 any danger of Discovery? Or would they
 not have Pretence enough for denying it?
 And would the Allies invade *France*, upon a
 bare Suspicion of sending such an Assistance
 to *Spain*? And for Men, tho' a Body of
 Troops could not have been sent thither
 without being known, might not what Num-
 bers they pleas'd of the *French* Troops, that
 were in *Spain*, have stay'd there, under a
 colour of Desertion, or have been detain'd
 by the Duke of *Anjou's* Order, upon some
 kind Pretence or other; a Trick the Grand-
 Master has practis'd often enough, for the
 Grandson to learn it from him? Well, but
 suppose *France* had neither openly, nor un-
 der-hand, given the Duke of *Anjou* any As-
 sistance for that Summer, (not that I can by
 any Means grant it) how long would that
 be held? Or what Use would the Allies
 be made of it? Could the Troops we had
 in *Spain*, have ever-run the Kingdom
 without further Help, or have driven out the
 Duke of *Anjou* in one Campaign? That I
 think won't by any body be pretended.

Of could a sufficient Reinforcement have been sent time enough to them, either from *Italy* or *England*, to do any great Matters that Year? That, I suppose, will be pretended as little, by those that consider, it was *Jun* when these Preliminaries were finish'd. 'Tis plain then, *Spain* could not have been gain'd that Year, unless the Duke of *Anjou* had consented to Relinquish it: Let us then in the next Place suppose the Summer spent and the Armies gone out of the Field, and see what we are to expect then. A Peace is made with *France*; the Allies have got each of them their respective Shares, and have nothing more to hope for; they renew perhaps the Grand Alliance, with great Expressions of mutual Zeal; the *Emperor* at least and the Maritime Powers; but some of the lesser Princes might possibly shew themselves disgusted, and think they have been neglected: For, as the Preliminaries are not settled, 'tis certain more than one of them are not satisfy'd. Suppose the King of *Prussia*, or Duke of *Savoy*, for Example, had thought due Care had not been taken of them 'tis plain in that Case, their Alliance is no longer to be depended on; and either of these falling off, would very much weaken the Confederacy; especially the last, whom the *French* would be very glad to draw into their Interests. But suppose none of the Allies have any of these Repentments, or at least stifle them, and all consent to renew the Grand Alliance; what becomes of the Armies upon leaving the Field? Is it not certain, that they will on all Sides dismi-

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great part of their Forces? Will not the Maritime Powers send home the Foreign Troops in their Pay, except such as *Holland* keeps for the Defence of their new Frontier? Shall we hear of any more Armies upon the *Rhine*, or in *Savoy*, when they have made Peace, when the Articles of the Treaty have been all Executed, and there is no more any Enemy to molest them, no Cause of Complaint, or Pretence for a new Campaign left? I think nothing can be surer, than that this would have been the Case; the Allies would have thought no more of War in the Places that have been hitherto the Seats of it, nor have made any Preparations for taking the Field another Year. All Sides would have made what Haste they could to have less'n'd the Burthen, which during the War they had been oppress'd with. *Holland* particularly wou'd have had full Work to take Care of their new Frontier, to provide so many Towns with sufficient Garrisons and Magazines, and settle what Foot the several Parts of their new Acquisitions should be put upon, with Respect to War, Trade, and Subsidies; and besides the great Expence this would for the present put them to, they would be at a very great Charge to pay the Arrears due to the Foreign Troops, without which they could not be dismiss'd. Add to this the extraordinary Allowance, which upon their Dismissing is to be made to carry them home: This would put the States under a Necessity of retrenching, as much as possible, the Expences of the next Year: And this last Article *England* would be proportionably

portionably affected with. Now I would be glad to know, what should hinder the King of *France*, from the Minute the Allies dismiss their Troops, to give what Assistance he will to *Spain*, provided it be not done too grossly, but gradually, by insensible Steps; and by those many ways of Artifice, which the *French* are Masters of? If they make a Peace, they may disband 60 or 80,000 Men, or more: And what shall hinder these Men from going into *Spain* to seek their Bread? What shall hinder the King of *France* from giving secret Orders for this; and when tis complain'd of, from positively denying, and perhaps seemingly forbidding it? And may not the Duke of *Anjou*, by this Means against the next Spring, have a greater Army than the Allies can bring against him? And how then are we to get *Spain*? Will the Allies raise new Armies, and make a new War upon *France* in *Flanders*, upon the *Rhine* and in *Saxony*, because some Men have insensibly stole out of *France* into *Spain*, against the express Order of the King; which you are sure will be pretended? You don't know the Sweets of Peace, or how unwillingly People are, who have once laid down their Arms, to take them up again: If you think the Allies could be brought to this, or that any Armies would take the Field against *France*, after a Peace was once made, what then is to be hop'd for? Why, I think nothing more than this; that the *Dutch* and the *Emperour* would contribute for a little while, perhaps for one Campaign, some Money and Troops to act in Conjunction with *England* against *Spain*;

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in which no great Success can be expected, considering the numerous Army I have shewn you, the Duke of *Anjou* might and would have. Now if this upon the Trial of one Campaign, were found to be the Case, I am afraid *Holland* would not be very willing to continue the Prosecution of so expensive a War; and the whole Weight of it another Year would lye upon *England*, except a very little that might be expected from the Emperor: And what could this end in, but in the Ruin of *Spain*, and the Loss of *Spain*. For the most that could be expected from this War would be, that the Duke of *Anjou* would offer a Partition, such as I have mention'd in my first Letter, but with no Option in the Case; he would certainly keep *Spain* and the *Indies*, and give the other Part to his Competitor: And if that be accepted, what becomes of *England*, which is so much interested in the Recovery of *Spain*. And if it be not accepted, what shall hinder the *French* King from assisting his Grandson after one Year, more openly; and taking upon him to mediate a Peace, that is, to force such a one as he pleases upon us. For how can we help our selves? Shall we be in Condition to quarrel with him, when we have been exhausted Two Years more with such an expensive War, while he has been enjoying all the Advantages of Peace; to repair the Breaches the War had made in his Affairs; to restore Commerce; retrieve the Publick Credit; remedy the ill State of his Finances; look into the Condition of his Fleet, and put himself into the best Posture he can for

a new War; if the Support of the Duke of *Anjou* makes it necessary? No, sure; we shall never think our selves in a Condition to break with him; nor shall we be able to persuade our Allies to it: No Part therefore will be left us, but to submit to such a Peace with his Grandson as he shall in his Pleasure think fit to prescribe. I need not enlarge upon the Difficulties of making War in *Spain*, after what I have said in my First Letter: 'Tis easy to see, how the Duke of *Anjou* may find us Work enough for Two or Three Years, if he do but avoid coming to a General Action; Sieges will cost Time, as well as Men and Money; and many must be made before such a Kingdom can be reduc'd; and that will give the King of *France* Opportunity enough to do what he will, to support his Grandson seditiously or openly, or to prescribe a Peace, or begin a new War, which 'tis always easy to find a Pretence for; and we are sure he can't want Inclination to do whatever is in his Power, which such a Cause calls for; nor is he so little known, as to leave us the least Room to think, that any Treaties or Engagements can bind him, when Inclination and Power tempt him to break thro' them. His whole Reign is one continu'd Proof of this: I have said something of it already; and therefore shall add but one Instance, which is a little Parallel to the Case before us; and that is, the Manner in which he kept the Promise he made the *Spaniards* at the *Pyrenean* Treaty, Not to assist the *Portuguese*, who were then at War with them. Never was Treaty made with
more

more Solemnity; and yet what did those Engagements signify? All the time the Treaty was making, *France* was concerting Measures to support the *Portuguese*; and the King, the present King, who was then but Young in Perfidy; had so little Regard to cover or palliate what he did, that he sent in the Face of all the World, an Army to the Assistance of those, whose Defence he had renounc'd, commanded by a Mareschal of *France*. And can we after such an Instance, depend upon his Word? Has he not much greater Temptation to assist *Spain* against us, than he had then to support the *Portuguese* against *Spain*? Is not the Honour of his Grandson the Interest of his Family, and the Acquisition of so great a Monarchy, of infinitely more Concern to him, than the Defence of *Portugal* could be? A Man must be blind, not to see there is no Comparison between the Two Cases; and 'tis inexcusable when we are sensible of this, to think, that a Prince who has been so false in one Instance, can be ever true in the other.

The Sum of this Argument is, That if a separate Peace be made with *France*, upon the Foot of the Preliminaries, without the 37th Article, nothing can hinder *France* from assisting the Duke of *Anjou*; and if he be assisted by *France*, we can never be able to drive him out of *Spain*; and consequently if *Spain* be ever had, it must be by Treaty: If therefore no Peace can be a good one without *Spain*, then the 37th Article is necessary in Order to a good Peace: Which is the Point I was to prove. I know but one thing

can be said against what I have advanc'd upon this Head; and that is, That the Allies, tho' they make Peace with *France*, should still keep up their Armies, and then *France* won't dare to give the Duke of *Bourbon* any great Assistance: But First, I have already shewn, that this is a very unreasonable Supposition; the Allies most certainly would not continue to keep up their Armies, were a Peace with *France* once made: But let us now suppose they would, how will this mend the Matter? If we keep on Foot as great Armies as we have now, we should be no more at Liberty to send Men to *Spain*, than we are now: And if we sent any considerable Number to *Spain*, they wou'd be wanted elsewhere; and the K. of *France* would have nothing to fear from us, for want of a sufficient Strength to act offensively, in Case we should think our selves sufficiently provok'd to it, by any thing he does in Violation of the Treaty; nay, considering the Number of Towns given up to the Allies, which all must have Garisons in them; and those not very small ones to keep their new Subjects in Awe, we should want a greater Army in *Flanders* than before, to be in a Condition to act offensively: And if such Armies must be kept up, I can't see why they should not be employ'd; that is, why we may not as well continue the War; or to what Purpose we should make Peace. To me, continuing the War seems much more eligible, than such a Peace, for this plain Reason, that *France* would certainly make a great Advantage of Peace, while we must, under the Name of Peace, continue in a State

State of War, without the Fruits of it. For Example, all we have done this Campaign, would upon that Supposition have been undone; and we should have been so much farther off than we are, from putting *France* under a Necessity to give us *Spain*. For tho' the Successes of this Year have been so slighted, as to be thought not worth mentioning, where one would have most expected it; I can tell you, *Doway* alone is in the Opinion of *France*, of that mighty Consequence, that in all the Negotiations that have been carry'd on, since the Refusal of the Preliminaries, to find an Expedient for the 37th Article, *Doway* has always been excepted out of the Number of the Towns that they have pretended to give as an equivalent. Now this and the other Conquests of this Campaign, have brought us much nearer to our End, than if our Armies had gone out of the Field, as they came in, and had done nothing. I must therefore still maintain, that upon all Suppositions, the 37th Article is necessary in Order to a good Peace; unless some real Expedient could be found out, which has hitherto been in vain look'd for: But that and what else has been done towards a Peace, since the Preliminaries were rejected, I must reserve for another Letter. I shall conclude this with shewing you, what at first Sight you will think very strange; and that is, that even a separate Peace could not last Year have been made with *France*; tho' the Allies had been willing to recede from the 37th Article.

You will remember, it was the 8th of *June*, when Monsieur *Rouille* shew'd the Pensioner his Instructions, and declar'd finally, that his Master could not agree to that Article: Now suppose the Allies would have departed from it; could he have sign'd the rest? No; he had no Authority to do that: He must have made another Journey to *Ver-sailles*, to receive the King's Instructions, as well as to inform him of what had pass. And we may easily guess at part of these Instructions, that the King when he found the Allies were content to recede from this Article, would have wanted Amendments to be made to some others that relate to *Spain*; particularly to have those Words left out or explain'd in the 4th, where he is oblig'd to take *proper Measures*, in Concert with the Allies, to oblige his Grandson to quit *Spain*. And 'tis probable he would pretend to new model some of the Articles relating to the *Emperor* and *Savoy*, while he agreed to them in the main: And who knows how much time might have been spun out, in going backwards and forwards; while in the midst of his Concessions, some new Difficulties are started to delay signing; as long as he thinks fit? But supposing nothing of all this, he had a sure Method in Reserve to defeat the whole Treaty: The First Thing to be executed by Vertue of it, was the Surrender of *Mons*, *Namur*, and *Charlevoix*. This was to be done before the First of *July*; but we are sure it wou'd not have been done at all. For when the time came, *Franco* would have pretended it was not in her Power; for these

these Towns were in the Possession of the Elector of *Bavaria*; and when *France* should have demanded a Surrender of them, there was a ready Answer for him, That the Towns were the King of *Spain's*, and that he could not Surrender them without his Order. This we are sure would have been the Case; for tho' it did not come to bear, the Design was form'd, and could not be kept so secret, as not to take Wind: And thus the Treaty could never have had one Step made in the Execution of it; for the King of *Spain*, we may be sure, would not order them to be given up, and 'tis as sure, the Elector would never have given them up without Order, but to make Terms for himself, that he might be restor'd to his *Electorate*, which Affair had been left out of the Preliminaries, and was reserv'd to be consider'd in the Congress, that was to be open'd the very Day on which the Surrender of these Towns was to have commenc'd. He is a wise Man, that can tell how this Difficulty could have been overcome, without fresh Delays, and Loss of Time; and the Disputes this Point would have created, would have put the Execution of all the others so much backward; that I am apt to think this single Point, with good Management, might have taken up as much of the Campaign, as *France* and the Elector had a mind to.

I may add, that it is the Opinion of some Knowing Men, that the Concessions *France* has seem'd to make in other Articles, were never intended to be Executed; and that they would never have been consent'd to, but

but that they knew the Allies could not accept them, as long as the 37th was refus'd. The *English* Plenipotentiaries, they knew, were ty'd by a Vote of Parliament, to insist upon the Restitution of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy; and as long as that was so, they were sure, no other Concessions they could make, could hurt them in the End, tho' making of them was in the mean time of the greatest Service to them, by the seeming Sincerity and Earnestness it shew'd on their Part for Peace, and by the room that gave them to amuse and divide the Allies, and spin out the Time as long as they had Occasion for; and by giving them at last, a Handle to throw the Blame of breaking off the Treaty, upon them, for refusing such good Terms, for the sake of one that could not possibly be comply'd with: These, and the like Purposes, *France* serv'd by making such large Concessions as her Ministers have done to the Maritime Powers in these Articles; but this was only Sporting with them. As long as they kept one Link of this Chain of Articles in their own Hands, the Allies could not be at all the better for having the rest held out to them, nor themselves the worse. But whether this Opinion be true or not, what I have said before, renders it exceeding probable, that *France* never meant the Treaty should take place; they design'd nothing but to gain Time, and when that Purpose was serv'd, they broke off. 'Twas necessary for the King's Affairs, at the beginning of the Year, to make specious Offers of Peace, to quiet the Minds of his People, and induce the Allies

lies to defer the opening of the Campaign, the Severity of the hard Weather having reduc'd his Country to great Misery, and made it impossible for his Armies to take the Field early. But by *June* the Case was a little alter'd, and they began to recover from the Fright they had been in; Methods had been taken to remedy the extreme Want his Capital City labour'd under; an Inspection had been made of what Corn there was in the Provinces; great Quantities had been imported, or were expected from the *Levant*, and other Parts; there was a good Prospect of Summer-Corn every where; the D. of *Anjou* had gain'd a considerable Advantage over the *Portuguese*; and what 'tis probable weigh'd most of all with him, *Mareschal Villars* had made the King believe his Army was in a pretty good Condition; and assur'd him, he was so posted, that it would be impossible for the Allies to force the Entrenchments he had made, or draw him out of them; so that they had nothing to apprehend but a Siege; and that from the Disposition of the Allies, they thought could be no other, than that of *Spain*, the Preparations for it being sent up the *Lys*; and this they hop'd would find the Allies work enough, for a Campaign that began so late; and perhaps the very Want and Famine which at first put them into great Consternation, they might upon further Thoughts see, was in some Respect their Security; since if the Allies should have the good Fortune to attack the *Mareschal* with Success, it would be impossible for them to make much use of their Victory, or penetrate far into a

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Country, where nothing was to be had; and
 Army may make a Famine, but they can't
 follow one. These seem to have been the
 Motives that determin'd them to put an End
 to the Treaty, when they had drawn it out
 into length enough, to answer the Purposes;
 for which it was begun: And then the Mask
 might safely be taken off: And this I take to
 be the true Reason; that *Mons. Rouille* gave
 himself such Airs in his last Conferences,
 and refus'd in the King's Name to agree to
 the 27th Article; without offering any Expe-
 dient at all for it; which was something
 strange, considering the Allies had before the
Marquis de Torcy's Departure, urg'd with so
 much Earnestness the Necessity they were un-
 der to adhere to it. Therefore, I think, this
 can have no other Meaning in it, but that up-
 on the *Marquis's* Return, the State of *France*
 being thoroughly consider'd, 'twas judg'd, that
 they might without any great Risque hazard
 one Campaign more; and that determin'd
 the King to break off the Treaty as he did;
 which, by offering no Expedient, he shew'd
 his Affairs 'did no longer, in his Opinion,
 want.

This, tho' the best Account I can send you
 of this Affair, is, I am sensible, extremely
 short of what it might be: But considering
 the Secrecy, with which things of this Na-
 ture are, and ought to be transacted, I flatter
 my self, you will be content to find I know
 so much of them, rather than wonder I can't
 tell you more. And as imperfect as this Ac-
 count is, if what I have said be true in Fact,
 and

and my Reflections just, you have so much Candor, that I am sure you will allow I have prov'd these Three Things:

First, That neither the D. of M. nor any other Ministers of the Alliance, are justly to be Blam'd for having contributed unnecessarily to prolong the War, by their Management in these Negotiations.

Secondly, That it was reasonable and necessary for them to insist on the 7th Article, in order to a good Peace.

Thirdly, That proceeding from that Article, they would not then have procur'd a Separate Peace with France, whatever it would have done here. All which Points are submitted to your impartial Consideration, and better Judgment.

Your most Faithful

Humble Servant.

H. POST.

And my Reflections that you have
Lest you will see that I am
Lest you will see that I am

P O S T S C R I P T .

And that neither the D. of M. nor any
of the English Nation are so readily
mistaken, if he thinks I shall enter
the Lists with any other Writer,
who can neither speak French nor know
when he hears it. I shall not be mov'd with
the Ignorance and Malice of a Mercenary
Scribler, who treats the D. of M. and the
Victorious Troops he has the Honour to
Command, with so much Insolence, in so
many of his Weekly Libels; and in one of
them, N. 4. villanously calls him a *Cataline*
at the Head of a *Mercenary Army*: Words,
which, I trust, will not be easily forgotten.
What I have said of the Management of
the War, will, I doubt not, support it self
against all his Attacks; who, were he much
abler than he is, has met with more than his
Match, in the most Ingenious Writer of the
MEDLEY; and to his Correction I shall
leave him.

And that neither the D. of M. nor any

And that neither the D. of M. nor any

T 2 0 9 F I N I S .

THE
NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A
Treaty of Peace,

FROM

The Breaking off of the Confe-
rences at the *Hague*, to the End of
those at *Gertruydenberg*,

CONSIDER'D,

In a Fourth LETTER
to a TORY-MEMBER.

[Francis Haye]

PART II.

Cum Domino Pax ista venit—
— *Procul hinc jam Fœdera sunt*
Credidimus Fatis, utendum est Iudice Bello.

L O N D O N,
Printed for *A. Baldwin*, near the *Oxford-arms*
in *Warwick-Lane.* 1711.

THE
NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A

Treaty of Peace
FROM

the Government of the United States
to the Government of the Kingdom of Great Britain

CONCLUDED AT
WASHINGTON
ON THE 17th DAY OF SEPTEMBER
1794

PART II

OF THE TREATY OF PEACE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN

ARTICLE

OF THE TREATY OF PEACE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN

* * * Jan. 10. 17¹⁰₁₁.

S I R,

I Fear you begin to wish you had kept your Desire to your self, and not ask'd my Opinion upon Matters that have grown under my Pen so much beyond the compass, which I at first hop'd they wou'd have come within: bat Patience once more, and this shall be the last time I will trouble you with my Thoughts upon the Management either of War or Peace, till you shall again make it your own Request, to whom I can refuse nothing. To come then to the Business, and resume the Subject where my last left off; I shall give you in this, the best Account I can, of what was done in relation to Peace, from the breaking off of the Conferences at the *Hague*, to the end of those that were held the Year after at *Gertruydenberg*; that is, from *June* the 9th 1709, to *July* the 25th 1710. And that you may have a more distinct View of this Affair, it may not be amiss to divide this Space of Time into three Parts; and consider First, what pass'd from the Return of Monsieur *Rouille*, to Monsieur *Petkum's* Journey to *Paris*, which was about the middle of *November*. Secondly, what Progress was made in this Affair, between

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that Journey and the Arrival of the Marquis *d'Uxelles* and the *Abbé de Polignac*, the *French* Plenipotentiarys, at *Gertruydenberg*: And then give you in the Third place, some Account of the Negotiations during their stay there; since which no Advances have been made on either side in this grand Affair.

First: For what pass between the Conferences at the *Hague*, and Monsieur *Petrum's* Journey to *Paris*, you know without my telling you, that the Negotiations did not entirely cease with those Conferences, but were still kept up, and carry'd on by an intercourse of Letters between Monsieur *Petrum* and the Marquis *de Torcy*; to try if an Expedient cou'd be found out for the 37th Article: the Difficulty in that Article being the only Point for which the Conferences, in appearance at least, were broke off. The Point they offer'd to satisfy the Allies in, was, That the King of *France* shou'd not directly nor indirectly assist his Grandson. You will easily judg of the Importance of this Point, by what I have said in my last Letter; and by that see, that the recovery of *Spain* and the *Indies* depends entirely upon it: for if the King of *France* supports the Duke of *Anjou*, all the Efforts the Allies can make against him, will be to no purpose, since *France* can send more Men and Money to *Spain* in a Month, than they can do in a Twelvemonth; but if the King of *France* will in good Earnest withdraw all Assistance from him, then a *Spanish* War wou'd be but a short Business, since in that Case, there can be no doubt, but that in a little time the D. of *Anjou* wou'd be content to leave the *Spaniards*, or they

they at least wou'd find it for their Interest to leave him. Now, the more important this Point is, the more are the others concern'd to insist upon sufficient Security, not to be deceiv'd; and all that has past hitherto on the Part of *France*, either in former Treatys, or in the last Conferences, give them but too much reason to think, they can never be cautious enough, how they trust to perfidious a Prince in an Affair of so much Consequence. And if you carry these Views with you in your Thoughts upon this Subject, you can't easily take up with their foolish and groundless Insinuations, who wou'd persuade you, that the Allies have been too difficult. As to the Expedients propos'd to secure this Point, all went upon the same Foot with that which Monsieur *Peskum* had propos'd, as from himself, the day before Monsieur *Rouillè* left the *Hague*; That three Towns shou'd be put into the Hands of the Allies, to be restor'd to *France*, when the Affair of *Spain*, &c. shou'd be decided. This was the nature of the Expedient in agitation; and nothing can shew better the Readiness of the Allies to put an end to the War, and the insincerity of *France*, than what past between them upon this Subject. The Towns to be given up for this purpose, must have been either in *Spain*, or on the Borders of it, or on the side of *Alsace*, or in *Flanders*. Whatever cou'd have been done of this kind, was but a poor Expedient for an Article of so much Consequence: and had the King of *France* been in Earnest, one can't think he wou'd have made any difficulty to give the Allies what they were willing to ac-

cept: but as he meant nothing less, than what he was so forward to promise, there was no Security of this sort the Allies cou'd ask, which he did not think too much to grant.

As for Towns in *Spain*, which was the best Security, and most to the purpose, that Expedient had been propos'd, as I told you in my last, during the Conferences at the *Hague*, and was by the *French* Ministers refus'd: and to prevent the Allies from persisting in this Demand, the King soon after put it out of his power to comply with it; otherwise his People, as blind as they are, cou'd not have had any great opinion of his Sincerity in the Desires he express'd for Peace, while he rejected a Condition that was so natural for the Allies to ask; and not only possible, but easy for him to grant; and which the Safety and Interest of *France*, as distinct from *Spain*, were no way concern'd in. That the Negotiations therefore might not continue to rest upon this Point, he took care immediately, that there shou'd be no room left for the Allies to insist on this Demand; and to that end withdrew his Troops out of all the *Spanish* Fortresses, as he did afterwards out of the Kingdom, upon Pretence, indeed, of evacuating *Spain* according to the Preliminary Articles. But that was only a Pretence; for he kept them there all the Summer, to be at hand to assist the Duke of *Anjou* in case his Army shou'd be attack'd, or an Invasion shou'd be made into *Arragon*: tho otherwise the General that commanded them, had Orders not to venture a Battle, but to be on the defensive;

five; as appear'd upon the Duke of *Anjou's* coming to his Army upon the Surprize of *Balaguer* by the Allies, and expostulating with Marechal *Bezons* for not joining upon that Occasion the *Spanish Army*; for which he justify'd himself, by producing the King's Orders. By this middle way the King thought he cou'd deceive the Allies, without abandoning the *Spaniards*: and in the mean time, the Duke of *Anjou*, according to the Direction of *French Councils*, made his utmost Efforts to put *Spain* into a Condition to defend it self, as if they were in earnest to expect no farther Assistance from *France*: which had so good an Effect on the *Spaniards*, that they exerted themselves beyond what cou'd be expected of them: They compleated in a little time their old Regiments, and rais'd besides a great many new ones; and the most vigorous Measures were taken to find Mony, and erect Magazines, as if they were to stand, for the future, on their own Bottom; tho the King of *France* was far from intending they shou'd want his Assistance, when their Affairs call'd for it. And that his Grandson might not want a General for his Army, 'twas publickly talk'd at *Paris*, before Monsieur *Rouille's* Return, that in case of a Peace, the Duke of *Berwick* had desir'd Leave to resign his *Baton* of Marechal of *France*, that he might go and command in *Spain*: Which shews us how the Duke of *Anjou* might have Officers as well as Men from *France*, if he had any want of them. If therefore the King of *France* withdrew his Troops, 'twas not with a Design to leave his Grandson to himself, but

but upon very different Views; 'twas to make the Allies and his own People believe he was sincere, and that he was willing to remove, as far as he cou'd, all Difficulties in the way to Peace; and yet, at the same Time, and by the same Action, increase the Difficulties he wou'd seem to remove, by rendring by this means, the most reasonable Demand of the Allies impracticable: besides that he really wanted these Troops himself, against another Year; the Danger he was threatned with in *Flanders*, obliging him to have a more numerous Army on that side. This was all he meant by withdrawing his Troops from *Spain*; and therefore he did not do it, till he had put the Duke of *Anjou's* Affairs upon a pretty good Foot, and he was sure, there cou'd be no immediate Want of them, the Campaign there being at an end. And that this Removal of his Troops might be of the least Prejudice possible to his Grandson, he contriv'd that as many of his own Troops shou'd desert, as wou'd make seven or eight Battalions; and to supply the place of the rest as far as he cou'd, he sent his Grandson all the *Walloon* Regiments from *Flanders*; from whence they begun their March for *Spain* the beginning of the *February* following, which was as soon as Money, Arms and Clothes cou'd be provided for them. And not content with giving the Duke of *Anjou* this Assistance, and supplying him with great Stores of Ammunition; because new rais'd Troops cou'd not be much depended on, the King kept many of the Troops

Troops he withdrew in *Roussillon* upon the Borders of *Spain*, to be ready to return, when his Grandson's Affairs shou'd make it necessary. And is not this very like the Conduct of one, who means in earnest to abandon *Spain*, and wou'd restore it to the House of *Austria*, if he cou'd? but poor Man, he can't do Impossibilities. 'Tis a pretty way to facilitate the Reduction of a Kingdom, to make it as difficult as possible; a great sign of Sincerity to put things out of our Power, which we can't without discovering our Insincerity keep in it; and mighty reasonable to create Impossibilities, and then complain of them. Who can help believing such a Man, when he tells you, he wou'd with all his Heart, to procure a Peace, give up the *Spanish* Monarchy, if he cou'd, but that he really can't; and that this is the only hindrance? Or what Pledge of his Good-will is there, one may not expect from him, as a Caution, that he won't directly or indirectly hinder your doing, what he can't possibly himself do for you? To expect a valuable Pledge from a Man, to be return'd to him when that is done, which he intends never shall be done; is a great Jest. And therefore since the *French* King has so plainly discover'd this Intention, you must not wonder he makes such Difficulties in settling an Expedient, as you cou'd not expect in a Man who means one word of what he says.

The first and only good Expedient, you see, is made impracticable, on purpose that it may not be insisted on; the next best was to put into the Hands of the Allies, some

French

French Towns on the Frontier of *Spain*, such as *Bayonne* and *Perpignan*, which wou'd have enabled the Allies to send Forces to *Spain* with infinitely less Expence and Trouble, and in a quarter of the time they can now; and at the same time have oblig'd the *French*, pretty effectually to keep their Promise, not to assist the Duke of *Anjou*, by cutting off in great measure the Communication between *France* and *Spain*. This was an Expedient which the King cou'd not say 'twas not in his Power to comply with; but when one has not a mind to do a thing, nothing is so easy as to find out a Reason for not doing it. If this cou'd not be said to be an impossible Expedient, 'twas easy to pretend, that it did not suit either with the Safety or Dignity of *France* to put the Keys of his Kingdom into the Hands of the Allies, since he cou'd not be sure what use they might make of them; or when he shou'd get them again. And this was very right arguing for a Man who never intended that shou'd be done, which is made the Condition, on which the Caution he deposits, shall be restor'd. If the King does not design *Spain* shou'd be quitted by his Grandson, it must be own'd it wou'd not be very prudent in him to give the Allies such important Places under the Notion of Cautionary Towns; which must either defeat his Design of supporting his Grandson, or if that Design succeed, cou'd never of right be demanded back of them: not but that a Prince of his known Abilities wou'd, we may be sure, soon find a Pretence to ask for them, and that

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Pretence he wou'd justify, if not readily submitted to, the same way he has so many others no less groundless, by Force and Arms, which with him have always been the Measures of Right and Wrong. But, if he were sincere, if he really meant that *Spain* shou'd be restor'd, what Inconvenience cou'd there be in complying with this Expedient? What ill use cou'd the Allies make of it? Cou'd they by the Help of these Towns hurt *France*, before they had reduc'd *Spain*? Can it be imagin'd that wou'd not find them Work enough? Or is there any room to fear an Invasion from *Spain* afterwards? No Iure, however significant *Spain* may be in *French* Hands, it won't in haste be very formidable out of them; they wou'd have too much Business in looking to themselves, to think of disturbing so powerful a Neighbour; and there wou'd be a thousand times more Reason for them to be afraid of *France*, than for *France* to apprehend any thing from them. Nor can there be the least Pretence for a Suspicion, that the Allies, if these Towns were once in their Hands, wou'd never part with them; supposing the End answer'd, for which they were entrusted with them: for, besides that such a Breach of Faith is without Example on the Side of the Allies, they can't for the Reasons I gave you in my last, act a false part in this matter, if they wou'd, especially not on this Side of *France*; where, if the Allies had ever so much Justice on their Side, they cou'd not long support themselves under the mighty Disadvantages with which
C . they

they must make War on this Frontier; of which you may judge by what I have said in my first Letter of the *Spanish War*, which, with little Alteration, will hold here. But there is no need of saying more, to shew you how ridiculous 'tis to pretend any Fears of the Allies, if these Towns shou'd be put into their Hands; the supporting of *Spain* has cost *France* too dear, not to know the low Condition it is in, and that nothing cou'd be greater madness in King *Charles* or his Allies, than not to sit down quietly in peace the minute that Kingdom is reduc'd to his Obedience, without seeking for new Pretences to continue the War needlessly.

Nothing therefore can be thought to be the true Reason, why the King of *France* rejected this Expedient, but that he never intended the Allies shou'd obtain the End for which 'twas ask'd; as you will still see more plainly in what follows. On the Side of *Alsace*, nothing was propos'd that I know of, but *Thionville*, a Place of great Consequence to *France*, were they in any danger from the Empire; but considering the feeble low Condition of that enervated exhausted Body, one can't but think the strong Places on that Side, are of no other use but to enable the *French* to invade the Empire, and not to secure 'em against Invasions from it. And what shou'd be deposited only as a Pledge, wou'd be to be restor'd, long before the Empire cou'd be in a Condition to make any use of it, that wou'd be either unjust in it self, or troublesom to *France*. But *France* never intending to fulfil the Condition
on

on which the Caution shou'd be restor'd, this Proposal was rejected upon the same Pretences as the former.

Nothing now was left, but to seek for an Expedient in *Flanders*; which was what the *French* offer'd from the first, and all along press'd, as if they were very much in Earnest: But had they been so, 'tis very hard to give a good Reason, why an Expedient shou'd be look'd for here, rather than in any other Part. The Allies, tho' they were sensible whatever cou'd be given on this Side, was but a poor Expedient at best; yet they were so sincerely dispos'd to put an end to the War, that they wou'd not absolutely reject it. Whatever Towns *France* cou'd put into the Hands of the Allies on this side, if they were not such as lie nearest to those that are to be given up by the Preliminarys, their Tenure wou'd be very precarious, and it wou'd be very difficult to keep them, when *France* had a mind to have them again. This you may easily judg of, by the Impossibility the Allies were under last Campaign to make the Siege of *Arras*, while they left *Douay* behind them; and the difficulty *Tpres* gave them in the Siege of *Aire*. But if these cautionary Towns were to be of those that lie nearest, they cou'd not be of so much Importance to *France*, as that they shou'd not be willing to part with them to keep *Spain*, since this wou'd only be making a little farther addition to the Barrier of the *Netherlands*, as I hinted in my last; which wou'd secure them more from *France*. But as had an Equivalent as this was at the best,

the *French* refus'd to make it as good as they cou'd, by excepting such Towns as were of most Consequence, such as *Douay*, *Arras*, and *Cambrai*; which wou'd lay them open to an Invasion from the Allies: which, if the Allies were able to make, they knew their own Designs wou'd give but too just a Handle for; besides, they were unwilling to part with, under the Name of a Caution, what they cou'd not be willing to part with for good and all; since they intended to forfeit the Condition, and not do themselves, or rather not suffer that to be done, which wou'd give them a right to ask for it again.

This being the Design of *France*, all these Negotiations, by Letters, came to nothing; and one Side wou'd never offer what the other cou'd accept, unless the Allies wou'd be content with the Name of an Expedient instead of the Thing; and have taken that for a Security, which they were before-hand sure cou'd by no means answer the End 'twas given for: which the Allies were too wise to do; and had they done otherwise, which is so foolish a Supposition, I don't well know how to make it, had it been agreed to put into the Hands of the *Dutch* three cautionary Towns, over and above those that they are to have by the Preliminaries, Wou'd it have pleas'd the Gentlemen, who are so angry that a Peace is not yet made? Wou'd they not have been the forwardest to shew the Insufficiency of such an Expedient? Wou'd they not, from the evident Folly of it, have readily argu'd, it was the effect, not of Folly, but of Treachery? Wou'd it not have been said,
that

that *Spain* and the *Indies* were given up in Complement to the *Dutch*, that they might have a better Frontier? Wou'd not some body have been censur'd as a Favourer of the *Dutch* too, for agreeing to so scandalous an Expedient, for an Article of so much Importance? Wou'd not Emmissarys have been employ'd in *Holland* and *France*, to learn if there were not some secret Whispers at least, of a private Correspondence carry'd on by a Great Man, for facilitating the way to a Peace so much to the Mind both of *France* and the *States*? From what is now doing of this kind, we may be very sure what wou'd have been done; and the foolish *Frenchify'd*, *Anti-Dutch* Politicks of some Men, which if they prevail, will, some time or other, infallibly prove the Ruin of this Nation, leave no room to doubt, but that if *Spain* must be lost, they had rather lose it without this Expedient, than with it, if *Holland* is to be the better for it. This is so plain, that I shall say no more to vindicate the Allies on this Head, which I shall end with observing, that the *French* did not only trifle with the Allies, in offering ridiculous Expedients; but sometimes did it in Terms pretty evident, when they saw Monsieur *Villars* cou'd not be attack'd in his strong Camp near *Douay*, and were in hopes the Allies cou'd do nothing more on that side but take *Tournay*, and had no Fears from any other Quarter. Nay, this Insolence they affected to continue even after the Defeat of *Tanieres*, which because 'twas short of those they had before receiv'd, and their Men were so hem'd in with Intrenchments, that they cou'd

cou'd not run away if they wou'd, they wou'd have it thought a sort of Victory, and a Sign that the *French* Courage was at last restor'd by *Villars*, which *Vendome* had in vain attempted, tho fetch'd from *Italy* on purpose for that great Work: which had then no other effect on the King's Affairs, but to ruin them in one part, without mending them in the other. But now it seems the Business is done, and the lost Courage is restor'd; and had the *Dutch* been as ready to believe what the *French* said of that Battle, as some other People have been since to credit the Accounts they give of what pass in the late Treatys, they had certainly been frightned into Peace upon their terms: any Expedient or no Expedient, it had been all one, they wou'd have accepted without difficulty so much of the Preliminaries, as the Marquis *de Torcy* wou'd have left them. But the *Dutch* knew better the Ground they stood upon; they knew the Accounts of their Friends were to be depended on; but that the Reports of the Enemy deserv'd no credit, whose Affairs put them under the utmost necessity of misrepresenting the true State of Things; an Art they have long practis'd in great Perfection, and oftentimes with no little Success. This made the States stand to their point, and not recede an inch from what they had insisted on; which, for some time, occasion'd a stop in the Negotiation, the *French* not knowing how to press their own Expedient, or to accept theirs, since they were resolv'd to propose no good one, and ill ones wou'd not be receiv'd; and they found them-

themselves more puzzled by the Reduction of *Mons*, which was a plain Declaration to all the World, that the Advantage as well as Honour of the Battle was altogether on the side of the Allies. These Successes of the Campaign, in which the Allies had taken the strongest Fortress in *Europe*, and another not much inferiour to it, and had gain'd under the greatest Disadvantages one of the most obstinate Battles that were ever fought, gave the *French* reason to think the Allies wou'd rather rise than fall in their demands; and this made them for a while affect to stand off, and the intercourse of Letters with Monsieur *Petkum* seem'd to be at an end: but this Humour, as it was affected, so it did not last.

After some time, the Marquis *de Torcy* wrote to Monsieur *Petkum* to desire, since the Point in dispute cou'd not be adjusted by Letters, that Passes might be granted for some Ministers from *France* to come to *Holland*, and renew the Conferences, or that Monsieur *Petkum* might be permitted to go to *France*; to try if his Presence cou'd help to find out an Expedient, that had hitherto been in vain endeavour'd by Letters. The first the States refus'd, till they knew precisely what they were to come for; since under the appearance of some good, the Presence of *French* Ministers in *Holland* gave them an opportunity to do a great deal of harm, by sowing Seeds of Jealousy among the Allies, poisoning the Minds of the People against their Governours, and retarding the great Preparations for another Campaign; which can never be push'd with

with the Vigour they shou'd, while People are amus'd with the specious Appearances of an approaching certain Peace. For so the *French* endeavour'd to make it every where thought, when they meant nothing less. For these Reasons the States refus'd to give Passes for any Ministers to come from *France*, till they knew more of their Intentions. But to shew their readiness to hearken to any reasonable Proposal, they consented Monsieur *Petkum* shou'd go to *France*; which he did about the latter End of *November*.

But before I give you an Account of that Journey, I must acquaint you, that while their Negotiations were carrying on by Letters with *France*, the Duke of *Anjou* did not only take all the proper Measures he cou'd to maintain himself in the Monarchy, which his Grandfather was in appearance treating to give up, but publish'd a notable Manifesto the beginning of *July*, wherein he protests against all that should be transacted at the *Hague* in his prejudice, as void and null, and declares his Resolution to adhere to his faithful *Spaniards*, as long as there is a Man of them will stand by him; and is so far from quitting *Spain* and the *Indies* to his Competitor, that he won't consent he shou'd have those parts of the Monarchy, which he was then possess'd of; and in pursuance of this Manifesto, he names the Duke d'Alba and Count *Bergheyck* for his Plenipotentiaries, with orders to notify it to the Maritime Powers, which Count *Bergheyck* did, in a Letter to the Duke of *M——* dated from *Mons*, *August* the 21st, with a Copy of their Instructions,

structions, and they sent another at the same
 time to the Deputys of the *States*, which were
 accordingly transmitted to their Principals:
 but no Answer was thought fit either by *Eng-
 land* or *Holland* to be return'd to them: And
 to admit Plenipotentiarys from him now,
 wou'd undo all that had been hitherto agreed
 on; and instead of seeking for an Expedient
 for one Article of the Preliminarys, the
 whole of them wou'd have been destroy'd,
 and the Treaty must have been begun entirely
 anew. This wou'd have been the Consequence
 of admitting Ministers from the Duke of *An-
 jou*; and 'twas this we shall see afterwards
 the *French* aim'd at. But I can't leave this
 Head, without observing to you, that in Count
Berghejck's Letter there were broad Intima-
 tions, how grateful the Duke of *Anjou* wou'd
 be, if by means of his Grace's good Offices, his
 just and reasonable Desires might be comply'd
 with: There was nothing he wou'd not do
 to content *England* in general, or that might
 be to his Grace's Satisfaction in particular.
 I have likewise heard from good Hands, that
 Monsieur *Torcy* did very unnecessarily, and
 with great Officiousness, write two or three
 very civil Letters to his Grace; till he found
 his Civilitys were lost upon him. They were
 both mistaken in their Man, if they thought
 any thing cou'd tempt him to go into any se-
 cret Measures against the Interest of his Coun-
 try, and the Good of the common Cause.
 But these Ministers have both of them had
 too much Experience of the Power of Cor-
 ruption elsewhere, not to be excusable for try-
 ing it here, when it was so much for the

Service of their Masters. And their not succeeding here, has not, I believe, deterr'd them from trying their Skill, where they may succeed better.

If the D. of *M.* govern'd himself with respect to Peace, by private Views; there is, I think, no doubt, but more is to be got a great deal, by agreeing to the Terms of *France*, than he can ever hope for by refusing them: And I believe one may safely say, no Minister was ever gratify'd for making a good Peace, tho' many have been well paid for persuading their Masters into ill ones.

But to return to Monsieur *Petkush*, and his Journey to *Paris*, which the *States* consented to, not from any Good they expected from it, but to prevent the ill Use the *Buissarys* of *France* wou'd make of their refusing it. After a stay there of about ten Days, and several fruitless Interviews with the Marquis de *Torcy*, he return'd to the *Hague*, Decemb. 7. without having been able to make the least Progress in the Business he went on, or bringing so much as the Pretence of an Expedient along with him: But instead of that, he brought the Sense of the *French* Court in a Paper drawn up by Monsieur *Torcy*, which has been made so publick, that I can't but presume you have seen it, and must remember, that the Substance of it was to this effect:

“ That the Design of the Preliminary Articles being to prevent, if possible, the Campaign that was then drawing on, since that Effect cou'd not be obtain'd, the reason of them was now ceas'd, together with the King's Obligation to agree to them,

“ since

“ Since they were not accepted within the
 “ Time limited : but that if the Allies wou’d,
 “ the King was willing the Winter shou’d be
 “ employ’d in treating definitively of Peace;
 “ and that suppressing the Form of those
 “ Articles, he wou’d preserve the Substance of
 “ them, and on the Foundation of the Con-
 “ cessions therein made to the Allies, he
 “ wou’d consent to resume the Negotiations,
 “ to commence from the first of *January* fol-
 “ lowing; and that the Execution of the
 “ Articles shou’d, as is usual in all Treatys,
 “ begin from the time of their Ratification.”

This was the Answer *Mons. Petkum* brought,
 which was short even of their Expectations
 who hop’d for least from it: for this over-
 threw all the Preliminaries at once, while the
 King pretended to agree to all but one; and
 by promising to keep the Substance of them,
 while they destroy the Form, they effectually
 defeat all that had been done, and recover to
 themselves an entire liberty to dispute all
 Points afresh, and to lay hold of all the Occa-
 sions which that wou’d give them to create
 Divisions and Jealousys between the *States* and
 their Allies, which is plainly the great Point
 they have all along aim’d at; which tho they
 have been so terribly disappointed in, they
 are unwilling to give over, in hopes their
 Constancy and Firmness to the common Cause
 wou’d in time be weary’d out, and yield to
 the importunate Solicitations with which they
 tempted them.

Tho to prevent a new Campaign might be
 a reason for hastening the Preliminaries, ’twas
 not the only or chief Design of them. When-

ever a Treaty shou'd commence, the Allies had declar'd long before, in answer to the Elector of *Bavaria's* Letters at the end of the *Ramillies* Campaign, they wou'd not enter on it, till some fundamental Points were first settled; the necessity of which they were convinc'd of by the dear-bought Experience of former Treatys; and the same Experience has taught the Allies, that no Treaty with *France* can be effectual, if the fundamental Articles are not executed as well as agreed on, before the general Treaty is concluded: which Security the Marquis wou'd entirely take away, by deferring the Execution till after Ratification. Thus the two great Ends of a Preliminary Treaty, which are to agree on some fundamental Points, and secure the Execution of them, are by this Answer utterly destroy'd; and the Allies are not only where they were before that Treaty was begun, but are really the worse for it; it being of greater Advantage to the *French* to know before-hand what are the particular Demands which the Emperor and Maritime Powers insist on for themselves, and in behalf of the rest of the Allies. As for solving all now by two Words, *Form* and *Substance*; two other Words, the *Letter* and *Spirit* of the Partition-Treaty, are still too well remember'd for the Allies to be again deceiv'd by *French* Distinctions; which if they cou'd now pass upon them, 'tis easy to see, that the Form of these Articles wou'd have been found to be the Substance of them, and the pretended Substance wou'd have prov'd a Shadow only. Here then *Dutch*-Bluntness and Plain-dealing prov'd too

too hard for the *fineness* of the *French*; a Word not more peculiar to them than the Thing meant by it. The States, having consider'd this Answer more than it deserv'd, with the Ministers of the Allies, who all easily agreed in the same Opinion of it, in a Resolution they took *Dec. 14.* which has likewise been made publick; declar'd it was not satisfactory, and resolv'd to push the War with the utmost Vigour.

About the time that *Monf. Petkum* return'd, the King of *France* wrote to the Duke of *Anjou*, to acquaint him with what had pass, and assure him, that tho he was oblig'd to recal his Troops, he need not be alarm'd at it, for that he wou'd never abandon him; and that he had order'd Twelve of his Regiments, that were then in *Spain*, to join the *Spaniards*, in case King *Charles* shou'd make an Irruption into *Arragon*. And a little after *Monf. Ibberville* was sent to *Madrid*; but both his Journey and Business were made so great a Secret, that it was not for some time known whither he was gone; and when he came to *Madrid*, where he arriv'd *Dec. 26.* his Instructions were to communicate his Business to no body but the King himself. He did not make a long stay, nor was he in appearance well receiv'd; but no judgment cou'd be made from thence what his Errand was, there was no way to distinguish between what was real and what disguise. But to judg from other Steps, 'tis most reasonable to think his Business was to learn the State the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Lesson, how he shou'd manage

manage in so nice a juncture, with Assurances, that in spite of all Appearances to the contrary, which the necessity of his Affairs might oblige the King to make, he wou'd never desert him, much less agree with the Allies upon any terms to turn his Arms against him. But this Journey was made a great Mystery of; to make the Allies believe, the Business of it was, to persuade the Duke of *Anjou* to retire out of *Spain*, since it wou'd be impossible for the King to support him any longer. If this King were not a perfect Master in all the Arts and Methods of Deceit, as great an Enemy as he is, I shou'd be almost tempted to pity him, to see how hard a Game he has to play. He has to deal with two Partys; one of which must be impos'd on: he assures the *Spaniards* he will assist and support his Grandson, cost what it will; and at the same time he promises most solemnly the Allies, that he will not give the least Assistance to him directly or indirectly. Now if he can find credit with both Partys, either he is a very cunning Man, or one of them are very great Fools. In the present Case I shou'd suspect the last, if the Allies cou'd be thus impos'd on: for if we consider which Side, both by Nature and Interest, he is most inclin'd to, or allow his Actions to be a better Proof of his Meaning than his Words, there is no room to doubt but the Allies are the Party he wou'd deceive if he cou'd; since 'tis evident from what I have already said in the beginning of this Letter, he has, ever since the Conferences at the *Hague* broke off, been doing all he cou'd for

for the Service of his Grandson, that he may be able to support himself without any visible Assistance from *France*, till her Affairs are so far retriev'd, as not to make any Managements in doing it longer necessary. But all the Inference I wou'd at present make from this is, that, since the *Spaniards* must be deceiv'd, if we are not, or we must, if they are not, no Words or Promises, be they ever so fair, shou'd weigh with us; or be thought an Argument of his Sincerity, unless his Actions go along with them.

But to return to the Negotiations, after the Paper brought by *Mons. Petkam*, no new Advances were made till the beginning of *February*, when an Express brought him a fresh Project of Peace to be communicated to the Allies, which differ'd little from the other, or rather was an Amplification of it. 'Twas in the main the same with the Preliminaries, but cast into another form, which as effectually destroy'd the Preliminaries, as if it had been put into no form at all: besides several material Alterations, for the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* there is a Promise only; the Clause in the 4th Article, whereby the King engages to take in concert with the Allies proper Measures to oblige his Grandson to it, is left out; the restoring of the Two Electors is insisted on as a Preliminary, and of the Elector of *Bavaria* in particular to the *Upper Palatinat*, in contradiction to the Preliminaries, by which 'tis agreed it shou'd remain to the Elector *Palatin*, whom the Emperor had some time before put into Possession of it, than which nothing cou'd be more reasonable;

sonable; no Prince having suffer'd so much from *France* as one of them, or deserv'd so ill of the Emperor as the other. As for the 37th Article; the Expedient offer'd, was Three Towns in *Flanders* of his own chusing: an Offer, which by what I have already said; you will see is worth nothing, since he wou'd never give any Towns that the Allies cou'd think a tolerable Security for so important a Point; besides that, if the Towns were agreed on, many Difficulties wou'd certainly rise in the Execution, and in settling the Terms on which they shou'd return to him or not: for If the Allies were to keep them only till the Affairs of *Spain* were decided; what wou'd they be the better for them, if in the Issue of Things it shou'd not end to their mind? which he wou'd take the best Care he cou'd it shou'd not. I mention this, because I have seen the Condition of the Expedient so worded, or to that effect; and 'tis not very easy to take away all room for Equivocation, and any handle that can give, which the Prince we are treating with, knows how to erect into a clear indisputable Right. But to complete the Project, and that the Design and End of the Preliminaries might be entirely subverted, 'tis propos'd, that the Execution of all the Articles be defer'd till the Treaty be concluded, and the Ratifications exchange'd. This is the noble Project that was sent to the *Hague* the beginning of *February*, and was the Result of many Councils that had been held in the preceding Month, to satisfy the King's good Subjects of his sincere Desires after Peace; and as if this had been an Act
of

of great Grace, the King, if this be not accepted, declares himself free from all Engagements; but this being in effect the same with the Paper Monf. *Petkum* brought, and nothing but the old Bait made up a-new, the Allies were too wise to bite at it; but as *France* had all along excepted to nothing but the 37th Article, they were resolv'd to adhere to the rest, and therefore wou'd admit of no Conferences till they explain'd themselves fully as to that Point. When the *French* saw so much stiffness on the Part of the Allies, they, who are not such religious Observers of their Word, as to suffer a little seeming Compliance to do them any harm, or to lose their Point for want of it, thought fit to recede in appearance at least, and gave the States all the Assurance the most express Words cou'd do, that the King agreed to all the other Preliminaries, and that if they wou'd consent his Ministers shou'd come and confer with them upon the 37th Article, he did not doubt but what shou'd be propos'd from him, wou'd be to their Satisfaction. This was so full a Declaration, as gave some hopes, this Difficulty might be adjusted, or at least it wou'd have made the refusal of what they ask'd look invidious: the States therefore, to remove all pretence of complaint, as if they were too diffident, or had a mind to prolong the War, which they knew the *French* were always labouring to insinuate; a Practice, in which their Friends here copy after them perfectly well; granted them Passports for such Ministers as the King shou'd

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think fit to send: the Express arriv'd the 20th, and was sent back the 23d. I mention these Dates (which, as all the rest, are of the new Stile) to shew, how little difficulty the States made, tho at the very time the King gave them these Assurances, that all the Preliminaries shou'd remain in full force, only with such Alterations in the Terms of the Execution as the Course of Time had made necessary, they knew he had just done what wou'd make other Alterations necessary, and wou'd oblige them to change the Stile at least of the Preliminaries in several Articles, and that in a very material Point; the thing I mean, was his giving to the 2d Son of the Duke of *Burgundy*, who was born the 15th, the Title of Duke of *Anjou*, which was an Indication, he resolv'd to insist upon his Grandson's having the Title of King *Philip* given him in the next Conferences: Which, tho in appearance a little matter, wou'd draw after it no little Consequences; for, if he is to retain the Title of King, it can't be imagin'd he can ever return to *France* with that Character, that wou'd upon many accounts be, so inconvenient, that had his return thither been intended, we may be sure, his former Title wou'd have been retain'd. If therefore the Name of King was to remain to him, 'twas intended a Kingdom shou'd do so too; and from thence one of these two things necessarily follow'd, either that the King of *France* wou'd make only a separate Peace for himself, and leave the Allies to get *Spain* as they cou'd; or if he agreed to a General one, it shou'd be upon the Foot of a Partition. But these Inferences,

rences, as natural as they were, did not hinder the States to grant the Passports desir'd, and to do every thing they cou'd to facilitate the way to a good Peace.

This short Account of what pass'd from *Monf. Petkum's* Journey to *Paris* to this time, that is from the latter end of *November* to the beginning of *March*, leaves but little room to expect much from the new Conferences; the Affair having in this interval not at all advanc'd, but rather gone backwards. For before that Journey, the constant Language was, to look out for an Expedient for the 37th Article, and that all the others were allow'd. But from that Journey that Language began to change; some things were to be left out, others put in; the Form, which is the Life of 'em, as Articles, is taken away, and the whole new modell'd, and the Security is destroy'd, while the Execution, agreed on, is defer'd. This is all this Interval produc'd, till just the End of it, when the old Language is again resum'd, and the only Point to be adjust'd, in appearance, is the 37th Article.

As this Management of *France* gave the States no great Opinion of their being yet sincere, they push'd the Preparations of the Campaign with all the Vigour possible, and erected prodigious Magazines on the Frontier, that the Army might be able to take the Field early; and wrote in very pressing Terms to the Queen, that she wou'd please to send over the Duke of *M———* if he cou'd be spar'd so soon, before the end of *February*, that they might have the Benefit

of his *Wise Counsels*, as well as reap the Advantage of his *incomparable Valour*: This is the Language in which the States, who have had so much Experience of him, always speak of this great Man; a sufficient Reason with some, to undervalue him, who know nothing themselves, but are taught to think whatever the *Dutch* do must be wrong. But to go on, as the Suspicions the *French* gave of their Insincerity, made the States pursue the most effectual Measures for an early Campaign; so it put them upon taking the best Care they cou'd, that if no good shou'd come from the Renewing of the Conferences, they might prevent the Mischief they apprehended was design'd by them. And therefore, tho' they gave leave for the Conferences to be renew'd, they wou'd not suffer the Ministers of *France* to come into the Heart of their Country, till the Point in dispute shou'd be agreed. Since the *French* pretended to except to nothing but the 37th Article, and said, they had an Expedient for that which, they doubted not, wou'd give content; this being an Affair, which, in all appearance, requir'd but little time, and seem'd not to require many Conferences; the States propos'd, upon *Antwerp* being dislik'd, to send their Deputies to confer with the Ministers of *France* either at *Moerdyke* or *Gertruydenberg*. The *French* lik'd neither of these Places, but when no other cou'd be obtain'd, they chose the last; where they arriv'd the 10th of *March*, but were met the Day before by the Deputies of the States at *Moerdyke*, where was held the first Conference: which sufficiently shew'd, what
 slender

slender Hopes there were of any great Good from them. The Ministers of *France* were the Marquis d' *Oxelles* and the Abbé de *Polignac*; Men extremely well qualify'd for the Business they came upon: And the Deputies on the part of the *States*, were Messieurs *Bays* and *Vanderdussen*; the same by whom the first Conferences with Monsieur *Rouille* were manag'd the Year before; and who are known, which I shou'd have mention'd in my last, to have no Aversion to a Peace, if it cou'd be had on reasonable Terms. These Conferences, which were begun on *March* the 9th, continu'd till *July*; on the 25th of which Month, the *French* Ministers left *Gertruydenberg*. So that these Conferences lasted more Weeks than they shou'd have been suffer'd to do Days; there being but one single Point, by their own confession, in dispute; which is the only Fault that I believe any body can find in the part the *States* had in the management of this Affair; and they were as sensible themselves of it, as any body else cou'd be. They knew the Advantage the *French* made of the stay of their Plenipotentiaries in *Holland*; which contributed extremely to keep up the Spirits of the People in *France*, and make them bear patiently the continuance of the War, and the arbitrary and violent Methods made use of to support it. *Bread and Peace* was the cry of the common People all over *France*; and the Court was continually afraid of Tumults in the great Towns, and in the remoter Provinces; which made it necessary to quiet them with the most specious Appearances of Peace, which they all

all along gave out was as good as made: and every Express that arriv'd, the People were made to hope, wou'd bring the welcome News, that the Articles were sign'd. Nor were the *French* content to impose thus on their own People, their Emissaries did the same thing in *Holland*; and 'twas by their means often very confidently reported, that all was agreed, when the *States*, who had no Interest in deceiving their People, gave themselves, no occasion for their entertaining such false Hopes. But this the *French* did, to make them insensibly grow weary of the War, and shew themselves out of Humour with their Governors; and that they might have the Odium of deceiving them, while themselves made their Uses of it: One of which was, to enable them to find Credit more easily at *Amsterdam*; where underhand, 'tis certain, great Sums of Money were negotiated, and sent in Specie to *France*; which an appearance of Peace very much facilitated, by the Hopes it gave of good Payment; and in the mean time, there was the Temptation of great Interest: and besides all the other Purposes, these reports of Peace serv'd to, they hop'd it might make the *States* themselves less forward to supply the great Expence which a vigorous Siege calls for, and utterly averse to a Battle, which the *French* were most afraid of; and whenever the Conferences shou'd end, the greater the Expectations had been of Peace, the more People wou'd be dissatisfy'd at its going off; and the Fault wou'd seem to be least theirs, who had been loudest, and talk'd most for it. These

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Advantages the *French* in fact did make of the stay of their Plenipotentiaries at *Gertruydenberg*; and it was before-hand easy to see they wou'd: but the Remedy was not so easy. And therefore, tho the *States* were sensible from the first Conference, that the wisest part they cou'd take, was to send them back immediately, or limit their stay to a very short time; they did not only manage their Conferences by Deputies, who, as I have said, want no Inclination to Peace, but suffer'd the *French* to stay till there was not the least Pre- tence for more Conferences, or the *French* at least wou'd make none, but were themselves willing to be gone. This the *States* thought themselves oblig'd to do, to prevent the In- sinuations of the *French*, which were industriously spread by their Emissaries, as if the old Ministry, the Pensionary, and his Friends, were averse to Peace, and had a Design to perpetuate the War for their own Interest. This is a Calumny has too much Influence on the Minds of the People in other Go- vernments, to think, that great Care ought not to be taken to obviate the Force and Mischief of it in one that is wholly Popular. This was the reason that determin'd the *Dutch* Ministry to let the Plenipotentiaries make so long a stay; for they too have their Enemies, tho not hitherto successful ones.

But to come to the Conferences them- selves: The first was on *March* the 9th, at *Moerdyke*; in which, to shew what might be expected from the rest, the Ministers of *France*, after all Assurances that had been given

given of the King's agreeing to those Articles which give up the whole *Spanish* Monarchy in the most ample manner, begun with proposing a Partition; and that *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the Towns upon the Coast of *Tuscany* belonging to *Spain*, shou'd be granted to one of the Competitors, without naming which: That since the *Dutch* wou'd not be satisfy'd with cautionary Towns in *Flanders*, no other Expedient was left but this; it being very hard to oblige the King to force his Grandson to quit, and impossible to persuade him to it, without a valuable Consideration. Tho' nothing cou'd be more exactly against the Preliminaries than this Proposal of a Partition, the Allies did not wholly reject it, nor did the other side absolutely insist upon all they at first ask'd; which if they had, little had remain'd for them but to go back, it being impossible to think the Emperor wou'd ever consent to part with *Naples*, which wou'd give the *French* such footing in *Italy*, as wou'd soon make them Masters of the whole, and endanger his Hereditary Country. The Ministers of *France* were made so sensible of this, as to give up the Point; and say, They believ'd the King wou'd, for the sake of Peace, be prevail'd with to desist from that part of his Demands; towards which they promis'd their good Offices: and so the first Conference ended. The Deputies return'd to the *Hague*, and the Plenipotentiaries sent an Express to the King, to let him know what had pass. Upon the return of the Express, the Plenipotentiaries sent to the *Hague*, to desire another

ther Conference; which was agreed to, and the 20th the Deputies went a second time to confer with them: their part in these Interviews having been concerted in the mean time with the Ministers of the Emperor and *England* at several Meetings for that purpose, and the rest of the Allies having been at a general Meeting inform'd of what had been mov'd in the first Conference. And this was the constant way, in which these Negotiations were carry'd on while the Ministers of *France* continu'd at *Gertruydenberg*. At the end of a Conference they sent an Express to Court; and upon his Return, perhaps the next day, perhaps two or three days after, when they had decypher'd their Instructions, and settled matters between themselves, they notify'd it at the *Hague*, and desir'd another Conference; which was agreed to. The Deputies went, confer'd, return'd, reported, upon which the Allies meet, consult, agree, and settle what further Steps shou'd be made on their part. The *French* on their side send an Express again to Court, and so on. In this manner the Deputies went to a third Conference the 6th of *April*, and to a fourth the 29th. The main Point debated in these Conferences, was this Partition. And that no Obstruction to a General Peace on this foot on the part of *England* might arise from the Address of the two Houses mention'd in my last, care was taken by the D. of *M.* and the late M—— that the Parliament shou'd not be prorogu'd in the Spring as usually; but that the Session shou'd be continu'd by short Adjournments, till all Hopes of Peace

were at an end, that the Q— might have their Concurrence to agree to such a Partition, as they shou'd think reasonable. The King of *France* was willing at last to recede from *Naples* being part of it, but insisted on the rest, and wou'd by no means consent to quit the Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, which his Grandson had still possession of. And as he was unwilling to give up these, so the Deputies cou'd not consent to part with *Sardinia*, which was already in the Emperor's possession. So that on the part of the Allies, the Deputies were unwilling to part with any thing of the Partition propos'd but *Sicily*, and the *French* would quit nothing but *Naples*. The Allies were willing to give something for a General Peace, and 'twas thought *France*, if they were sincere, wou'd be willing to take any thing. And this the Allies had the more reason to expect, from the turn the Campaign was like to take: The D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*, who left the *Hague* the 14th, having pass'd the *Scarpe* without opposition the 20th, of which the States had the welcome News time enough for the Deputies to carry it with them to the fourth Conference. But this Success, which put *France* into a great Consternation, had in appearance no effect on them. They pretended they had no power to recede from their last Demands, but would send to Court for further Instructions; for which they were allow'd till the 18th of *May*. But they had no occasion, it seems, for so much time: Their Express came back the 3^d, which was notify'd the 7th; but the King still insisting, 'twas to no purpose to have more
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Conferences, which was signify'd to them by *M. Petkum*. Upon which they pretended to be very stiff, and declar'd they wou'd leave *Gertruydenberg* the 15th or 16th; and the Jest was carry'd so far, that part of their Retinue and Equipage was actually sent away. But this was all a Feint: When the 15th came, an Express arriv'd very *à propos*, to salve Appearances, and enable them to stay with a good Grace: which they notify'd the 18th, and the Deputies went to them the 23d. And in this Conference the King was pleas'd to desist from the Towns on the Coast of *Tuscany*, but adher'd to his Demand of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. And to remove the Objection against the last, a Project had been sometime forming to make a Descent on it, and get into possession; which Design, when it was in a manner executed, was happily defeated by a part of the Forces that were then going from *Italy* to *Catalonia*.

This Point of the Partition being driven as far as it wou'd go, 'twas now the turn of the Allies to ask, supposing this Partition agreed to, that these Parts of the *Spanish* Monarchy shou'd be given to the D. of *Anjou*, which way the King propos'd they shou'd have the rest secur'd to them: For the reason the Allies insist'd on the 37th Article, was, that they might have a General Peace, and not be involv'd in a separate War with *Spain*. This was the Business of these Conferences, and there was no Sense in the *French* pretending to demand a Partition upon any other Terms, but supposing the Allies wou'd quit one part of the Monarchy to the D. of *Anjou*;

that he shou'd quit the rest to them. 'Twas to be presum'd, the King knew his Grandson's mind upon this head, and that he had either Authority from him to treat of a Partition, or that he had himself the power in his hands to oblige him to consent to it. But this the Plenipotentiarys cou'd not speak fully to at this Conference; 'twas left to be the Subject of the next, which was not held till *June 16*. For tho' that Express arriv'd the *6th*, it was not notify'd till the *10th*. By this time the *French* Court were pretty well out of pain for *Artaas*, their Army having been some time assembled, and in such ground, as would make it impracticable for the Allies to come either at them or the Town: And this probably had no little share in regulating the Motions of the *French* Counsels, and the Instructions they sent to their Ministers; with whom the Deputies had on the *16th* Conferences from morning to night, upon this capital Point, How the Allies shou'd be put into possession of *Spain* and the *Indies*. To which the Answer was, That the King was willing to concert the proper Measures with them, according to the fourth Article. But this the Deputies could not think sufficient: for this he was oblig'd to by the Preliminaries, tho' the *37th* had been struck out; besides that it was inconsistent with a General Peace, which they had all along insisted on, and would necessarily engage them in a *Spanish* War, which they had been treating of a Partition to prevent. But to understand their Meaning more distinctly, they desir'd them to explain themselves, what those

those Measures were, the King would come into: Would he join his Forces to theirs, to oblige his Grandson to accept the Terms he shou'd make for him? Why yes, perhaps he wou'd. But in the discussing this Point, they took care to start a thousand Difficulties, to shew it was impracticable; such as these, how to settle what shou'd be the whole Force employ'd to reduce *Spain* and the *Indies*; what Share each shou'd contribute; how they shou'd act, jointly or separately; who shou'd command; how and where and by whom their Instructions for acting shou'd be form'd, and the like; and the same Difficultys might be started for the Sea-Service. Well, if these Measures are impracticable, as no-doubt they are where one Party never designs to come heartily into them; what are those the King will come into? Why, he will contribute a certain Sum of Money towards the Expence the Allies shall be at on this occasion. How now will this mend the matter? How shall they be able to settle the Sum, and secure the Payment? The first of these is a very difficult Point, when it comes to be drawn out into particulars, and to be consider'd how hard it is to know the Expence of such a War, how long it may continue, when and where and at what time the Payments shall be made; and if a Sum certain can't be fix'd at first, who shall settle the Proportion *France* shall pay, or oblige them to acquiesce in it? But if these Difficultys cou'd be overcome, what Security can the Allies have for Payment? A very pretty one indeed, is that which the *French* offer'd, That the richest Bankers

Bankers of *Paris* shou'd be bound for it. One wou'd be glad to know, what remedy the Allies cou'd have against their Bankers in case of Failure, or how they can reach them. To take *Paris* it self, does not seem to me more difficult. But they are Men of Honour, and may be trusted: 'Tis true, and so they have been, till the King's Affairs have made the greatest of them Bankrupts. But if they were Men of ever so much Honour, or were eyes, so much concern'd to support their personal Credit in their own private Affairs; what is Honour or Credit against Reason of State, where an Arbitrary Prince is pleas'd to interpose? which the King has, this Summer particularly, shewn he knows how to do; having for very great Sums taken the Debts of his Bankers on himself, and declar'd them his, and by that means has render'd all legal Remedies impossible. Before indeed their Credit was better than the King's, but by being us'd for him, it is sunk as low as his, and in effect become one with it, that is, no Credit at all. And is not this a rare Security for the Allies to trust for the Payment of such Sums as may be suppos'd to be the King's Share in the Charge of so expensive a War? And if Security cou'd be given for a Sum certain, what is this, but in effect to sell a part of the *Spanish* Monarchy for a Sum of Money, towards carrying on a War, which he will take care to render ineffectual?

Upon the Report which the Deputies made the 18th, of what had pass'd in this Conference; the Allies had several Meetings to consider what shou'd be the next Step. 'Twas plain

plain from the account the Deputies had given, that it was to no purpose to think of concerting Measures with *France* for a War with *Spain* after a Peace made with them: What had been said about both Troops and Money, evidently shew'd, nothing of that kind cou'd be thought of, which *France* wou'd not be able to defeat, by the Difficultys with which they wou'd take care to puzzle it; that all Proposals of this nature were not only inconsistent with the End for which these Conferences were resum'd, which was to find an Expedient for the 37th Article, and obtain the thing design'd by the Preliminarys, which was a general Peace; but also contrary to what had from the beginning of them been suppos'd, upon the *French* proposing a Partition: which cou'd mean nothing else, but that they were willing the *Spanish* Monarchy should effectually be given up to the Allies; some part being taken out for the benefit of the Duke of *Anjou*: That if there were in earnest need of Force to compel the Duke of *Anjou* to it, which was not at all probable, it ought to lie wholly on the King, since he had from the beginning promis'd the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and had laid it down as the Foundation on which they were to treat; which left no room to doubt but that the King knew he cou'd by Persuasion or Constraint oblige his Grandson to consent to it; since otherwise such a Promise cou'd have no other meaning in it, but from the beginning to amuse and impose on the Allies. But however, if Force were necessary, they were willing the Troops they had in *Portugal* and

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Catalonia shou'd act in concert with the King's to obtain this End within the two months, or such other time as shou'd be agreed on. And whoever considers the Duke of *Anjou's* Dependance on *France*, will easily be satisfy'd, that if the King were sincere, and in earnest meant what his Ministers had all along promis'd in his name, a small Force and a very little Time wou'd be more than enough.

Upon these Considerations the Allies resolv'd to reject the Offer of Money they had made, because it suppos'd a particular Peace with *France*, and the Continuation of the War with *Spain*, which they could not consent to, for reasons given in the first Conference; and to demand of them to explain themselves upon the Subject of the Evacuation of *Spain* and the *Indies* in favour of King *Charles*, agreeably to the Preliminaries, before the Allies cou'd declare their Intentions with respect to the Partition: and that unless they did this, all further Conferences wou'd be to no purpose.

This Resolution the Allies signify'd to the Ministers of *France*, in a Letter to them from Mr. *Petkum*, July 8. to which they declin'd giving a distinct Answer, but desir'd another Conference; which was accordingly held with them the 13th: in which the Deputies having explain'd fully the Sense of the Allies, and the Resolution sent them by Mr. *Petkum*, (not that it wanted any Explanation, tho the Plenipotentiarys had thought fit to say so, to avoid giving a distinct Answer to it) they insisted on a like clear and full Explication on the part of *France*: and this being a home-

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push, that left no room for Evasion. When they saw themselves thus press'd, they resolv'd to put the best Face they cou'd upon the Matter, and were pleas'd to call this peremptory Summons to explain themselves, a formal Rupture of the Treaty; and that therefore nothing was left for them to do but to return home. The Deputies gave them time to send once more to Court, in which they desir'd there might be no delays, and so parted. The Express they sent to *Versailles* did not stay above two or three Hours, as if he had gone merely for Form sake, and was back again at *Gertruydenberg* the 18th; which they notify'd the 21st with a long Letter to the Pensionary, in Form of a Manifesto, and went themselves away the 25th. This Letter I take for granted you have seen, it has been so often printed; and therefore need not tell you it has in it all the Art of a *French* Writer, and of an Able Minister; and that it is as well done, as the Cause they are to defend, will admit: but if you have read this Letter, I cannot but suppose you have also read the Resolution of the States, *July 27.* in answer to it, which is writ with that Plainness and Sincerity, it is so free from Disguise and Artifice, there is in it such solid Reasoning, so much good Sense, such a force of Truth, that a Man must be a very ill Judg, or have no very honest Mind, that can't see, or will not own, that the Integrity and Honour of the Allies is abundantly justify'd and clear'd from the false Aspersions which the *French* Letter wou'd throw upon them; and that

the ill Success of these Negotiations is intirely owing to those, who wou'd cast the blame of the Rupture upon them; it being exceeding plain, that the King of *France* has put it out of the Power of the Allies to make a general Peace, by refusing to give them *Spain* and the *Indies*, without which a good Peace can never be made, or the End for which we went into the War tolerably answer'd: and the more this Affair is examin'd into, the more you will be convinc'd of the Insincerity of the *French*, and the Necessity the Allies were under, to act as they did.

First, 'Tis indisputably true and confess'd on all hands, that the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, whatever became of the rest of the Monarchy, was promis'd from the very first; they did not pretend to desire so much as one single Conference for Peace on any other terms.

Now, if the King cou'd do what he promis'd, what becomes of the pretended Impossibility? And if he cou'd not, what cou'd he mean by such a Promise but to amuse and deceive? But if he design'd that, then it undeniably follows, all these Negotiations on his part have been one continued Cheat from the Beginning to the End. And that this is the Truth of the Case, I have given you many Proofs both in my last Letter, and in this. All the Expedients he propos'd, were so many Shams, and had no other meaning in them but to gain Time, quiet his People, and sow Jealousie among the Allies; and defeat if possible by a Treaty those he can't defeat.

feat by his Arms. What else cou'd he mean by proposing a Partition as an Expedient, and yet refusing to let it have the Effect of one? To ask the States to consent to a Partition, and not suffer them to ask for what, is a little too barefac'd. Cou'd they think the *Dutch* wou'd consent to this Expedient for the sake of a general Peace, without being sure, a general Peace wou'd be purchas'd by it? I scarce believe, they expected that of them; but nevertheless hop'd, they shou'd gain their Ends by it; and that the very hearkning to the Proposal of a Partition wou'd create Jealousies and divide the Allies, in which they did not judg very ill: for the Conferences upon this foot very much alarm'd the Ministers of the Emperor and King *Charles*, who were utterly averse to a Partition of any kind; and it was with great difficulty they were prevail'd with to consent to let the Conferences with the Ministers of *France* be manag'd by the Deputies of the States, without their being themselves present at them; which wou'd have rendred the Negotiations for a general Peace much more difficult than they were, tho' *France* had been in earnest for it. And this was all *France* aim'd at by proposing a Partition; some of the Allies, they knew, wou'd be extremely against it, while the States, they hop'd, wou'd, for so desirable an End, be willing enough to come into it; and this Difference they promis'd, themselves much from: but for fear this Difficulty shou'd be overcome, and the Allies shou'd take them at their words, and accept some of the Expe-

dients offer'd, they had another Resort behind, by which they cou'd at any time confound all that had been done, and had great Hopes, at the same time, that the Alliance might be broke by it. And that was this; they pretended they cou'd not execute any part of the Preliminaries, unless the Allies wou'd oblige themselves not to make any farther Demands, than what were already contain'd in those Articles, or that they shou'd be now declar'd: which is contrary to the 32d Article, in which there is a Power expressly reserv'd for the Empire, the four Associated Circles, the Kings of *Portugal* and *Prussia*, and the Duke of *Savoy*, to make what further Demands they shall find reasonable. This the *French* insisted on; for no other reason but because they knew 'twas impossible for the Allies in justice to comply with it, unless the respective Powers above-nam'd had had Ministers at the *Hague* with full Instructions from each of them; which they knew they neither had, nor cou'd have without losing a great deal of time: Besides, this Demand of the *French* is contrary not only to the express Terms of the Preliminaries, but to the very Nature of them; for if nothing is to be left to be adjust'd at a general Treaty, how does a Preliminary Treaty differ from it? But it was very much for the Purpose of the *French*, who meant nothing but to amuse the Allies and make mischief, to insist on it; which accordingly they did, being sure which ever part the Allies took, they shou'd find their Account in it: For if the Allies wou'd not agree to this Demand, then there was always

always a Handle ready to break off the Treaty upon; as long as further Demands may be made upon them, they can't be sure, any Concessions will procure a lasting Peace, and they shall be in danger of having the War renewed upon them, after all they shall have done to put an end to it. And this is very plausible and specious; but as I shall shew you by and by, has at the bottom nothing at all in it. But if the Allies had comply'd with this Demand, and declar'd no further Demands shou'd be insisted on, what a fine Game wou'd the *French* have had? They had nothing else to do, to break the Alliance, but to represent to some of these Members of it, how their Interests were neglected, and what poor Terms the Maritime Powers and the Emperor have made for them. You see, Gentlemen, the utmost your Allies ask for you; you see the whole you are to expect from them; these are the Terms they have made for you, and they have promis'd to oblige you to acquiesce in them; Are these Allies worth adhering to? Come over to the Interest of the King, and support his first Pretensions, and you will find both him and his Grandson more grateful; you shall have this and that and t'other good thing, this Town, that Principality, so much Money, such a valuable Match, in short, Terms infinitely more advantageous to your Masters, and the Interest of their Familys, than any thing the Allies will do for you. This Artifice the *French* found the good Effects of the last War, and their Fingers itch to be again at it; for this was the way they drew off

of a certain Prince then, which was the ruin of that Confederacy; after their Emissaries had been for some time in *Holland* proposing underhand Terms of Peace, and endeavouring to find, what Articles the Principal Allies wou'd be content with for the rest: when they had learnt this, the Use they made of it, was to seduce one of them, by offering much better Terms than had been ask'd for him; the Bait took, and 'twas agreed to leave the Side he thought himself ill us'd by; nothing remain'd but to contrive how this might be done most decently: the way agreed on was to invade his Country with a great Army, and lay siege to his Capital. What cou'd the unhappy Prince do in these Circumstances? he is in the utmost Danger, his Allies neither do nor can support him; there is no Safety for him but in a Peace. Thus a Member was brought off from the last Confederacy; and the same Play they want to be again at. This is so certain, that we are sure they were trying this very trick with the same Prince. While the Marquis *de Torcy* made at the *Hague* such mighty Difficulties in complying with the Terms demanded for the Duke of *Savoy*, whom he pretended his Master had great Reason to be dissatisfy'd with, this false perfidious Court was at that very time tempting him with better Offers at *Turin*; but that Prince understood his Interests too well to hearken again to them.

This is the Use the Ministers of *France* hop'd to make of this Demand of theirs, if the Allies had been weak enough to have agreed

agreed to it; but they were not to be so impos'd on, nor wou'd they act in so arbitrary a manner, as to force any of their Allies to submit to Terms made against their consent, or without their knowledge; and therefore cou'd not, by all the Artifice of *France*, be prevail'd with to preclude them from making such further Demands as they shou'd think reasonable. But to shew they were sincere, they were willing to desist from all further Demands for themselves, according to the 31st Article; this they cou'd do, more in justice they cou'd not. And had the *French* been in earnest on their part, they wou'd, without difficulty, have trusted the Allies in this Point; for they cou'd not with any colour of Reason believe, that when the Maritime Powers and the Emperor were satisfy'd, they wou'd renew the War at the end of two Months, or what other time shou'd have been agreed on, for the sake of any further Demands on the part of the other Allies, which it wou'd not be very reasonable for *France* to grant them. And therefore it can't be thought they meant any thing else by urging this Point, but to make mischief, and draw the Allies if they cou'd into a Snare; and if that did not succeed, that they might always have it in their Power to go off.

To reduce the whole Management of the *French* in this Affair under one short View; they press the Allies to an impossibility contrary to the Preliminaries, and complain at the same time of being press'd to an impossibility themselves, tho the Allies ask nothing

thing but what they themselves offer'd from the beginning; and the Steps they have taken in this Point are very extraordinary. First, Negotiations are broke off upon the single Point of the 37th Article; then an Expedient is offer'd of Cautionary Towns; then the Conferences are again desir'd to be renew'd, upon repeated Assurances of agreeing to all the other Preliminaries except the 37th; then, as what wou'd solve all Difficultys, a Partition is propos'd, which is at last reduc'd to *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. And what is all this for? Will they sign the Preliminaries, if this Partition be agreed to? by no means; they take the very asking of this Question for a plain design in the Allies to break off the Conferences; and they who wou'd have given you before all the Preliminaries, except the 37th Article and three Cautionary Towns, now take it very ill, you won't accept the Preliminaries, not only without that Article, but without any Cautionary Towns or other Expedient, tho' *Sardinia* and *Sicily* be taken out of them, without having for this any more Security given than before, that *Spain* and the *Indies* shall be restor'd; tho' the proposing a Partition cou'd not possibly have any other meaning in it: for it was propos'd as an Expedient, but for what? To leave the Allies where it found them? no sure; but to remove the pretended Difficulty of evacuating *Spain* and the *Indies*, in favour of King *Charles*: But if this be the plain meaning of this Proposal, how came the Treaty to break off upon this Point? What can be more unjust, than to desire the Allies to

to quit part of what the Preliminaries give them for the sake of the rest, and yet not tell them, which way the rest is to be had? What more ridiculous than to press the States to all the Inconveniences, which the consenting to a Partition might be attended with, without allowing them the least Advantage from it? How can one reconcile the asking a Partition at the beginning of the Conference, and then breaking them off, because the Allies desire to be secur'd of the Effect propos'd from it?

Now after all that has been said upon this Subject, can there be any doubt which Side is in fault, or at whose door it lies that these Conferences did not succeed? One would think, without entering into the Merits of the Cause, we shou'd in this case believe our Friends rather than our Enemies, and not be in the least at a loss, to know where to lay the fault, that these Negotiations were broke off, especially considering the part the Allies acted, was what they all readily concurr'd in. Such Friends in such a Case, and when so unanimous, ought surely to be credited, by those at least who are not themselves competent Judges of the Matter; and even they that are, ought to be very sure of the Goodness of their Reasons before they presume to dissent from them, much more before they censure them: and if we all think our selves so wise, that we will be using our own Judgments, yet sure more credit will be allow'd to such, so many and so faithful Friends, who are embark'd with us in the same Interest, than to Enemies, the worst

of Enemies, the basest, falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven: for that the *French* Court is and has been time out of mind. So that even in a disputable Case, which this is far from being, 'twou'd be absurd to credit them before our Friends, especially in an Affair, where 'tis of the utmost Importance to them to deceive; and therefore all the Words they can use, be they ever so solemn, ought not upon their bare credit to have any weight with us. The grand Project of a Universal Monarchy is now upon the point of being finish'd or destroy'd; 'tis now at its crisis; one or other must in a little time be the Fate of it: and can we think they will stick at saying any thing, true or false, to prevent the ruin of it? No: what they will or rather will not do to secure their Project, now they have brought it to such a Point, you can't better judge, than by seeing what they cou'd bring themselves to do for the sake of it in its Infancy; when it was but just thought of, and then hardly seem'd practicable. There is, in the Memoirs of the Treaty of *Munster* lately publish'd, so remarkable an Instance of this, as shou'd deter a Man as long as he remembers it from giving credit easily to any Asseverations whatsoever of a *French* Minister, when 'tis for the Interest of his great Master, to which all good Faith and Sincerity must bend. There must be no squeamish kind of Honour; no Integrity must be inflexible; 'tis the King, he must be obey'd, and nothing must be boggled at that is for his Service. The Case was this: The Union of
France

France and Spain was a Project Cardinal Mazarin was extremely fond of; and to facilitate this, he hop'd at the Treaty of *Munster* to get from *Spain* the *Low Countrys*, which he propos'd to do two ways: First, To have them in Exchange for *Catalonia*; which the *French* had taken from the *Spaniards* in the War they were then endeavouring to put an end to. Secondly, By way of Dowry upon a Marriage of the Infanta with the King. This Design the Cardinal was so full of, that one meets with it in almost all his Instructions and Letters to the *French* Plenipotentiaries from one end of the Memoirs to the other; and he had endeavour'd to draw the Prince of *Orange* into it, upon a Promise of the Marquisat of *Antwerp*. This Matter some how or other took air and alarm'd the States extremely, who were then in League with *France*. Their Plenipotentiaries at *Munster* complain'd of it to the Ministry of *France*, who protested nothing of that kind had ever been propos'd to them by the *Spaniards*. But this did not satisfy the States; the Year after, 1647. one of their Ambassadors, *Monf. Servien*, went to *Holland*, and to allay the Jealousys and Fears this Affair had given the States, he protests there is nothing in it, in a manner the most solemn that can be imagin'd: he writes a Letter in *April*, about six Weeks after the Prince of *Orange* was dead, to each of the Provinces, and therein tells them, that as to the pretended Treaties of Marriage or Exchange, 'tis so gross an Invention, (*une fourbe si grossiere*) that there is no Man, who understands any thing

thing of Affairs, but must know it would be as great Imprudence as Perfidiousness to hearken to any such Propositions; and tho' there be no room for them to doubt of the Assurances which the King's Ministers had already given them, yet, says he, I protest a-new to your Lordships upon my Life and my Honour, that they are Falsities, maliciously invented by the Enemy; and I submit my self to lose both, if on the part of *France* any ear has been given to any thing of this kind, or any Negotiation has been enter'd into. After so solemn a Declaration, the good Ambassador thinks it but just, that the Authors of this Imposture should be punish'd in an exemplary manner, for daring to attack with their Calumnies the Faith and Reputation of a great King. And have we not great Reason to take the bare Word of a Minister of *France*, when they are our Enemies, who could deceive in this solemn manner those whom at that time they were in League with? Others may have a good Opinion of *French* Faith if they please, and think the Protestations of *Torcy* or *Polignac* of more weight, than what a whole Congress of our Allies tell us; for my part, I shall always remember *Servien*, who acted this scandalous part not as *Servien*, but as the Ambassador of *France*, for the same King, and for the same Cause, we are now treating with and guarding against. There is nothing so false, I can't think this Prince and his Ministers capable of, that can help them to give the finishing Stroke to their Project, when they could violate their Faith in so infamous a manner, to give the first Beginnings to it.

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And I confess 'tis a great Surprise to me, to think we shou'd not in this be all of the same Mind.

But some Men, it seems, were in so much haste for Peace, that they cou'd not bear the Disappointment; they had work to be done, that wou'd not stay; and yet cou'd not without a Peace conveniently be carry'd on. The want they had of a Peace made them too easily believe there wou'd be one; and their impatience to be doing wou'd not let them wait till they cou'd be sure: they were so fond of their leap, that they were resolv'd to take it in the dark; they find themselves plung'd so deep, they don't know which way to turn themselves, or how to get out, and then are angry there is not a Peace, and wou'd fain lay the Fault on others, right or wrong, to excuse what they have brought upon themselves. In truth 'twas a very great Dilemma these Gentlemen were under: 'twas very much for their Purpose, to have the Ferment the Nation is in, and a Peace, no matter what sort of one, come both together. The Ferment they are in possession of, the Peace is a little doubtful; what now shall they do? if they stay for a Peace, which wou'd be very convenient for them, they may lose the Ferment; for nothing that is so violent can last: On the other hand, if they take the advantage of the Ferment, they may lose the Peace. Well, 'tis resolv'd to venture, if they lose one, 'tis but ruining the Nation: whereas losing the other wou'd be the ruin of themselves. When that is the Dilemma, 'tis no great wonder such

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Men shou'd choose the Side they have; Self weighs more with them than a whole Nation, whom they vainly think they cannot only make blind but keep so, and hope to skreen themselves from their Resentments by setting them upon those who never did them any harm, but have steddily pursu'd their true Interests.

But if a Nation can't see, they can feel; and the time may come, when they, who are now so angry with the late M_____ that there is no Peace, may find it more than they can do, to excuse themselves for bringing the Nation into a necessity of submitting to an ill one. When People have been long well in their Affairs, they may contract such an Insensibility of the good Condition they are in, as to be persuaded they are ill; but when their Affairs go very ill, 'tis not in the power of Words to make them believe they go well; and there's nothing can prevent this, nothing can save the Nation from the dangers some Men wou'd bring it into, and them from what they deserve for it, but the unshaken Constancy, and unwearied Endeavours of those very Men, whom they daily load with the blackest Calumnies, and treat in so barbarous a manner, as if they never thought they cou'd be us'd ill enough.

But to return to the Rupture of the Conferences; 'tis plain they broke off, because the *French* wou'd not secure to the Allies the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*; and 'tis as plain, the *French* ought to have done this; 'tis what they promis'd from the beginning, and undertook for at the opening of these
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Conferences, the Proposal of a Partition being incapable of any other fair Construction: and therefore the blame of the Rupture can lie only upon the *French*, or on those who have encourag'd them to act thus; by discovering the mighty *halls* they were in for Peace. For whether the *French*, when they first began these Conferences; intended they shou'd end as they did, may possibly be a Question. I must own; when I heard they had propos'd a Partition, I thought the necessity of their Affairs had allan forc'd them to be inclin'd ere, and that they would have struck up a Peace before *Dunoy* was taken; that the *Allies* might not extend their Conquests beyond the Boundaries of their Reclamations. And perhaps, even after this they might balance with themselves, and were for some time irresolute, with intention to consent, or not consent to the *Allies*, as they found themselves press'd by the War. And cou'd the Duke of *M* have either beat their Army, or besieg'd *Arras*, I believe they wou'd have thought, the King might with Honour have abandon'd his Grandson, after he had sacrific'd so much for the Support of him; and the Safety of *France* wou'd have excus'd to all the World his quitting *Spain*: and it was with this view principally; they kept their Ministers so long at *Gertruydenberg*, that they might be upon the Spot, to clap up a Peace immediately, if there shou'd be occasion. By this they were sure to have an Advantage in case of a Battle, which ever way it turn'd; for if they lost it, they wou'd have been able to prevent the fatal Consequences of a great

great Defeat; by closing with the Terms of the Allies, before a Victory could be pursued; and if they had won it, they would have made use of the first Consternation, which the Loss of a Battle would have put the Dutch into, to press them to a Peace on their Terms. That this was the most the French meant by these Conferences, is evident from what was doing at the same time in Spain. I have observ'd before, that either the Spaniards or we must be decid'd; and therefore the French kept it in their Power by the most artful Ways they could; to do either as they found most convenient; but that the King's Inclination and Interest were too well known, to leave room to doubt, that he would keep his promise to the Spaniards, if he could. Accordingly we see, he did not only enable his Grandson, as I have observ'd before, to put Spain into the best Posture of Defence 'twas capable of, and supply him with every thing that was necessary; but promis'd to make the Siege of *Girona* early in the Spring, and was making a new Offensive and Defensive Treaty with him, during these very Conferences. And the Assistance and Assurances the Duke of *Anjou* had given him, made him think of nothing less than quitting *Spain*. In the Spring he pretended to have an Army of 12 Battalions, and 145 Squadrons; besides the Troops that were coming to him from *Flanders*. Before the Conferences begun, the King receiv'd an Express from his Grandson to acquaint him with the Zeal the *Castilians* express for him, and his Resolution to stand by them; and the French Minister at *Madrid*

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in *April* gave out, that the Conferences were broke off. At the same time the Duke of *Anjou* was hastning to put himself at the Head of his Army, but was stop'd by the Affair of the Duke *de Medina-Celi*; which, as great a Mystery as it is, was probably at bottom a *French* Trick. 'Twas very natural for the *Spaniards* to take Umbrage at the Conferences, and to think it was time to take care of themselves; and that if the King, shou'd in earnest abandon them, 'twas to no purpose for them to adhere to his Grandson. To feel their Pulse upon this point, 'tis probable the *French* Ministers, either *Blecour*, or *Ibberville*, or some others of their Emissaries had pretended to treat with some of the *Grande*s upon this foot, and acquainted them that the King's Affairs wou'd not permit him to support his Grandson any longer, and that the King did not expect they shou'd ruin themselves to maintain him on the Throne, since in that case it wou'd be impracticable; but that if they wou'd dispose him to resign, the King wou'd endeavour to get some Partition for him. 'Tis extremely probable, this Trick was try'd at *Madrid*, to find how the *Grande*s were inclin'd to act on this occasion; the Duke *de Medina* in particular, who was the first Minister; and that when they had got out of him the Sense of him and his Friends on this nice Subject, the use they made of it, was to betray him to the Duke of *Anjou*: and possibly the thing went further, and that in concert with the *French*, to save the King's Honour, they had agreed to seize his Person and carry him off; which

I remember, was the first Report we had upon that Minister's disgrace. After this Affair was over, which had sufficiently intoxicated the Spaniards, the Duke of Anjou left Madrid, and joyn'd his Army near Lerida, And the Duke de Noailles was advanced to the Banks of the Ter, the River Gironne stands upon, to favour his Designs. In June, the Duke of Anjou was so sanguine, that he made no doubt of being able to drive King Charles out of Catalonia that Campaign, especially if the Duke de Noailles cou'd but make the Siege of Gironne: this appears at large in some Letters of his that were intercepted, to the King and the Duke of Burgundy, writ to congratulate the Marriage of the Duke of Berry, which he shews himself not at all pleas'd with. Upon his Disappointment in Catalonia, when he cou'd neither attack Marechal Starenberg, nor besiege Balaguer, he grew dissatisfy'd with his Spanish Generals: and in July both he and his Princess sollicit the King in very pressing Terms to send the Duke of Vendome to him; which was soon comply'd with, and that the Duke might have no Apprehensions of the King's designing to abandon him, he entred into a new Alliance with him. This Alliance was framing while the Ministers of France were at Gertruydenberg, which place they left but the 25th; and the 8th of August, or before, the Articles of this new Treaty were known publickly at Paris: which makes it plain to a Demonstration, that this Treaty was forming before the Conferences were broke off.

From

From this Account 'tis Exceeding evident, that the *French* were taking the most effectual Methods to support the Duke of *Anjou*, and make the *Spaniards* faithful to him, while they were persuading the Allies, the King wou'd in earnest abandon him, and give him no Assistance directly or indirectly; nay while they were making Terms for him, upon which they wou'd oblige him to resign. And if this be not insincere in the last Degree, I wou'd be glad to know, what is. If he was sincere, why did he treat for a general Peace, when he either wou'd not or cou'd not make the necessary Conditions of it practicable? Why, when he meant nothing but a separate Peace, did he not frankly from the beginning tell the Allies, that he was willing to make Terms with them for himself, but that he cou'd make none for *Spain*? Was this for any thing else but to amuse the Allies, who he knew wou'd flatly have refus'd entering into any Negotiations, if he had spoke out plainly what he meant? Did not he intend from the beginning, to defeat by an Exception, a general Peace, while he pretended all the while to be for it? as old Managers sometimes do with a Bill in Parliament, which they contrive shou'd be lost by an Amendment, while they wou'd be thought zealous for it; which they wou'd not have been able to effect, had they openly declar'd against the Bill, it, self. Thus they gain the Point they wou'd have, by seeming to be for, what in truth they wou'd not have: and the same Part the King of *France* has acted with respect to Peace; but not yet with the same

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Success.

Success. He has not got yet what he wants, I mean a Separate Peace, by affecting to treat for a General one; which he wou'd of all things keep off. A Man must shut his Eyes very hard, not to see the *French* meant nothing by these Conferences but to amuse the Allies, and keep it in their power to make what use of them they shou'd have occasion for; and that they never design'd to consent to what was necessary to make a General Peace practicable; they either meant no Peace at all, or only a separate one for themselves; which they hop'd, from the Temper of the *Dutch*, the Nature of their Government, and the Experience they have formerly had of them, they might be frightned into: to which End they affected from the very first Conference to let nothing fall from them that might look like a Desire to retard the Operations of the Campaign, but on their own part threatned what mighty things they wou'd do upon the *Rhine* and in *Spain*; and to intimidate them the more, *Marschal Villars* condescended to the mean Artifice of writing to the *French* Ministers, from time to time, Letters fill'd with the grossest Gasconade, what a brave Army he had; how desirous they were to come to an Engagement; and that if the Allies had a mind to a Battle, they shou'd meet with no Intrenchments, but shou'd find him ready to receive them in an open Plain. These poor tricks they fancy'd wou'd pass upon *Dutch* Deputies: but they were too well known to be believ'd; and the Event shew'd there was nothing else in all these Boasts aim'd at, but to deceive: for the
minute

minute *Douay* began to capitulate, the *Maréchal* retir'd to safe ground, and intrench'd with all his might, and dar'd not offer them Battle all the rest of the Campaign, tho' more Battalions had been weakned by the Sieges of *Douay* and *Bethune*, than the Battle of *Blenheim* was fought with; and almost as many more were afterwards at the same time employ'd in the Sieges of *St. Venant* and *Aire*. But these and all the other Artifices of *France* cou'd not delude or drive the States to quit the common Interest, or induce the Allies to hearken to a separate Peace with the *French*, who they knew, were taking the most effectual Means to make the Reduction of *Spain* impossible, while they were treating of Terms for the Surrender of it. But nothing can discover more plainly the Insincerity of *France*, than what happen'd after these Conferénces were ended: Two Days after their Plenipotentiaries were gone, the Duke of *Anjou* receiv'd a considerable Disgrace at *Almenara*, and in about three Weeks after that his Army was intirely defeated at *Saragossa*, beyond a possibility of maintaining his Ground, or recovering his Affairs without the Assistance of *France*. Here now was a fair Occasion for the *French* King to shew himself; his Language had been all along, that he cou'd not be active to dethrone his Grandson, but wou'd consent absolutely to abandon him, if that wou'd procure a Peace. The Allies can't take his bare Word; his Ministers make the most solemn Protestations in his Name, and give repeated Assurances of this in the most express Words, and complain

plain heavily, that they are not believ'd. Now in less than a Month after the Conferences were ended, there happens the best Opportunity in the World for the King to shew his great Sincerity; the Obstruction to a Peace, is the Evacuation of *Spain*. Let now the King but keep his Word, and be passive only, and the Thing will do it self; the Allies can't fail of *Spain*, if the King does not support his Grandson against them. What part now does the King take? Does he send to the Allies that he will abandon his Grandson in earnest, if that will content them? Nothing like it; he ballances indeed for some time what to do, and holds frequent Councils; but for what? Not because he has any doubt, whether he shou'd act agreeably to his Word, or shew he is sincere: for that I have already observ'd he cou'd not be; he must deceive either us or the *Spaniards*. All the Debate therefore was, which he shou'd do; at first their Affairs seem'd to be in so desperate a Condition, as to be beyond retrieve, and that all the Support he cou'd give his Grandson wou'd be insignificant; and therefore, there were some thoughts of making a Virtue of Necessity, and to procure a Peace to *France* by abandoning *Spain*, since, if he did not abandon it, it must be lost. And had the Action of *Saragossa* happen'd a Month sooner, it's very likely it had prov'd so; for the Hands of the *French* were too full of other Work to send any considerable Force to *Spain*, till the Campaign was in other parts, *Savoy* particularly, drawing to an end. After many Consultations, he resolv'd to
make

make the utmost Efforts to support the Duke of *Anjou*, notwithstanding all their Pretences to leave him to himself, or rather to persuade him to quit a Kingdom which, without their Help, all the World sees he cou'd not have kept. What success this Assistance, that has been given him, has had, I need not tell you; nor what further mischief the common Cause is like to suffer from it. 'Tis great pity the Conferences did not last one Month longer; which wou'd have put the *French* under a Necessity of keeping their Word, or in the most infamous Manner breaking it, to support a Cause they had so often, and with so much seeming Earnestness promis'd to renounce. As it is, there is but one excuse for them, which those I am arguing against, had rather shou'd not be made; and that is, to plead that the Case is alter'd, Affairs are not in the same Condition they were in, when they made these Promises. They have a Political Observatory at *Paris*, where the Marquis *de Torcy*, and the *French* Ministers frequently examine what Appearances there are in the Heavens of all the Countries in War with them, and according to these they take their Measures of War and Peace; and 'tis by this they justify their assisting the Duke of *Anjou*. What pass'd in *Spain* the 20th of *August*, they thought sufficiently ballanc'd by what happen'd, to the North-West of them the 19th. What preceded that Phenomenon, and has since follow'd it, has determin'd the *French* not only to support the Duke of *Anjou*, but to desist for the present

present from all further Offers of Peace, by which we are as much plung'd into the War as we were seven Years ago, and there seems no remedy for it but, what is worse than the Disease, an ill Peace. - For the Truth of which I shall refer you to your own Reflections upon all the News we have had for these four Months past from *Paris*, and to what is as good a Proof as all the rest, to a Letter of the Elector of *Bavaria's* Minister to his Master, a Piece of which you have in the *Medley* of the first of this Month; which some People wou'd be glad to prove, is not so genuine, as they know it is.

Some People indeed wou'd still pretend to put a good Face upon the Matter, and do not question from the *D— of M—* past Successes, that he will yet frighten our Enemies into an honourable Peace. But I must beg their don, if I can't be of their Opinion. I am afraid he is not likely to do so much at this time, when the Enemy are encourag'd to take heart afresh, the Allies are full of Jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortify'd; Things are not the same, any more than the Usage he meets with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the Favour of his Sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the People; when his want of Interest at home makes it impossible for the Allies to depend on the Hopes he gives them; when he is without Authority in his Army, where 'tis made criminal to espouse his Interest, and to fly in his Face is the surest means to Advancement; when 'tis meritorious in his Officers to cabal against him,
and

and the most factious will be thought the most deserving. With what heart can a Man in these Circumstances serve? Or what Success can be expected from him, when he is to depend upon profess'd Enemies for his support? 'Tis little, I think, we can hope for even from him hereafter, tho that little be more than any body else cou'd do.

But 'tis time to draw to a Conclusion of this Argument, in which I have said so much, that I flatter my self I may be allow'd, not as a Favour but common Justice, to conclude from it, That nothing can be more false and groundless than the malicious Aspersions of these Men, who without the least regard to Truth, Honour or good Conscience, tell the World that the D — of M — in conjunction with the late Ministry, was for perpetuating the War. If they shou'd describe the D — of M — to be a short, black, fattish, red-fac'd, ill-shap'd Man, that loves to drink hard, never speaks to be understood, is extremely revengeful and illbred; if they shou'd represent his Mind to be a Complication of all ill Qualities, and his Body to be the Image of Deformity, 'twou'd be as like him as the Picture those Gentlemen draw of him. Nothing can be more ridiculous and absurd, than to accuse of a Design to perpetuate the War, a Man who has in every respect out-gone our Wishes, and has done more towards a good Peace, by his own Conduct, Address and Ability, both in War and Peace, by his Conduct in the Field, by his Interest with the Allies, by his happy Temper to prevent or make up Differences, by his Dexterity and

Wisdom, by his great Humanity and Sweetness of Behaviour which is peculiar to him, by his Zeal for the Honour of the QUEEN, whom he has serv'd with more Affection than most Men ever did a Mistress; and by his true Concern for the Good of his Country, and the Liberty of *Europe*, in which he has few Equals. By these admirable Qualities, which so eminently shine in him, he has done more towards a good Peace than all those that find fault with him, ever did or will do, put them all together: he has struck such a Terror into the Enemy, and preserv'd so perfect a Harmony among our Allies, that nothing, humanly speaking, cou'd have destroy'd our Hopes of a good Peace, but the Endeavours that have been us'd to destroy him. What Villany then was it to try by Calumnies and Lyes to ruin him, who cou'd not sink without drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him? And 'tis that Consideration makes me express my self with so much warmth. For as for the Duke himself, he defies the feeble Efforts they make against him; their Malice may add to his Glory, by giving fresh Matter for him to shew the World how great a Man he is under all Tryals, but can lastingly take nothing from it: for Time will dissipate the thickest Mists with which his Glory may be overcast, and the malicious Attacks of Envy and Faction may very soon turn upon themselves; and at worst Posterity will be just, and his Name will be immortal and live for ever in Esteem, while the Writers of Scandal, and their Masters, are either
bury'd

bury'd in Oblivion, or remembered with Infamy and Detestation. 'Tis not therefore the Person of the Duke of M—— I'm concern'd for; but for the Connexion which the Fate of this poor Nation, of our Allies, of all *Europe*, has with his. 'Tis the Prospect of an ill Peace after so glorious and successful a War, and the dismal Train of Consequences which such a Peace will bring with it: 'tis this disturbs me; and 'tis indeed this, and only this, disturbs him: for were the Glory of the *QUEEN* secur'd, and the Safety of his Country fix'd by a safe and honourable Peace, what cou'd be so desirable to him as to retire and leave the Theatre of Business to them, who want so much to have it all to themselves, and that he were gone off of it? In which, he wou'd before now have prevented their impatience, if the publick Service did not want him: but such is the hard Fate of this Great Man, that they can neither bear his Company, nor be without him; they know not how to let him either leave his Command, or continue in it: If he had left it, then with loud mouths they wou'd have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon themselves, and all the Effects of their own ill Management wou'd have been laid upon him, as if his quitting had been the sole Cause of them; and we shou'd have heard nothing but Invective and Complaint of his Ingratitude to his Queen and Country, after such ample Acknowledgments as they have made of his Services. But how base and unjust is this? for with what comfort

can he continue in a Command under a Notion of doing his Country Service, when all possibility of serving well is taken from him? When nothing is left him that can make a General be obey'd or lov'd? What Encouragement can he have to venture upon any great Enterprize, when he is sure ill Success will be made a Crime, and good Success from him they had rather be without? What Service then is it they pretend to expect from him? Or what do they mean, by seeming desirous he should continue in his Command? I tremble with Indignation as I write, to think how strangely some Men act, who would confound all things to serve themselves, and can bear no Vertue, that stands in the way of their Designs; be it never so useful to the World, or be the Interest of their Country never so closely interwoven with it. But they tell us, we need be in no Pain for our Country. There is a certain Sett of Men, the Oracle of the Party says, *they are sure, will use all proper Means to promote a safe and honourable Peace.* Will they? I ask no more, let but the Event make good their Words, and I'll forgive them all the rest. But what Means are these to be, or what Peace are we to expect from them? What these Means will be from these Words I can't guess, but I can tell you what they will not be; they must not be such as have been already us'd, for this is said in opposition to those who were for perpetuating the War. Now the Means they us'd, who are accus'd of this, were these; they kept things quiet at Home,
took

took the most effectual Methods to support Credit, carry'd on the War with Vigour, and maintain'd a good Correspondence with our Allies, that the common Enemy might find no room to sow Jealousies or make Divisions. Quiet, Unity, Credit, Vigour, Harmony, these were the Means the last M— us'd to perpetuate the War: I leave you then to judge, what Means those must be, that we are now told will, in Opposition to these, be us'd to put an End to it. But I'll venture to foretel thus much of them, that more proper Means they can't use, nor so proper, unless they will condescend to use the same; and the same if they had a Mind to use, they can't, 'tis too late, they are not to be had. What then are we to expect, should be the End of such improper Means? Or how shall we come to a safe and honourable Peace? If the Means they use, be contrary to those that have been already us'd, we can have no Peace, none that is safe and honourable: For let them remember, no Peace is so, without *Spain* and the *Indies*. Either the Queen and Parliament and Nation, and the whole Body of the Allies, have been these nine Years mightily in the Wrong, who think these necessary to a good Peace; or they are so, who think any Peace can be good without them. Let them remember, 'tis all one which ever way we suffer *France* to keep Possession, whether by a formal Treaty, or by a separate Peace; which can hardly fail of these two Consequences, to bring the whole Weight of a *Spanish* War upon *England*, and be at last forc'd

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